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INTRODUCTION
n United States v. Winstar Corp.,' the Supreme Court found the
federal government liable under the Tucker Act for breach of
contract. The Court found that the government had entered into
contracts with the owners of savings and loans ("S&L"s) regarding the
thrifts' capital accounting when the thrift regulators approved mergers of
the thrifts. Several years later, Congress enacted stricter capital rules as part
of its broad reform of the S&L industry. The Court found that this new
legislationbreachedthe contracts representedby the regulatory approvals.2
Understood simply as a contracts case, Winstar appears reasonable, even
as it creates a new presumption that the government will pay damages
when it changes regulatory policies reflected in agreements.
But Winstar is also about sovereign power, for both the approvals of
the mergers and the subsequent capital rules represent examples of the
government directly exercisingregulatory authority. From this perspective,
Winstar poses the question of how far the current majority, as represented
by Congress, may go in altering or rescinding agreements made by
previous majorities. It also raises the question of how easily a regulatory
agency may bind the government as a whole, including Congress, to
particular agreements and regulatory policies. The sovereign power
perspective suggests a due process analysis, including administrative law
principles due to involvement of a government agency. The sovereign
power perspective suggests a far more permissive standard than that
applied by the Court in Winstar.
The simple fact that the regulatory approval was reduced to a written
document, consented to by both the thrifts and the regulators, however,
creates the puzzling ambiguity that the contractual perspective and the
sovereign power perspective each make sense in isolation, even though
they suggest quite different legal standards. Ultimately, making sense of
the law of regulatory agreements requires analyzing both perspectives. 3
This Article criticizes the Winstar Court for relying too simply on the
contractual analysis and using that perspective to subtly manipulate its
precedent and lay the groundwork for a conservative regulatory takings
'United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996).
2 See id. at 909-10.
3 See generally Jones v. United States, 1 Ct C1. 383, 384 (1865) ("The two
characters which the government possesses as a contractor and as sovereign cannot
be thus fused; nor can the United States while sued in one character be made liable
in damages for their acts done in the other.").
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agenda. By ignoring the implicit threshold issue of which perspective
makes more sense, the Court leaves open the possibility that its new
presumption of damages will apply to anything that could be styled as an
agreement, be it administrative enforcement orders, regulatory approvals,
or even run-of-the-mill licenses and permits. Much like the conservative
regulatory takings agenda, this regime would force the current majority to
buy its way out of outdated regulatory policies.
The law of regulatory agreements, as discussed herein, consists of the
four special contract defenses, available only to the government, raised in
the Winstar case.4 For each of these defenses, Part I of this Article reviews
the case law establishing the defense, critiques the defense as it existed
prior to Winstar, and then evaluates the Court's analysis of the defense.5
The first of these special defenses-the unmistakability doctrine-is
essentially a rule of strict construction that presumes that the government,
in making an agreement regarding its regulation of a private party, has not
promised to restrain future use of its sovereign power, unless the intent to
do so appears unmistakably clearly in the agreement. The unmistakability
doctrine seeks to protect the current majority's ability to revise and change
outdated policies, but still allows a way for the government to bind future
governments. Given the power ofthe unmistakability doctrine to excuse the
government from contract liability, there is an obvious but largely
unresolved question of how to properly limit the circumstances where the
government may raise the doctrine.
The unmistakability doctrine dominates the Court's four opinions in
Winstar. Part I ofthis Article provides an extensive review ofthe precedent
establishing the unmistakability doctrine, in order to better illuminate the
Court's manipulation of the precedent. The Court establishes a new rule
that is essentially the opposite presumption: that the government has
promised to pay damages if any future use of its sovereign power results
in a different regulatory policy than the one set forth inthe prior agreement.
This presumption does not prevent outright the subsequent government
from enacting new legislation, but it does force the government to pay
damages to all parties who can build a case of reliance on the old rule.
While it is possible that parties to regulatory agreements could bargain
around either the traditional unmistakability doctrine or the new presump-
tion from Winstar (if both parties had full information about the rule, of
course), the Winstar rule is a sea change that leaves most existing
regulatory agreements potentially vulnerable to damages claims if the
4 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 860.
5 See infra Part I.
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policies reflected therein are changed in the future. The Winstar rule,
therefore, puts a steep price on new policies, especially those replacing
older and broader policies affecting more people and companies. Rather
than balancing the needs of the current majority to govern with the
legitimatereliance interests of individuals, Winstar sacrifices the majority's
freedom to change policies. In so doing, it hands a windfall to individuals,
who should have included the possibility of new policies in calculating
their reliance interests in the old rule.
Historically, it is true that the Court's efforts to achieve this balance
have been hampered by its analytical habit of relying solely on the
contractual perspective. This has lead the Court, when ruling for the
government, to create exceptions to contract law for the government (i.e.,
the four special defenses), instead of constructing a more logical frame-
workthat also incorporates the sovereign power perspective. This probably
explains the inconsistency in the Court's application of the unmistakability
doctrine. The failure to incorporate both perspectives has also left the Court
without any articulatedunderstanding ofwhen the unmistakability doctrine
should apply, just as it has never articulated any principle for deciding
which perspective makes more sense in a given case. Winstar lurches
through this hole to provide a new rule for when the unmistakability
doctrine should apply: only when the plaintiff's claim necessitates a
remedy equivalent to an injunction blocking the new law. Such cases will
necessarily be extremely rare, given how much control plaintiffs have over
their own damages theories. This new rule, therefore, serves to eviscerate
the unmistakability doctrine. Instead of taking the doctrine seriously, the
Winstar plurality essentially ignores the sovereign power implications of
its rule by disingenuously asserting that damages remedies do not block the
use of sovereign power. Winstar thus gives individuals far more protection
than they have ever had over any reliance interests they might have in
regulatory policies. This comes at the direct expense of the majority who
might wish to change those policies because, for example, the policies did
not work.
Like the unmistakability doctrine, the other three special contract
defenses arose from the same need to balance the current majority's power
to govern effectively and individuals' reliance interests.6 One of the
unfortunate aspects of the law of regulatory agreements is that the Court
has never seemed to recognize how these defenses overlap or contradict
one another. Winstar too makes no attempt at unifying the defenses.
Indeed, upon closer examination, it appears that the plurality's reasoning
6 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 874.
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on these other defenses is largely driven by the need to avoid creating
logical weaknesses in the Court's rationale justifying the new rule for the
unmistakability doctrine.
The strongest example of this appears in the plurality's reasoning on
the sovereign acts doctrine, another of the four special contract defenses,
which provides "that the United States when sued as a contractor cannot be
held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the particular contract
resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign."7 Courts have
traditionally focused on the "public and general" aspect of the subsequent
statute or administrative order, and Winstar is no exception.8 Thus, when
subsequent legislation has a broad effect on many persons beyond merely
the class of persons who contracted with the government, the government
is not liable to 'that class for breach of contract. A straightforward
application of the sovereign acts doctrine should have resulted in no
defense for the government in Winstar, because the 1989 reform legislation
specifically targeted for repeal the capital treatments accorded thrifts, such
as the plaintiffs. Despite the fact that the Court could have simply applied
the sovereign acts doctrine as is and reached the same result, the plurality
goes well out of its way to reformulate the reasoning behind the sovereign
acts doctrine, even though it re-establishes essentially the same public and
general standard as existed before. The reformulated reasoning, however,
avoids the sovereign acts doctrine's distinction between the government's
role as a contractor from that of a sovereign.
Indeed, it appears that the reason for this tortured analysis is to avoid
endorsing the distinction between the sovereign and contracting (or private)
roles of the government. Endorsing this distinction would suggest a logical
and practical way to govern when the first defense-the unmistakability
doctrine-should apply. The unmistakability doctrine, after all, has always
aimed to protect the government's sovereign powers, which are implicated
when the government acts in its sovereign role and not when the govern-
ment acts as a typical, private contracting party, for example when it hires
employees. It makes sense, therefore, to limit the unmistakability doctrine
to cases where the government acted in a sovereign capacity and not in a
private contractual capacity. This logical limitation on the use of the
unmistakability doctrine would, however, avoid the need for the Court to
limit the unmistakability doctrine to an impossibly narrow set of circum-
stances. Moreover, the plurality's reformulation of the sovereign acts
7Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925).8 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 891-910.
9 See id. at 880.
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doctrine also helps it defeat another potential problem with its reasoning on
the unmistakability doctrine. As explained below,"° the plurality uses a
purely contractual perspective to turn on its head the widely accepted
reasoning that a private party's reliance interests in government policy are
necessarily limited in highly regulated industries.
The plurality dismisses the othertwo special contract defenses with the
same reasoning it used to sidestep the unmistakability doctrine; these
defenses no longer apply when plaintiffs seek a damages remedy." One of
these defenses, the reserved powers doctrine, should have been abandoned
long ago. With luck, Winstar will consign it to the dust bin. The other
defense, however-the express delegation doctrine-should command far
greater respect than it has traditionally been accorded. It can help clarify
the limits of an administrative agency's power to bind the government as
a whole to policies selected by the agency, or even to bind the government
to paying damages for changes in these policies.
Under an updated reading of the express delegation doctrine, the
regulatory approvals in Winstar shouldhavebeen interpreted as bindingthe
banking agencies to honor the promised capital accounting treatments as
long as the agencies continued to have statutory authority to honor them.
The express delegation doctrine should require something more, however,
for an agency to impose liability on the federal treasury for subsequent
legislation from Congress that reverses the agency's regulatory policy. This
interpretation ofthe express delegation doctrine suggests that the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act, instead of contractual theory, should provide the
basis for enforcing regulatory agreements. This would allow for enforce-
ment of the agreements against the government without having to resort to
a contractual analysis. This reading of the express delegation doctrine
would also better police the separation of functions between the legislative
and executive branches. Furthermore, it would go further towards meeting
goals of both allowing the current majority the freedom to revise policies
selected by regulators and protecting the reliance interests of individuals
who extract promises from regulators. As withthe other defenses, however,
Winstar adopts a purely contractual perspective that fails to balance the
need for the current majority to govern effectively and the need to protect
individuals' reliance interests.
Winstar throws nearby areas of law into confusion. Claims of reliance
on regulatory agreements have historically been litigated under three
different clauses of the Constitution: the Contracts Clause, the Due Process
10 See infra Part I.E.
" See, e.g., Winstar, 518 U.S. at 891.
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Clause, and the Takings Clause. A deeper and broader analysis of relevant
case law illustrates clearly that the presence of sovereign power in
regulatory agreements has always made a controlling difference in the
Court's holdings. At the same time, the damages/injunction distinction
urged by the plurality has never made such a difference. But even more
disturbing than Winstar's disregard for precedent is the fact that the
damages-friendly rule in Winstar creates tremendous pressure for plaintiffs
to repackage heretofore losing takings claims as Winstar claims. Doctrin-
ally, this encourages debate about which category a given claim belongs in,
rather than on what standard should control the outcome. This debate about
the category, or definition, of a claim inevitably confuses the underlying
substantive issues and leads to more arbitrary and inconsistent applications
of whatever rules are developed. Indeed, legal standards ought to be
evaluated explicitly in terms of whether they create pressure to stretch the
definitions of neighboring or analogous legal standards. Winstar seriously
fails on this measure because it pretends to be a case about contracts, when
a more intellectually honest-and doctrinally useful-analysis would
acknowledge the decision's impact on the neighboring jurisprudences of
due process, takings, and the Contracts Clause.
Part II of this Article synthesizes the concerns raised in Part I and
proposes an alternative legal framework for the law of regulatory agree-
ments." The framework seeks to reconcile the sovereign power and
contractual perspectives and improve upon the balance between the needs
ofthe majority and individual reliance interests. The framework aims to set
clear standards for when Congress and agencies retain the power to change
regulatory policies and when, instead, individuals can rely on continuation
of policies. The key to the proposal is distinguishing between when the
initial governmental agreement concerns the use of its sovereign power and
when it instead represents the government acting as a private, commercial
entity. Certain defenses, such as the unmistakability doctrine and the
express delegation doctrine, make sense only when the agreement at issue
involves the government acting in its sovereign role. The sovereign acts
doctrine, on the other hand, should apply to the government when acting
in its private, or corporate, capacity in making the original agreement. The
lynchpinto the proposal is the test for distinguishing between the sovereign
and private roles of the government. Though periodically criticized as
unworkable, this distinction can be reduced to a simple test that is
consistent with nearly all relevant Supreme Court decisions.
12 See infra Part II.
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The proposed framework is superior to the regime of Winstar for
several reasons. Most importantly, it does not saddle the current legislative
majority, acting through Congress, with the crushing expense of buying off
the consent of every individual who came to rely on the policies of the past.
At the same time, the framework provides at least as much (and more
certain) protection for individuals' reasonable reliance interests than the
law pre-Winstar. The proposed framework also tackles other issues left
unaddressedby courts and commentators alike. It clarifies the relationships
between the various special contract defenses, and in so doing clarifies the
reasoning behind each defense. For example, it suggests elimination of the
reservedpowers doctrine, which provides that certain governmentalpowers
may never be bargained away, because it logically contradicts the
unmistakability doctrine, whichprovides that any governmental power may
be bargained away if done so with unmistakably clear language. Finally,
the proposed framework minimies the definitional pressure between
claims based on breach of regulatory agreements and those based on
takings, economic due process, or the Contracts Clause. This broader
synthetic approach provides another perspective on just how out of step the
decision in Winstar really is. Apparently designed by clever plaintiffs'
lawyers, the Winstar rule single-mindedly functions to create a backdoor
for regulatory takings claims, without regard to the damage done to
surrounding jurisprudences, let alone to the power of legitimate majorities
to govern effectively.
Few critics have exploredthe implications of Winstar orrecognizedthe
two perspectives on regulatory agreements. The most probing analysis of
Winstar appears in two articles by Professor Schwartz, published just
before and after the Court decided Winstar.13 Schwartz frames his analysis
around two divergent themes he identifies in the law of government
agreements and contracts: "congruence" refers to the rules that treat the
government the same as any other private contracting party, while
"exceptionalism" refers to contract rules that apply only to the
government. 4 This Article adopts these terms, albeit with the reservation
13 See Joshua I. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts: Congruence and
Exceptionalism in Government Contracts Law, 64 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 633 (1996)
[hereinafter Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts]; Joshua I. Schwartz,
Assembling Winstar: Triumph ofthe Ideal ofCongruence in Government Contracts
Law?, 26 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 481 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of
Congruence].
14 See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 637-38;
Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 489-90.
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that this dichotomy still fits too well within the contractual perspective and
so tends to ignore the deeper ambiguity within the law of regulatory
agreements.
This Article will subdivide the terms "contracts" and "agreements" into
three separate categories that reflect the presence or absence of the
government's regulatory power. "Contracts" will referto contracts between
private parties. "Government contracts" will refer to contracts between a
private party and the government acting in a non-regulatory capacity, for
example, typical procurement and government employment contracts.
Finally, "regulatory agreements" refer to agreements between a regulated
entity and the part of the government with direct regulatory authority over
the entity, where the agreement concerns the government's regulation of
the entity.
The law ofregulatory agreements will become increasingly important
as the government looks more frequently to more cooperative methods of
regulation. Winstaritselfwill likely add some $10 to $30 billion to the cost
of the S&L cleanup.' 5 This alone makes the decision worthy of close
scrutiny. More importantly, by reducing to the vanishing point any
analytical difference between regulatory agreements and contracts,
Winstar's reasoning could just as easily be applied to any sort of govern-
mental grant, license, or permit. Consider also the government's efforts to
reach an agreement with the tobacco industry on liability for smoking-
related injuries and the government's role in regulating the industry, or the
15 For estimates of the cost of the Winstar decision, see Richard B. Schmitt,
Rogues' Revenge: Why an S&L Crook Believes Uncle Sam Owes Him Millions,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 1999, at Al (estimating $30 billion); see, e.g., Stephen
Labator, The Debacle that Buried Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, at 1
(citing estimates from $4 to $50 billion); Michael Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge May
Cost U.S. Billions, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 1998, at Al [hereinafter Grunwald,
Lawsuit Surge] (estimating $32 billion for Winstar claims of S&L owners and
citing an estimate of $31 to $53 billion for similar lawsuit arising out of the
government's nuclear waste policies). Thirty billion dollars works out to over
$1000 per American citizen. Much depends on the theory of damages that the
courts eventually settle upon. Compare Michael Grunwald, Thrift Wins $908
Million from U.S. in Disputefrom S&L Crisis, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1999, atA6
(reporting that the judge rejected one thrift's lost profits claim for $2 billion and
adopted instead a restitution theory) with Cal Fed Vows Goodwill Appeal-Judge
Gave it Just $23 Million, AM. BANKER, Apr. 20, 1999, at2 (reporting that the court
rejected the restitution theory and awarded only the costs of securing replacement
capital). Thrift owners have filed 125 Winstar cases. See Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge,
supra.
[jVOL. 88
PURCHASING THE RIGHT TO GOVERN
Justice Department's anti-trust litigation against Microsoft. If these
disputes result in settlements, will contractual analysis of their enforcement
best serve the ends of justice and effective government? Should the
government pay damages if activities allowed in these settlement agree-
ments are later prohibited? If the government litigated these matters to their
conclusion, and a generation later changed the laws to prohibit activities
carved out of the final orders, should compensation be owing? The law of
regulatory agreements deserves far greater attention than it has received so
far, and Winstar is not the answer.
I. UNITED STATES V WINSTAR CORP.
A. Background
1. The Savings and Loan Crisis
The story of the thrift crisis of the 1980s begins in the late 1970s when
the economic landscape unexpectedly began to experience the new
phenomenon of high interest rates and high inflation. For many years, the
bread-and-butter of many, if not most, thrifts had been long-term, fixed-
rate home mortgages. 16 Unfortunately, the higher interest rates forced
thrifts to raise the interest paid on their deposits. This quickly undermined
the thrifts' profit margins since they could not raise the interest on their
fixed-rate loans, nor could they hope to sell many of these loans and make
new loans at market rates, since the secondary market for loans was poorly
developed and these assets were less desirable given the high interest rates
available elsewhere. Responding to early warning signs, Congress and the
regulators permitted thrifts in the early 1980s to move into previously
impermissible forms of lending, notably commercial real estate, which
offered higher profits and greater risks.' 7
Regulators also loosened the capital 8 standards applicable to thrifts in
order to give the growing number of weaker institutions extra breathing
16 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 845.
7 See National Commission on Financial Institution, Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement, Origins and Causes of the S&L Debacle: A Blueprint for Reform
(1993) (commissioned by FIRREA) [hereinafter National Commission].
8 
"Capital" can be defined two ways. First, as the total amount of equity paid
into the institution by shareholders plus retained earnings less certain deductions
requiredunderbank accounting rules. This amount should always equal the amount
under the second definition of capital, which is essentially the net worth of the in-
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room, thereby reducing the number of thrifts that would need to be
liquidated and eventually bailed out by the FSLIC. Nevertheless, the
number of failing thrifts quickly threatened to exhaust the funds available
in FSLIC to pay depositors as required by law.19 The thrift regulators
appealed to Congress for more insurance funds, but these appeals were
largely ignored.2° The thrift regulators soon hit on a strategy of supervisory
mergers whereby healthy institutions wouldtake over weak or failing ones;
with a bit of luck, the combined institutions would be strong enough to
grow out of the problems of their weaker predecessors.
In addition to making educated guesses about which institutions could
be appropriately merged, regulators used two unusual provisions in
approving these merger transactions to increase the chances of success. The
first was supervisory goodwill. Supervisory goodwill represented a sort of
phantom asset whose initial value was calculated from the difference
between what the acquiring institution paid for the weaker target and the
stitution. From the thrift's perspective, loans are assets and deposits are liabilities.
So the net worth is the amount left over on the asset side of the ledger after all the
depositors and other creditors have been paid. This is the more useful definition of
capital in the context of bank failures. Bank and thrift regulations have traditionally
required financial institutions to maintain capital above a certainpercentage oftotal
assets. This capital acts as a buffer protecting the government's deposit insurance
fund against loss. The minimum needs to be well above zero because in a typical
bank failure, there is an inevitable lag between identification of critical weakness
and actual closing of the bank; during this time, the value of the assets often decline
further. Thus, the higher the minimum level ofrequired capital, the earlier a failing
institution can be identified and the lower the probable liability ofthe government's
insurance fund. Of course, higher capital requirements tie up bank assets and thus
reduce the bank's profit potential.
19 This is how the taxpayers got involved. The funds in FSLIC came from fees
paid by banks and thrifts but these funds ran out. By 1989, the treasury was on the
hook for over $50 billion, and by 1995 the cost reached an estimated $140 billion.
See generally Winstar, 518 U.S. at 844-48.
20 The question of whether the banking agencies prudently responded to the
S&L crisis ultimately raises the questions of whether the regulators did enough to
explain the problem to Congress. One could argue that the pleas from FSLIC and
the FHLBB were muted by their prior advocacy of loosening capital standards and
broadening thrift powers. On the other hand, Congress probably discounted the
alarms the regulators raised and listened too much to the thrift lobby. For a
balanced analysis, see generally National Commission, supra note 17, at 1 (citing
as major precipitating factors the rise interest rates, the new asset powers granted
to thrifts by Congress, and relaxation of regulatory standards).
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target's market value.2 ' Supervisory goodwill had no value at all other than
the fact that the regulators permitted the merged institution to count it
towards minimum capital requirements. This supervisory goodwill would
be amortized over a long period of time, often thirty years, but this
amortization differed in important ways from the generally accepted
accounting principles. One result of these differences was that the merged
institution enjoyed artificially inflated profits in the first few years after the
merger.' Supervisory goodwill did not fix any of the weaknesses in the
loan portfolios. It merely let the thrifts live with them. Keeping the thrifts
open longer left them free to dig deeper holes for themselves and,
ultimately, for the FSLIC. Supervisory goodwill was used purely to entice
the stronger thrifts to buy weaker ones.
The secondunusual provision inthese merger approvals were net worth
maintenance agreements ("NWMAs") sometimes called capital mainte-
nance agreements. TheNWMAs requirednew owners, whetherindividuals
or holding companies, to invest additional money in the combined entity
after the merger if regulators subsequently determined that the combined
thrift fell below minimum capital requirements. Regulators used the
NWMAs to compensate for risk created by the supervisory goodwill.
Supervisory goodwill gave the new owners the time to rehabilitate their
institutions' weaker portfolios, but the personal liability would both
encourage the owners to grow in cautious ways and provide an additional
source of funds to backup FSLIC. The FHLBB sought to include NWMAs
in virtually every supervisory merger approval that involved supervisory
goodwill. One of the unfortunate tendencies in analysis of the thrift crisis
has been viewing the NWMAs as separate from the supervisory goodwill
provisions. Viewed in isolation, both appear far less rational than when
they are viewed in combination, which is how they nearly always were
used.23'
Nevertheless, these policies did not work very well. The real estate
crash in the 1980s hit harder and lasted longer than any in living memory.
Even though many thrifts had moved away from fixed-rate mortgages and
into variable-rate mortgages, the value of these portfolios plummeted
precipitously but, thanks in part to supervisory goodwill, often took years
to hit bottom. When the depth of the real estate problems finally became
21See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 849 n.4.
2 See id. at 848-56.
23 See, e.g., Howell E. Jackson, The Expanding Obligations of Financial
Holding Companies, 107 HARV. L. REv. 509, 520 (1994) (noting that NWMAs
were almost always required in approvals granting supervisory goodwill).
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apparent, supervisory goodwill came to look more like a desperate gamble
of double-or-nothing. To make matter worse, the NWMAs provided no
help, because the courts began to reject the agencies' theories for enforcing
them.24
Congress responded in 1989 by enacting the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act ("TIRREA"). 5 FIRREA
abolished the FHLBB and FSLIC and replaced them with the Office of
Thrift Supervision ("OTS") and the Savings Association Insurance Fund
("SAIF") administered by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC").26 Criticizing the "capital gimmicks"27 used by the F-LBB,
Congress included a provision phasing out all supervisory goodwill by
1995.28 Most in Congress appreciated that FIRREA would revoke the
promises made bythe F-LBB regarding supervisory goodwill. Typical was
the reaction of Rep. Ackerman: "In its present form, [FIRREA] would
abrogate written agreements made by the U.S. government to thrifts that
acquired failing institutions by changing the rules in the middle of the
game."29 Congress probably knew that FIRREA would unleash a second
flood of thrift failures by withdrawing supervisory goodwill, 0 but it wisely
realized that, as bad as this would be, without strong action the S&L crisis
could still have become far worse. FIRREA broke the industry's and
24 See, e.g., United Liberty Life Ins. v. Ryan, 985 F.2d 1320, 1332-33 (6th Cir.
1993) (Contie, J., concurring) (reaching merits and finding NWMA not to be a
contract); FSLIC v. Capozzi, 855 F.2d 1319 (8th Cir. 1988), vacated on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 1062 (1989), on remand, 877 F.2d 727; RTC v. Tetco, Inc., 758
F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1990), vacated, 1992 WL 437650 (5th Cir. Apr. 22,
1992); FSLIC v. Savers, U.S. Dist. 1989 WL 248120 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 14, 1989);
In re Conner Corp., No. 87-01697-MO4, 1990 WL 124052 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. June
20, 1990), affd, 127 B.R. 775 (E.D.N.C. 1991); but cf In re Deltacorp, Inc., 111
B.R. 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Securities Groups, 116 B.R. 839 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990).
1 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183.21 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 856.
27 H. REP. at 310.
28 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 857 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(3)(A) (1933)).
29 Id. at 900-01 (quoting 135 Cong. Rec. 12145 (June 15, 1989)). See also id.
at 901-02.30 See, e.g., id. at 858 (quoting William K. Black, Ending Our Forebearers'
Forbearances: FRREA and Supervisory Goodwill, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 102,
107 (1990) for estimate that over 500 thrifts failed to meet FIRREA's new capital
requirements).
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FHLBB's double-or-nothing mindset that it could grow out of its problems.
The withdrawal of supervisory goodwill, along with enhanced regulatory
enforcement powers, provided considerable assurance that the financial
institutions open in this country were all in actual fact reasonably healthy.
The post-FJRREA wave of failures required another bailout by the
taxpayer, but on balance the legislation was a necessary and responsible
response. Several thrift owners whose financial institutions were closed
after having their supervisory goodwill taken away then sued the govern-
ment for breach of contract, claiming the regulatory approvals created a
contractual obligation for the government to recognize supervisory
goodwill. Since these alleged contracts involved regulatory policies, as
opposed to commercial transactions, one could also frame the question
raised by Winstar as whether the costs of FIRREA's second bailout should
include an estimated $10 to $30 billion of lost profits to those owners
whose thrifts would still be open but for the annulment of supervisory
goodwill.3
1
2. Arguments Raised in Winstar
Three thrifts brought separate actions against the United States in the
Court of Federal Claims3 2 seeking damages forbreach of contract under the
Tucker Act.3 Each thrift prevailed at the trial court on summary judgment
on the issue of contract liability and the cases were consolidated on
appeal.34 The court of appeals initially reversed, but later vacated this
decision and affirmed en banc. 35 The initial panel based its decision on the
unmistakability doctrine, which provides that the government is not liable
on a contract if the contract terms involve a promise by the government to
exercise or refiain from exercising a sovereign power. The unmistakability
doctrine requires that such a promise be "unmistakably clear" in the
contract to hold the government liable.3 6
31 See supra note 15.
32S See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 858.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1491.
3 See Statesman Say. Holding Corp. v. United States, 26 CI. Ct. 904 (1992)
(finding the government liable to both The Statesman Group, Inc. and Glendale
Federal Bank, FSB); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 25 CI. Ct. 541(1992) (Winstar
1/); Winstar Corp. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 112 (1990) (Winstar 1).
31 See Winstar Corp. v. United States, 994 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1993), vacated
en banc, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995).36 See, e.g., Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment,
477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) ("TOSSE").
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The full court of appeals rejected the initial panel's conclusion and
found the government's promise was unmistakably clear. In addition, the
court went on to find that the unmistakability doctrine should not apply
when the plaintiff seeks only monetary damages, because damages would
not prevent the exercise of sovereign power contrary to the contract.
Instead, it only creates monetary liability for the treasury.37 The full court
also rejected the government's defense based on the sovereign acts
doctrine, which shields the government from contract liability when the
governmental act causing breach was public and general and not targeted
at the individual contract.38
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed, with Justice Souter
writing the plurality opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Breyer, and in
large part, O'Connor. Justice Breyer wrote a separate opinion in addition
to signing onto Souter's. Justice Scalia concurred, joined by Justices
Kennedy and Thomas. Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justice
Ginsberg in large part. The 4-3-2 split in the opinions has caused some
uncertainty as to what Winstar stands for, and this is discussed further
below. Justice Souter organized his opinion around the four defenses raised
by the government in its brief urging reversal of the court of appeals'
decision: unmistakability, sovereign acts, and two other defenses referred
to as the reserved powers doctrine and the express delegation doctrine.39
The government's brief combines these last two defenses and so presents
itself as making three main arguments. As argued below, this weakened the
government's argument by obscuring the force of the express delegation
doctrine which arguably should have been the strongest of the four
defenses.
Souter sets the tone for his analysis early by avoiding discussion of the
"anterior question ofwhether theywere contracts at all." Souternotes that
the parties briefed and argued the question, but sets it aside as not being
part of the writ of certiorari.4' As argued below, the question of whether the
regulatory agreements constitute contracts is better seen as inseparable
from the threshold issue of whether to apply a contractual analysis or a due
process analysis designed for scrutinizing the fairness of government's
exercise of its sovereign power.
37 See Winstar Corp., 64 F.3d at 1540-43 (holding that the government's
promises were unmistakably clear); id. at 1545-48 (ruling the unmistakability
doctrine should not apply).38 See id. at 1548-5 1.
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The four special contract defenses are presented below in an order
designed to minimize confusion. The reserved powers doctrine can stand
alone logically and so comes first, though the Court did not address it first.
Then comes the unmistakability doctrine, which dominates the debate
among the Court's opinions. The express delegation doctrine is presented
next because it arose out of the unmistakability doctrine and its original
version is better understood as an outgrowth of the unmistakability
doctrine. The sovereign acts doctrine is presented last because the tortured
and unnecessary reasoning that the plurality applies to it is best understood
when one has thoroughly in mind the need to find a limiting principle for
application ofthe unmistakability doctrine. The plurality's reasoning on the
sovereign acts doctrine is best understood as working hard to avoid a more
reasonable limiting principle than the one it creates.
B. Reserved Powers Doctrine
This section argues that the reserved powers doctrine was never
particularly well defined nor widely followed and has outlived any
usefulness it may have had.42 The reserved powers doctrine traces back to
Stone v. Mississippi.43 In 1867, the provisional government of the State of
Mississippi granted a corporate charter to the plaintiff permitting him to
run a lottery for profit. In 1870, the state ratified a new constitution as part
of Reconstruction and the new constitution banned lotteries such as
plaintiff's. The legislature enacted a ban, the state fined Mr. Stone for
running his lottery, and Stone sued." The Court upheld the new ban,
reasoning, essentially for the first time, that states can neither waive nor
bargain away their police powers.45 Police powers were by then defined to
42 Because both the doctrine and this section commenting on it can easily be
removed from the rest of the study of Winstar and the law of regulatory
agreements, readers not interested in this doctrine specifically could skip this
section.
11 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880). Cf Stewart E. Sterk, The
Continuity ofLegislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L.
REv. 647, 675-76 (1988) (identifying Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U.S. 645, 650 (1876),
as a precursor to a related government contract defense); Janice C. Griffith, Local
Government Contracts: Escaping from the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75
IOWA L. REv. 277, 295 (1990) (referring to Boyd as the beginning of various
"inalienable powers doctrines").
"See Stone, 101 U.S. at 815-16.
45For an interesting take on the development of the police power category, see
Samuel K Olken, Charles Evan Hughes and the Blaisdell Decision: A Historical
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mean state and local governmental control over the public's health, safety,
and morality. So as not to lose the connection to public welfare, the Court
labeled lotteries a "pestilence,"" more harmful than other forms of
gambling. Therefore, regulation of lotteries fit squarely within the state's
police powers and the state always reserved the power to regulate
lotteries.'
Theoretical difficulties in such a rule appeared immediately when the
Court attempted to distinguish Dartmouth College v. Woodward," which
held that the Contracts Clause prevented New Hampshire from altering
Dartmouth College's charter, granted by the king of England before the
Revolution.4 9 The Court in Stone argued that taxation is not a police power
because "government was not organized for the purpose of taxation, but
taxation may be necessary for the purposes of government." '5 This
distinction between police power and taxation breaks down where taxation
serves policy goals by discouraging certain activity. The Court then argued
that the lottery charter was not a protected contract because it did not
involve property rights: instead the charter involved "governmental
rights"'I because it was so linked to the police power. 2 Of course, the
charter involved both property and governmental rights, just like taxation.
The distinction between police and other governmental powers
inevitably grew fuzzier over time. For example, the Court in Walla Walla
v. Walla Walla Water Co.- enforced as a contract a city's grant of a
twenty-five year franchise to provide water to the city. It rejected the
reserved powers argument of the city because water supply regulation was
Study of Contract Clause Jurisprudence, 72 OR. L. Rv. 513, 542-52 (1993)
(arguing that the notion of police powers receiving special treatment was raised in
early 19th century cases but did not prevail until after the Civil War). See, e.g.,
Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1862) (rejecting the
reserved powers argument and finding a violation of the Contracts Clause in new
tax on a bank contrary to the no-tax provision in the bank's charter).
"Stone, 101 U.S. at 818.47 See id.
4" Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
49 See id. at 519.
50 Stone, 101 U.S. at 820.51 Id.
52 See id. at 820-21. The Court added the argument that the property interest in
the lottery charter should have been discounted by the risk that the government
would later ban lotteries; this is clearly dicta in light of the breadth of the rule from
Stone.
53Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1898).
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not part of "peace, good order, health, or morals of its inhabitants."' 4 In
another case, regulation of street lighting was not seen as sufficiently
related to the public safety to allow application ofthe doctrine. 5 The Court
in Veix v. Sixth Ward Building & Loan Ass 'n56 found no violation of the
Contracts Clause in a New Jersey statute that put significant restrictions on
the ability of a shareholder of a state-chartered thrift to redeem his stock.
Citing Stone, the Court reasoned that the police power "is not limited to
health, morals and safety. It extends to economic needs as wel."
The Court used this same formalistic definition of police power in
takings cases, beginning most notably with Mugler v. Kansas,"8 where the
Court took the somewhat extreme position that the state owed no compen-
sation for taking private property if the taking occurred pursuant to a valid
police power. The Court eventually relaxed this rule in takings law, most
notably in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,59 but never clearly defined
when the government would have to pay compensation for regulatory
takings in a legitimate exercise of its police powers. The Contracts Clause
cases addressing the definition of police powers did no better, and indeed
54 Id. at 15-17.
1 See Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 251 U.S. 32, 38 (1919)
(holding that the city could not remove private street lighting and install its own
without compensating the owner of the private lighting, where the city granted a
franchise to provide the lighting).
56 Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1939).
57 Id. at 38-39.
58 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
51 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("m[ff a
regulation goes too far, it will be recognized as a taking."). See also William B.
Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1057 (1980) (arguing cogently that regulatory takings law should be seen as having
two divergent strands: that of Mugler's clear but harsh no compensation rule and
that of Mahon's more generous but ultimately undefinable rule that government
regulation cannot go "too far," in the words of Justice Holmes). Compare Mahon,
260 U.S. at 393-415 with Los Angeles Gas & Elec., 251 U.S. at 38 (reasoning, in
a Contracts Clause case, that 'But there is some point where power or rights must
prevail, however plausible or specious the argument of either against the other may
be."). Mugler's roots can be traced farther back, for example, to West RiverBridge
Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (finding no government liability for
condemning a bridge because the grantees took the contract/charter, as are all
private rights, subject to the state's power of eminent domain). For a later example,
see Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) (holding no taking
where the War Department required modifications to a bridge because the order
was pursuant to constitutional power).
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the Court heard far fewer reservedpowers cases than regulatory takings. By
1977, when the Court decided United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,60 it
noted the mixed precedent on the reserved powers doctrine and relied
instead on the analysis from the 1934 landmark decision in Home Building
& Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell.61 Blaisdell developed five factors to scrutinize
the importance of the public purpose in the legislation and how closely
tailored it was to achieving that purpose and avoiding unnecessary
infiingement on contract rights. In analyzing the reservedpowers doctrine,
the Court in United States Trust called the states' promise regarding the
Port Authority bonds at issue "purely financial" and not included in the
protection of the doctrine.62 Of course, taxation is purely a financial matter
also, and the Court did no better than Stone in distinguishing taxation from
a police power.63 Instead, the Court's analysis focused on the importance
of the legislative goals and their logical connection to the means chosen to
implement them.64
The reservedpowers doctrine is essentially an artifact of legal history.6'
This is fortunate in light of the harshness of the rule from Stone and the
definitional pressure that would result from leaving Stone alone while the
Court has moved away from Mugler. Stone's reliance on a formalistic
definition created potential for police power under the Contracts Clause to
evolve away from police power under the Takings Clause, and such
divergence would encourage plaintiffs to repackage regulatory takings
claims as Contracts Clause claims or vice versa. In this respect, both
60 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (striking down a New
Jersey statute affecting Port Authority bonds as a violation of the Contracts
Clause), reh'g denied, 431 U.S. 975 (1977).
6' Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (upholding a
Minnesota statute that gave a temporary extension to debtors facing repossession
of collateral).62 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25.
631 argue in Part H that the different treatment for municipal bonds owes more
to the distinction between sovereign and proprietary functions of government.
64 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28-32.65 But cf. J.D.B. Mitchell, The Treatment of Public Contracts in the United
States, 9 U. TORONTO L.J. 194, 200-01, 218 (1952) [hereinafter Mitchell, The
Treatment of Public Contracts] (defending the coherence of the police powers
category). Mitchell, however, focuses his analysis on the subsequent legislation that
causes the infringement, instead of looking to the original agreement and the
governmental power involved there. The subsequent legislation is much more
likely to appear within the definition of a police power since the government is not
likely to infringe on a contract by signing another.
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Blaisdell and United States Trust should be seen as advancing the
jurisprudence, even if only because they analyze the reasons behind, and
effects of, the legal rules; they do not purport to be deciding a purely
definitional question when the definitional question necessarily decides the
case. In the end, the most interesting legacy of Stone is probably the
historical insights to be drawn from the hostility with which the recon-
structed state government-and the Supreme Court-treated the laws
enacted by the "provisional"' state government. 7
Nevertheless, the government raised the reserved powers doctrine as
one of its three (or four) defenses to liability in Winstar. The government's
reserved powers argument relied on Stone and similar Contracts Clause
cases involving alleged infringements by state governments. At first glance,
it seems odd that the government did not cite Jeix, nor explain specifically
how thrift regulation fit under the police power. The concern might have
been that the police power per se necessarily pertained to state govern-
ments, not the federal government. To avoid this trap, the government may
have thought it better to rely on the cases' language explicating the nature
of "sovereign" power.
None of the four justices writing opinions in Winstar took the reserved
powers argument seriously. Writing for the plurality, Souter dismissed the
government's "two related contentions on the score of ultra vires"68 by
referring back to the same analysis he used for the unmistakability
defense.69 Breyer did not discuss reservedpowers at all. Scalia waved it off
by taking advantage ofthe formalistic definition ofpolice power: "I do not
believe that regulatory measures designed to minimize what are essentially
assumed commercial risks are the sort of 'police power' or 'paramount
power' referred to."7° In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist ignored the
reservedpowers doctrine. Because Souter and Scalia (seven votes together)
distinguished Stone instead of overruling it, the reserved powers doctrine
might technically be considered viable. In. the interests of clearing away
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 819 (1880).
67 Cf Sterk, supra note 43, at 679-82 (discussing the states' post Civil War
financial obligations). But see Griffith, supra note 43, at 297 (not discussing the
historical context and concluding that the "Court's decision was grounded in
political theory: power resides in the people, and the legislators as their
representatives cannot abdicate that power by entering into long-term contracts
that, at some point, cease to carry out the popular will").
6United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 888 (1996).
" See id.
711d. at 923.Nor does Scalia explain how a government's "commercial" powers
are different from sovereign powers. See infra Part II.
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doctrinal detritus, however, it seems preferable to read Winstar as
overturning Stone. The limits of the doctrine are doomed to remain fuzzy
and flexible, and the interests of both the government and private parties
seem well balanced andprotectedbythe other defenses at issue in Winstar.
This Article next analyzes the express delegation and the unmistakability
doctrines. The government's brief and the Court treated these two defenses
separately, but I make the case that they are better understood in compari-
son with one another.
C. Unmistakability Doctrine
The unmistakability doctrine treats regulatory agreements as contracts
but tacks onto contract law the proviso that the government cannot be held
to a contract regarding its sovereign powers unless the provision limiting
future use of a sovereign power is unmistakably clear. By doing so, the
doctrine attempts to balance the majority's right to change the law in the
future with the reliance interests of the individual who reached the
agreement with the government. The contractual analysis, however,
reduces the sovereign perspective on regulatory agreements to an exception
within the law of contract. This formulation fails to address the clash
between the legal standards more naturally associated with the sovereign
perspective, especially those arising in economic due process jurispru-
dence, which give the government much more latitude to update regulatory
policies than contract law does.
This Part reviews the relevant cases establishing the unmistakability
doctrine to flesh out exactly how the doctrine functions as an interpretive
presumption used by the courts to construe regulatory agreements. The
cases fall into two broad categories, depending on whether the government
involved is state or federal. The state cases rely directly on the Contracts
Clause ofthe Constitution, which does not applyto the federal government.
The federal cases, which are fewer, tend to be a bit vague as to their
constitutional basis; at least one is actually a takings case. None of the
cases depend on a distinction between blocking the implementation of the
new law and paying damages for breach of the old agreement-a distinc-
tion the Winstar plurality invents to distinguish the federal cases. The
plurality's use of this distinction, and discussion of only the federal cases,
raises deep questions about the reach of its rule. Does it overrule any of the
state cases? Does the Winstar rule apply only to regulatory agreements of
the federal government?
This Section offers a synthesis of the alternative rules put forth by the
majority opinions and criticizes the rule. For not only is the new rule a
cynical warp of existing precedent, it is so open-ended as to threaten
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damages for any change in regulatory policies. This regime--the equiva-
lent of an extreme version of conservative regulatory takings the-
ory-would destabilize the law of takings and economic due process as
well.
1. Unmistakability Doctrine Cases
Analyzing the major unmistakability cases reveals three significant
themes in the case law. First, although the interpretive presumption was
initially used more as a way to interpret words in corporate charters that
were subject to multiple meanings, courts eventually used the interpretive
presumption more in cases where the charters were silent as to whether the
government agreed to maintain a particular regulatory policy. The high
point in this use of the unmistakability doctrine is probably Rogers Park
Water Co. v. Fergus,71 discussed below. The secondmajor theme is that the
cases never succeed in defining the threshold issue of when the
unmistakability doctrine does apply. The cases are split along two lines,
and the opinions do not engage in a useful dialogue that might help clarify
the threshold issue. Third, the Supreme Court has applied the unmistakabi-
lity doctrine to a few cases involving agreements between agencies of the
federal government and Indian tribes. These cases describe the
unmistakability doctrine as equally applicable to all levels of government,
but again, there are other cases that emphasize the different standards states
faceunderthe Contracts Clause. This creates another dimension of pressure
in the jurisprudence to define the distinction between the areas where the
state and federal governments enjoy the same unmistakability defense and
where they do not.
a. Strength of the Interpretive Presumption
The Supreme Court first relied on an unmistakability presumption in
Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co.,72 even though the Court
did not label it as such. In this famous case, the Court found no violation
of the Contracts Clause when the state of Massachusetts granted a charter
to the defendant, Warren Bridge Company, to build a bridge over the
Charles River in 1828. The plaintiff, the Charles River Bridge Company,
had been chartered by the legislature in 1785 and granted authority to
charge tolls on the bridge for forty years (extended in 1792 to seventy
7' Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 (1901).
72 Charles RiverBridge Co. v. WarrenBridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
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years). The Warren Bridge Company subsequently built a bridge 800 feet
away from the plaintiff's bridge, and though the new bridge initially
charged a toll, it soon became free to cross. The Charles River Bridge
Company sued for damages and an injunction on the theory that its charter
was meant to be exclusive and had been made worthless by the new free
bridge.7a
Plaintiff's charter apparently containedno language on exclusivity, but
it should be noted that as general incorporation laws had not yet been
passed in Massachusetts, any corporate charter implied at least some form
of protection from competition. Justice Story, in dissent, agreed with the
implication of monopoly protection and would have struck down the
second company's charter.74 However, Justice Taney, writing for the Court,
rejected the implication of monopoly protection, writing that "in grants by
the public nothing passes by implication."75
Taney also noted that the 1792 legislation that extended plaintiff s
charter from forty to seventy years also included a provision permitting
construction of another bridge one to two miles away.76 Taney argues that
this is evidence that "the State" did not bargain away its power to charter
a competing bridge. Under this logic, then, the presumption necessary to
properly interpret the charter was not very strong. While it seems some-
what problematic to rely on a different legislature to interpret the original
act,'8 Taney lessened this criticism considerably by noting that only seven
years had passed and that even the original forty-year term still had a long
time to run,'9 implying that the 1792 legislature was essentially as
disinterested as the 1785 legislature (unlike the 1828 legislature, which
presumably was feeling pressure from a community having to rely on one
inadequate bridge). As an example of the unmistakability doctrine, the
interpretive presumption applied by the Court in Charles River Bridge was
7 See id. at 426-27.
74 See id. at 586-87 (Story, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 546. Story noted:
[I]t would present a singular spectacle if, while the courts in England are
restraining, within the strictest limits, the spirit of monopoly, and exclusive
privileges in nature of monopolies, and confining corporations to the
privileges plainly given to them in their charter, the courts of this country
should be found enlarging these privileges by implication[.]
Id. at 545-46.
76 See id. at 550-51.
7Id. at 550.
8 Cf Sterk, supra note 43, at 647.
71 See Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 550.
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not very strong. Subsequent cases often involved more ambiguous language
in corporate charters, and therefore resulted in application of stronger
presumptions.
The Court in Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific Railroad v. Dennis"
confronted a typical question in unmistakability cases: whether a tax
exemption granted as part of a corporate charter meant the state had
bargained away its power to tax the corporation later. Plaintiff's charter
provided that the railroad would be exempt from taxation "for ten years
after the completion of said road."'81 The state later passed a new tax on the
company, which hadnot yet completed the railroad.82 The Court upheld the
new tax after it applied an unmistakability presumption and found that the
exemption did not begin to run until completion of the railroad.8 3 The Court
noted that the exemption did not say "until ten years after the
completion." 4 Justice Field, leading a four-vote dissent, argued that it was
illogical to deny the tax exemption when the corporation is in its "infancy"
and could least afford the tax. 5 Because it is highly likely that Field was
correct that the tax break was designed to help the young company along
during its inevitably difficult initial period of low revenue (or no revenue),
the majority's interpretive presumption should be seen as strong enough to
overcome a reasonably strong policy argument.
Another example of a tax exemption case is Covington v. Kentucky,86
which upheld a state property tax on the city's waterworks, despite an
earlier law providing that the waterworks "shall be and remain forever
exempt from state, county, and city tax."87 Justice Harlan applied an
unmistakability standard, based both on the cases then comprising the
unmistakability doctrine and on a general provision ofKentucky law which
provided that all charters were granted subject to the state's reservation of
power "unless a contrary intent be therein plainly expressed."88 Harlan
interpreted the "forever" provision as merely lacking a built-in expiration
date for the tax exemption:
The utmost that can be said is that it may be inferred from the terms in
which the exemption was declared, that the legislature had no purpose at
0 Vicksburg, Shreveport & Pacific R.R. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665 (1886).
81Id. at 665.82Construction was delayed by the Civil War. See id. at 666.
83See id. at 667.
84 Id. at 670.
'-'See id. at 671.86 Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S. 231 (1899).
17 Id. at 233.
81 Id. at 234.
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the time [the tax exemption] was passed to withdraw the exemption from
taxation; not that the power reserved would never be exerted, so far as
taxation was concerned, if in the judgment of the legislature the public
interests required that to be done.
89
Other tax exemption cases finding in favor of the government typically
involve slightly weaker presumptions, as other facts provide independent
support for the government's interpretation."
Another bridge case, with facts very similar to Charles River Bridge,
presents an extreme example of using the unmistakability presumption to
interpret particular language. In Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co.,91 the
Court found no violation of the Contracts Clause where the plaintiffs had
obtained a ninety-nine year charter that barred "any other bridge" from
being built near plaintiff's bridge.9 Seventy years later, the defendant city
granted a competing charter to build a nearby railroad bridge.93
A period of time equal to three generations of the human race has elapsed.
During that time the progress of the world in arts and sciences has been
rapid. In no department of human enterprise have more radical changes
been made, than in that which relates to the means of transportation of
persons and property from one point to another, including the means of
crossing watercourses, large and small.94
The Court went on to concluded that the term "bridge" in the original
charter did not include railroad bridges:
89 Id. at 239. Harlan went on to find that the tax exemption was not a contract
within the meaning of the Contracts Clause because a city's purposes are
necessarily public, not private, and therefore its charter from the state does not give
it private contractual rights protected by the Constitution. See id. at 241-42.
" See, e.g., Metropolitan Street Ry. v. New York State Bd. of Tax Com'rs, 199
U.S. 1 (1905) (upholding a new tax on a railroad company whose charter required
ongoing payments into a state-administered sinking fund); Minot v. Philadelphia,
Wilmington & Baltimore Ry., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206 (1874) ("DelawareRy. Tax
Case") (upholding a tax on an interstate corporation which resulted from a merger
of Maryland and Pennsylvania corporations, where the charter of one of the
original corporations included a tax exemption and the language in both states'
legislation approving the merger granted the combined entity "all rights" of the
original companies); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Miller, 114 U.S. 176 (1885)
(similar).
91 Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 US. (1 Wall.) 116 (1883).
92 See id. at 146.
" See id. at 118.
9Id. at 146.
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Yet the structure which the defendants propose to build over the
Hackensack is not more like a bridge of the olden time than a railroad is
like one of its roads, or a railroad coach is like one of its coaches. It is not,
then, a necessary inference, that because the word "bridge" may now be
applied by common usage to the structure of the defendants, that it was
therefore the thing intended by the act of 1790.9s
If the passage of three generations suffices to apply such a strained
interpretation of the word "bridge," then the Court seems to be saying that
any similarly long-term grant will be subject to a similarly strict construc-
tion. Nonetheless, it is difficult to extract from cases like Hoboken a more
general description of how strong the unmistakability presumption should
be when applied to different charters because, at least in part, the variety
of language and factual contexts makes the fairness claims of the plaintiff
companies difficult to categorize.
Somewhat easierto generalize arethe interpretive presumptions arising
out of cases setting rates for utility companies. The best example might be
Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus,96 where the water company's charter,
running for thirty years, included a schedule of rates requiring the company
to "charge the following annual water rates to consumers of water during
the existence of this franchise[.]" 7 Nine years later, the city government
reduced the maximum rates and the water company refused to provide
water at the lower rates.98 The city sued "to compel [the water company] to
finish [ ] water at rates fixed by ordinance." ' The case is unusual in that
it is the city bringing the action and relying on a contract theory. The city's
offensive use of the unmistakability doctrine is somewhat remarkable. The
Court upheld the new lower rates, reasoning, that "[a] strict construction
must be exercised. The contract claimed concerned governmental
functions, and such functions cannot be held to have been stipulated away
by doubtful or ambiguous provisions."'' ° There is some ambiguity within
the quoted language from the charter, in the sense that some of the words
in the key provision have dual meanings. The ambiguity relied upon by the
95 Id. at 148.96 Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 (1901).
97 Id. at 626.
98 See id. at 625. In the interim, the city was annexed by Chicago, which
imposed the new rates.
9 Id. at 624. Note that the Court did not use the expression "specific
performance."
lo Id. at 628-29.
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Court in Rogers Park arises instead from an ambiguity present in virtually
all charters that set rates: does the provision bind both the city and the
company or onlythe company? Indeed, Justice White argued in dissent that
the quoted phrase contained no ambiguity: "there can be no doubt,from a
consideration ofthe text of the contract, that it fixed the rates to be paid by
private consumers during the life of the contract." 10 1 But the majority's
reasoning requires more: whenever "governmental functions" are at issue,
for a charter provision to bindthe city, the provision must use unmistakably
clear language that the government's power to change its regulation has
been bargained away." Apparently this would require language to the
effect that: "The city shall not set new rates for the next thirty years." A
good example of such language appears in LosAngeles v. Los Angeles City
Water Co., 3 which struck down new, lower rates where the city had
initially promised that it "shall not so reduce such water rates ... less than
those now charged."'' 4 The general applicability of the presumption in
Rogers Park and similar cases makes them not only powerful, but also the
most coherent examples of the unmistakability doctrine. 05 Indeed, the
comparison between Rogers Park and Los Angeles City Water should be
understood as the paradigmatic example of the unmistakability doctrine.
In sum, the state unmistakability cases generally fall into one of two
rough categories. First, there are the cases like Vicksburg, Shreveport &
Pacific Railroad and Hoboken that involve interpretation of ambiguous
phrases in the charter. The ambiguity in these cases is easier to locate in
specific phrases, but it is difficult to generalize the strength of the
interpretive presumption used in these cases because the level of ambiguity
varies and the holdings seem so inconsistent. Then, there are cases like
Rogers Park, which are a little easier to describe as a category because the
'
1 Id. at 632 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
102 See id. at 628-29.
03 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U.S. 558 (1900).
104 Id. at 560.
105 In addition to Rogers Park, the Court also decided two similar cases the
same day, all three finding for the government by the same 5-4 vote: Danville
Water Co. v. Danville, 180 U.S. 619 (1901); and Freeport Water Co. v. Freeport,
180 U.S. 587 (190 1).Freeport Water is similar to Vicksburg Shreveport & Pacific
Railroad in that the ambiguity appeared in a particular phrase in the charter.
Freeport authorized the water company to provide water to residents "at such rates
as may be fixed by ordinance, and for a period not exceeding thirty years." Id. at
600. Applying the unmistakability doctrine's presumption, the Court read "and for
a period" as referring only to the duration of the grant of authority and not to the
"rates as may be fixed by ordinance." Id.
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so-called ambiguity is not specific to certain ambiguous words or phrases.
When the same charter provision both grants a power to a company, for
example, to charge for water, and also regulates that power, the Rogers
Park line of cases reads it as ambiguous whether the government merely
recognized the power or also confined future government regulation of the
power to the given limits. This ambiguity exists in most charters that
include regulatory provisions. 6 If one sees the franchising ordinance or
statute as a contract, the natural reading is that its provisions bind both
parties. If one views it as a statement of government regulation, the more
plausible reading is that the government may subsequently alter its
regulation. Since the interpretive decision to treat the ordinance or statute
as a contract necessarily imports the bias that its provisions bind both
parties, the unmistakability doctrine canbethought of as requiring a certain
hesitation before reading ordinances or statutes as contracts, or at least as
binding the government party in the same way as it binds the private party.
b. Failure to Define When Unmistakability Doctrine Applies
The Supreme Court, however, has not applied the unmistakability
doctrine consistently, and this obviously makes it difficult to summarize
the strength of the interpretive presumption completely. In several cases,
the Court seems to ignore the defense (perhaps because it was not argued)
and apply instead a tacit assumption that the government must live by the
same contracting rules that apply between private parties. This assumption
is what Professor Schwartz dubbed "congruence."' 7 A good example is
Clevelandv. Cleveland CityRailway,08 where the Court struck down a city
ordinance requiring a local train company to reduce its rates to four cents.
The company's charter, whichresulted from consolidations ofthree smaller
railroads, set maximum fares at five cents but contained no language that
the city was surrendering its powers to set new rates. 19 Indeed, one of the
three earlier company's charter expressly reserved to the city the power to
decrease fares, 10 but the Court explained that the lack of a similar
reservation in the combined company's charter was one the three factors
106 This may be one reason why states have moved away from regulating
corporations through charter language and instead allow broadly written corporate
charters and provide for regulation of corporations via separate statutes.
'0' Schwartz, Liabilityfor Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 633.
108 Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry., 194 U.S. 517 (1904).
'o See id. at 524-27 (describing the various constituent charters and the
ordinances approving their consolidations).
"
0 See id. at 524.
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that convincedit that the five-cents fare bound the city. 111 Hence, Cleveland
City Railway presumes no reservation of power by the city unless the
charter expressly reserves it. Rogers Park makes precisely the opposite
presumption: that the city does not lose a power unless the charter includes
express language of surrender. The Court in Cleveland CityRailwayneither
cites nor distinguishes Rogers Park or any ofthe other similar unmistakabi-
lity cases. Instead, the Court in Cleveland City Railway relied on another
case that did not discuss the unmistakability doctrine."' The lack of
dialogue is unfortunately typical between cases upholding subsequent
government changes in regulatory treatment, which I shall refer to as
"unmistakability cases," and cases striking them down, which I shall refer
to as "utility congruence cases." '
. See id. at 536. The two other reasons were that rates were "fixed in
ordinances for a stated time" and that the city required "written acceptance by the
corporations of the ordinances." Id.
,,
2 See id. (citing Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 184 U.S. 368 (1902)).
1 Utility congruence cases striking down new regulation include: Appleby v.
Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926) (a good example of pure congruence analysis);
Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 206 U.S. 496 (1907) (holding that a
thirty-year franchise granted by the city and setting water rates was a binding
contract on the state); Detroit Citizens', 184 U.S. at 368 (invalidating a subsequent
ordinance requiring lower rates); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115
U.S. 650 (1885) (holding an "exclusive" charter prevails even against a change to
the state constitution); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674
(1885) (same as New Orleans Gas). Cf. Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co.,
172 U.S. 1 (1898) (granting an injunction against the city, which argued that the
Contracts Clause did not apply because the city acted in a private capacity in
contracting with the company to provide water). Walla Walla is probably best
understood as an example of a city outsmarting itself in arguing its case.
Other unmistakability cases upholding changes to regulation include: Keefe v.
Clark, 322 U.S. 393 (1944) (finding no violation of the Contracts Clause); St. Louis
v. United R.R., 210 U.S. 266 (1908) (finding no contractual obligation to avoid
taxing the railroad company); Owensborov. Owensboro Waterworks Co., 191U.S.
358 (1903) (ruling that the franchise authorized the company to "make and enforce
... all needed rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law, or provisions of
this ordinance"); Chicago, B&Q Ry. v. Nebraska, 170 U.S. 57,72 (1898) (holding
that the contract loses out to subsequent legislation); New Orleans City & Lake Ry.
v. New Orleans, 143 U.S. 192 (1892) (upholding a new tax on the company despite
charter language that provided for certain taxes and expressly promised that the city
would not charter rival railroads until 1906); Pennsylvania Ry. v. Miller, 132 U.S.
75, 84 (1889) (rejecting, on essentially unmistakability theory, the railroad's
argument that its acknowledged power to condemn certain property necessarily
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Of course, inconsistency in the Contracts Clause interpretations
generally, and unmistakability in particular, traces back to Charles River
Bridge and the difficulty in reconciling it with the earlier decision in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward."' Even more inconsistent with Charles
River Bridge is the later decision in Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton
Bridge Co.," 5 which granted an injunction and an accounting in damages
against a competing bridge company, despite strong similarities to the facts
of Charles River Bridge. Plaintiff Chenango Bridge Company received a
charter in 1808, with an unlimited term, and protection from competing
bridges within two miles." 6 Justice Davis, writing for the majority in
Chenango Bridge, cited Dartmouth College as controlling and found the
charter's competition protection clause dispositive. The majority had "no
doubt" that the legislature spoke clearly in declaring: "That it shall not be
lawful for any person or persons to erect any bridge... within two miles,
either above or below the bridges, to be erected and maintained in
included immunity from tort liability arising from the nuisance of its construction
site); Memphis Gas Light Co. v. Taxing District of Shelby County, 109 U.S. 398
(1883) (holding that no exemption to new tax on company is implied in a charter
that set certain rates the company could charge consumers); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde
Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878) (finding no violation in regulation which made fertilizing
company charter worthless). Few, if any, state unmistakability cases have been
decided since these.
"I Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (1819) (holding that
Dartmouth's charter from the king is a contract, whichNew Hampshire cannot alter
under the Contracts Clause). For a comparison with Charles RiverBridge, see, for
example, Robert E. Mensel, Privilege Against Public Right, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 1
(1994) (analyzing the political pressures behind the Charles RiverBridge decision).
Although I suspect the holdings from Dartmouth College and Charles RiverBridge
are not reconcilable, it is perhaps an underappreciated fact that the trustees of
Dartmouth College could not claim the protection of the Takings Clause (even if
it had already been applied to the states) because they were not owners in the sense
that they held stock or ownership rights and so they had no property interest per se
at stake. This would suggest that the college's only protection would be through the
Contracts Clause, but it also makes itunclearwhat interests ofthe trustees deserved
judicial protection.
"I Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51
(1865).
16 See id. at 53,55. The charter language referred to another charter with a two-
mile protection, even though the two-mile limit might not have made perfect sense
for the Chenango Bridge Company, in light of the fact that the Chenango River
flowed only a quarter mile downstream from the bridge before emptying into the
Susquehana River. Id. at 83 (Grier, J., dissenting).
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pursuance of this act."'1 7 Although the Court also cited Charles River
Bridge, it essentially ignored the question of whether the legislature meant
to bind itself in competition-protection clause. In contrast, the New York
Court of Appeals read the charter language as barring only "individuals,
public officers and authorities and other corporations [from building
competing bridges], and [the language] was not intended to be or to
constitute any restriction on the sovereignty of the state[.]"' The state
court's reluctance to bind the legislature is a good example of how the
unmistakability doctrine operates as an interpretative tool; the Supreme
Court's treatment is a good example of a tacit presumption of congruence.
Certainly, the unmistakability cases vary in the strength of the
interpretive presumption they employ, but the more important difficulty is
distinguishing when they apply at all, and when, instead, the utility
congruence cases, like Detroit Citizens'and Cleveland City Railway, apply.
Because the unmistakability doctrine aims to protect the government's
ability to enact new laws without incurring contract liability, it makes sense
for the unmistakability doctrine to apply only if exercise (or restraint) of a
sovereignpoweris allegedlypart ofthe disputed agreement. Unfortunately,
both the unmistakability and utility congruence cases avoid directly
analyzing this threshold issue. Rogers Park is again a good example. The
majority asserts that the regulation of water rates is a sovereign power and
therefore applies the unmistakability doctrine: "The contract claimed
concerned governmentalfinctions, and such functions cannot be held to
have been stipulated away by doubtful or ambiguous provisions." '19 The
problem with the "governmental functions" language is that the city in
Cleveland City Railway undoubtedly exercised a governmental function
when it made a binding contract with the local railroad and the Court did
not apply the unmistakability doctrine. Governmental functions would
seem to include acting in a private capacity, so the phrase does quite a bit
less than it might first seem to explain why Rogers Park favors the
government. TheRogersParkdissenters similarly avoidthe threshold issue
and instead simply assume that private contracting rules apply to the
government in all agreements made by the government:
17 Id. at 78.
"I Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 137,138
(1865) (Reporter's Notes to Case).
19 Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624, 628-29 (1901) (emphasis
added); see also County of Stanislaus v. San Joaquin & King's River Canal &
Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201, 210-11 (1904) ("To regulate or establish rates for
which water will be supplied is in its nature the execution of one of the powers of
the State .... ") (emphasis added).
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Can it, in reason, be said, in view of the terms of the contract, that if the
water company had wished to charge more than the contract price, on the
ground that an unreasonably low sum had been fixed in the contract, it
would have had a right at once to ignore the contact stipulation and exact
higher rates? If it cannot be, how can it be held that the city had the right
at its pleasure to disregard the rates fixed in the contract? Was not the
obligation of one the correlative of the right of the other?12°
Avoiding the issue allows the dissent to use powerfully coherent rhetoric
that follows from the tacit assumption of congruence. If the dissenters were
to acknowledge the possibility that government contracts are different from
private contracts, the dissent would immediately face a difficult question
of when and why government contracts would be different. The majority,
of course, faces the reverse dilemma. To argue that different rules apply to
government agreements could imply that these agreements are not contracts
at all. This radical implication immediately raises two difficult analytical
problems: (1) if the charter is not a contract, what is it?; (2) on what theory,
and under what circumstances, would the government ever be bound by its
provisions?
Perhaps the closest the broader jurisprudence came to rationalizing the
cases was to distinguish the sovereign role of the government from its
corporate, proprietary, or business role. Actions in the latter role are
binding under the traditional rules of contracts: "If [government] comes
down from its position of sovereignty, and enters the domain of commerce,
it submits itself to the same laws that govern individuals there."'' But the
distinction was never fully developed and rarely appeared in the unmistaka-
bility cases. Especially for municipal governments,"z the distinction can
11o Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624, 633 (1901) (White, 3.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
121 Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875) (holding the government
liable to pay on forged commercial paper it accepted and paid for when it did not
find the forgery with reasonable speed but was negligently slow); see also Los
Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co., 251 U.S. 32,38-39 (1919) (finding that
the city's construction of its own city lights was done in the city's proprietary
capacity and therefore did not relieve the city of liability to a company chartered
earlier to provide street lights); Vicksburg v. Vicksburg Waterworks Co., 206 U.S.
496, 508 (1907) (noting that "a state may, in matters of proprietary rights, exclude
itself from the right to make regulations"); South Carolina v. United States, 199
U.S. 437,461 (1905) (making a similar distinction in upholding a federal tax on the
sale of liquor by a state-owned seller).
" See, e.g., DelmarW. Doddridge, TheDistinctionBetween Governmentaland
Proprietary Functions ofMunicipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1925)
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become pretty fine, as for example, the difference between regulating the
rates at which a water company provides water to residents and contracting
with the company to supply water to residents. This threshold difficulty
probably explains the inconsistency in the unmistakability case law.
It also reflects a fundamental difference in perspective in the two lines
of thought. The utility congruence cases, like Cleveland City Railway, start
from the premise that the regulatory agreements are contracts and the
appropriate analysis therefore looks only to the reasonably ascertainable
intent of the contracting parties. It is not necessary to look more broadly to
the context in which government operates to arrive at an interpretation of
the parties' intentions and, moreover, to do so seems to invite a pro-
government result because there is no clear stopping point as to how broad
the contextual analysis should extend. This viewpoint seeks to protect not
only private parties who rely on government promises, but also the
government's reputation as a reliable contracting party.
On the other hand, the unmistakability cases, like Rogers Park,
generallyviewthe issue as fundamentally aboutgovernmentactions, which
are necessarily judged in a broader context than simply the contractual
intent of the parties. Governmental actions must be evaluated in terms of
how the rules regulating the actions improve or restrict democratic
processes. This viewpoint implicitly seeks to avoid saddlingthe community
with bad bargains agreed to by long-dead legislators and businessmen.
Regulatory agreements, as I have defined them, are fundamentally both
agreements between parties and exercises of sovereign authority. Fortu-
nately, the express delegation doctrine" provides some help by looking to
the government entities' authorizing statutes and distinguishing between
the authority to regulate rates and the authority to contract for certain rates.
This distinction between whether the state acts as a sovereign or as a
private party has made a difference in the scrutiny the state will face in
defending subsequent legislation against a constitutional challenge based
on the Contracts Clause. For if the state's promises constitute actions in its
sovereign capacity, the state need only raise the unmistakability defense
along the lines of Rogers Park, which should make it easy for the state to
escape liability for the subsequent legislation. If, however, the state's
promises related to actions that put the state in the same position as a
private contracting party, then there is little reason to think the state could
escape Home Building & Loan Ass 'n v. Blaisdell'24 and its progeny, which
(listing six areas of law that make the distinction and criticizing the coherence of
each).
. See infra Part I.D.
"2 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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require the state to justify both the breaching legislation's goals and the
means the statute applies to reach those goals.
Blaisdell upheld a Minnesota statute that gave temporary extensions to
indebted farmers who faced repossession of their farms during the early
years of the Depression. The Court nevertheless imposed a high standard
of review, upholding the statute only after finding it met five factors: (1)
the economic conditions constituted an emergency, (2) "the legislation was
not for the mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection
of a basic interest of society,"'" (3) the specific "relief afforded... [was]
appropriate to that emergency and could be granted only upon reasonable
conditions," '126 (4) the conditions for extensions were reasonable, and (5)
the extensions would only be available during the emergency and the
legislation expired shortly anyway.127 While Blaisdell has attracted a great
deal of criticism, especially for its infidelity to the original understanding
of the Contracts Clause,"2 the important point here is that Blaisdell's five-
part test, and subsequent Contracts Clause decisions, make it relatively
difficult for a state to escape liability compared to the unmistakability
standard from Rogers Park.
More recent decisions have weakened Blaisdell's standard somewhat,
though the precise rule is difficult to pin down due to subsequent conflict-
ing decisions. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus29 struck down a
Minnesota law requiring companies to fund the pension plans of their em-
ployees if the companies closed offices in Minnesota. Spannaus analyzed
the nexus between the purposes of the legislation and the ends chosen to
reach the goal and applied a sliding scale test.3° The Court found the im-
pairment severe because the company's contract with its employees speci-
fically exempted the company from the obligation to fund the
pension plan.' Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light
15Id. at 444-45.
12 Id.
127 See id. at 445-47.
" See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contracts
Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703,735-36 (1984).
129 Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
130 See, e.g., id. at 245 ("The severity of the impairment measures the height of
the hurdle the state legislation must clear."). This means-ends nexus analysis tends
to result in highly manipulable judicial tests. Accord Richard E. Levy, Escaping
Lochner's Shadow: Toward a CoherentJurisprudence ofEconomicRights, 73 N.C.
L. REV. 329 (1995) (criticizing this form of analysis in cases such as Lochner and
Spannaus, among others).
'
31 See Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 246.
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Co.13 upheld a Kansas statute resetting price ceilings on natural gas. The
Court in Energy Reserves unanimously found there were no contractual
rights impaired because the parties explicitly recognized the variability of
government regulation of price controls.133 Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton
134
upheld a law preventing tax increases from being passed on from oil and
gas producers to purchasers despite the private parties' contracts allowing
it. The Court found that the prohibition on the "pass-through" affected all
producers, not just those with contracts, and so declared the pass-through
prohibition "generally applicable" and therefore permissible.135 These
recent Contracts Clause decisions certainly suggest a much more permis-
sive analysis than Blaisdell, but they still represent an intermediate level of
scrutiny compared to the presumption from Rogers Park and the
unmistakability cases. The critical step in the analysis is thus still the initial
determination of which standard to apply to the subsequent government
action. 136 This decision implicitly turns on whether the initial government
promises constitute sovereign or private actions.
The state unmistakability cases exhibit three themes. First, the early
ummistakability cases interpret ambiguous phrases, but eventually the main
line of cases follow the Rogers Park model: silence on the question of
whether a governmental unit is bound is read as ambiguous and the state is
given the benefit of the ambiguity. Tolhold the governmental unit to an
allegedpromise concerning its exercise of regulatory power, the agreement
must use language unmistakably clear, as in LosAngeles City Water, where
the city promised that it "shall not so reduce such water rates.., less than
those now charged." '137 Second, the state unmistakability cases have a
parallel line of cases that treat the governmental units as private contracting
parties. The two lines of cases seem to ignore one another, leaving the
threshold question of how to determine when to apply the unmistakability
doctrine and when to simply treat the state or city as a private party
132 Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400
(1983).
1 See id. at 416. The Court also emphasized "the fact that the parties are
operating in a heavily regulated industry," which put them on notice of the risk of
changes in government regulation. Id. at 413.
34Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
135 See id. at 191.
136 But see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1564 (2d ed.
1991) (suggesting that modem standards for Contracts Clause review are essen-
tially the same as the due process standards); Levy, supra note 130, at 371-72
(arguing that Spannaus was overruled by Energy Reserves).
137 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U.S. 558, 560 (1900).
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unresolved. Third, the threshold issue divides not only the unmistakability
cases but, when one views the jurisprudence more broadly, the rule from
Spannaus and Energy Reserves probably requires more of the government
than Rogers Park. To the extent these standards diverge, the distinction
between the two lines of cases parallels the threshold question that divides
Rogers Park from Cleveland City Railway.
c. Federal Unmistakability Cases
Although the Supreme Court has had fewer occasions to apply the
unmistakability doctrine to agreements made bythe federal government,"'
the resulting body of case law reflects similar results, as well as another
dimension to the threshold issue. The strongest example of a federal
unmistakability case is probably Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe. 139 In
Merrion, a Native American tribe leased land and oil rights to a developer.
The lease prevented the tribe from raising the rent or royalties payments
required under the lease but said nothing specifically about taxes. Later the
tribe imposed a severance tax on oil production and the developer sued for
relief from the tax, claiming breach of the lease."4 The Court upheld the
tax, reasoning that: "[w]ithout regard to its source, sovereign power, even
when unexercised, is an enduring presence that governs all contracts
subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact unless
surrendered in unmistakable terms."141 Two aspects of Merrion are
important. First, the interpretive presumption necessary to decide Merrion
is essentially the same as the one from Rogers Park because the tribal lease
was silent on the issue of taxes. The Court cited a state unmistakability case
for the rule: "the government's power to tax remains unless it 'has been
specifically surrendered in terms which admit of no other reasonable
13 Federal unmistakability cases are less common because the federal
government rarely grants corporate charters, with the notable exceptions of national
banks and federal thrifts, and in the 19th century, a few railroads. But cf Schwartz,
Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 500 (arguing that there are so
few federal unmistakability cases because the sovereign acts doctrine "occupied"
the field and made it unnecessary). As explained below, however, this may lead
Schwartz to give too much credence to Justice Scalia's claim that the
unmistakability doctrine and the sovereign acts doctrine really amount to the same
thing. See infra Part H.A.139 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
140 See id. at 135-36.
141Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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interpretation." 42 In the two other Supreme Court decisions most often
cited as examples of the federal unmistakability doctrine, the interpretive
presumption did little to decide the cases because the original agreements
contained express reservations of authority forthe subsequent legislation.143
142 Id. (quoting St. Louis v. United R.R., 210 U.S. 266, 280 (1908)). St. Louis
is a typical example of the Rogers Park line of cases.
43 See United States v. CherokeeNation, 480 U.S. 700,706 (1987) (upholding
the government's exercise of its navigational servitude power); Bowen v. Public
Agencies Opposed to Social Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986) ("POSSE")
(upholding changes to the Social Security Act). In POSSE, prior to the contested
change, the Social Security Act ("SSA") gave states the right to join the Social
Security System in order to cover state and local employees for old age, disability,
and death benefits. States could drop out ofthe program with two years' notice. See
id. at 43-45. After several states withdrew from the system and it appeared likely
more would follow, Congress repealed the option of withdraw. See id. at 46-48. In
rejecting the contractual arguments of the California state agencies, the Court first
reasoned that the unmistakability doctrine applied. "[W]e have emphasized that
'[w]ithout regard to its source, sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to the sovereign's jurisdiction,
and will remain intact unless surrendered in unmistakable terms."' Id. at 52
(quoting Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148). However, the Court spent comparatively more
time analyzing the SSA's express reservation of Congress's authority to "alter,
amend, or repeal any provision" ofthe SSA, and concluded that the SSA therefore
"created no contractual rights." Id. at 52 (citing the Sinking Fund Cases and
AMTRAK, discussed infra notes 147-153 and accompanying text). Because of this
reservation of authority, and the Court's reliance upon it, POSSE adds little to our
understanding of the strength of the interpretive presumption because the
presumption was not needed to decide the case. But POSSE is significant for its
sympathetic description of the unmistakability doctrine.
In Cherokee Nation, the Court rejected a takings claim brought by tribe for
damages done to a riverbed by the Army Corps of Engineers. The tribe purchased
the river from the federal government but the government claimed it had retained
a navigation easement to the riverbed and therefore had the right to dredge the
riverbed to clear a channel without being liable to the tribe for damages. The Court
agreed with the government, finding that the Commerce Clause in the Constitution
gave the United States implied easements over all navigable waterways. The Court
also pointed out, however, that an earlier decision interpreted the same transfer of
ownership of the riverbed to the tribe and that the earlier decision included an
express statement that the United States had retained such an easement. See id. at
706 (quoting ChoctawNation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,635 (1970)). Thus, there
was little ambiguity on that issue left for the unnistakability doctrine to interpret
and so the case does not represent a powerful interpretive presumption.
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Second, the Court in Merrion notes that sovereign power, "[w]ithout
regard to its source,""' is protected by the unmistakability doctrine. The
state unmistakability cases saw the doctrine as arising from the Contracts
Clause, which provides that "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing
the Obligation of Contracts,"'14 5 and as solely applicable to state govern-
ments. Merrion sees the unmistakability doctrine as equally applicable to
Indian tribes and presumably the federal government. This should mean
that the state unmistakability cases would.be, at a minimum, relevant
guidance for interpretation of the doctrine, and indeed Merrion relies on
one of the state unmistakability cases for its unmistakability rule.'4
144 Merrion, 455 U.S. at 148.
145 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
14 See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147-48 (citing three cases). The third, St. Louis v.
United Ry., 210 U.S. 266 (1908), is a typical unmistakability case firmly in line
with Rogers Park. The Court also cites Blaisdell and Feix v. Sixth Ward Building
& Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940). Blaisdell, discussed supra note 124 and
accompanying text, involved private contracts between private parties. Feixupheld
a state law that restricted the rights of shareholders of a building & loan to redeem
their shares. This is also a private contract. The Court reasoned thatBlaisdell means
that the police power extends to economic regulation as well and that the
shareholders rights were subject to the police power all along. This combination of
reasoning is historically interesting because it marries, albeit awkwardly, the 19th
century deference to the police power with the huge expansion of the concept
worked by Blaisdell.
Justice Stevens dissented in Merrion. He did not take issue with the
unmistakability doctrine, nor with the Court's interpretation of the lease per se, but
questioned whether the tribe had the inherent authority of taxation. Stevens argued
that the tribe's power to tax was derived from the power to exclude non-Indians
from the reservation and, therefore, by granting access to the reservation via a
lease, the tribe no longer had sovereign power over the developer. Consequently,
the tribe should not be allowed to act as a sovereign by imposing a new tax. See
Merrion, 455 U.S. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is atits core another dispute
about the threshold issue of when the unmistakability doctrine should apply.
Interestingly, the majority in Merrion resolved the threshold issue as determining
the government's role: "Most important, petitioners and the dissent confuse the
Tribe's role as commercial partner with its role as sovereign. This confusion
relegates the powers of sovereignty to the bargaining process undertaken in each
of the sovereign's commercial agreements." Id. at 145-46. The majority eventually
confronted Stevens' argument by dissecting the precedents cited by Stevens and
concluded that they do not rely "solely [on] the power to exclude" as the basis for
tribal sovereignty. See id. at 141. So the dispute about the threshold issue of
whether the unmistakability doctrine applies is specific to the origins of tribal
sovereignty. Unfortunately, the majority does not articulate rules for deciding when
1999-2000]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The Supreme Court touched on the issue of whether the federal
government faces the same standard as the states in 1879, when it decided
two companion cases known as the SinkingFund Cases.47 During the Civil
War, the Whigs were finally able to pass legislation chartering companies
to build the intercontinental railroad and open up the West to greater
settlement. Congress chartered the Union Pacific. In light of the railroad's
heavy reliance on bonds for financing, Congress funded "subsidy" bonds,
payable in thirty years. The initial legislation also provided "that Congress
may at any time alter, amend, and repeal this act."'48 In 1878, concerned
that the railroad's shareholders might divert so much money in dividends
as to threaten the railroad's long-term solvency, Congress added a
requirement that the railroad establish a sinking fund 149 with the treasury,
and mandated that the railroad "deposit" into the fund "half ofthe earnings
for services rendered the Government."' 5° The Court upheld the sinking
fund requirement against a due process challenge. Justice Waite, writing
for the majority, hinted that the same standards applied to both the federal
government and state governments despite the wording of the Contracts
Clause:
The United States cannot any more than a State interfere with private
rights, except for legitimate governmental purposes. They are not
included within the constitutional prohibition which prevents States from
passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, but equally with the
States they are prohibited from depriving persons or corporations of
property without due process of law. They cannot legislate back to
themselves, without making compensation, the lands they have given this
Corporation to aid in the construction of its railroad.'
a government unit is acting within its governmental role, nor does Stevens offer a
competing rule. From this, it seems that the threshold issue remains unresolved in
the federal cases. Moreover, Merrion's comment that unmistakability applies
equally to all levels of government obviously did not command unanimous support.
'" Union Pacific Ry. v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 700 (1879); Central Pacific Ry. v.
Gallatin, 99 U.S. 700 (1879).
141 Union Pacific, 99 U.S. at 720.
14' A sinking fund is essentially a segregated account securing payment of
bonds.
15o Union Pacific, 99 U.S. at 726. Note that the other half of such earnings were
already required to be paid towards the debt on the subsidy bonds, so the 1878
amendments effectively took this halftoo. The sinking fund supposedly benefitted
all creditors, but it is unclear how much benefit the private bond holders actually
received.
15 Id. at 718-19.
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If a state were to pass the same law, "it would not be seriously contended
that such legislation was unconstitutional, either because it impaired the
obligations of the charter contract, or deprived the corporation of its
property without due process of law."'5 Waite's reliance on the standard
from the Contracts Clause makes the Sinking Fund Cases consistent with
Merrion's statement that unmistakability applies equally to all levels of
government.
While I do not mean to suggest that I think the unmistakability
standards should be different for the state and federal governments, it is
important to understandthe arguments for and against similar standards. As
argued below, Winstar radically altered the unmistakability defense
available to the federal government and so these issues will likely arise
again later. Because the combination of issues that arise in Winstar is so
complicated, I hope the reader finds it easier to see these arguments here
in simpler form. The argument for maintaining similar standards begins, of
course, with the language from the SinkingFund Cases andMerrion. These
cases treat the unmistakability doctrine as an inherent attribute of sover-
eignty within the American system of government. The state unmistakabi-
lity cases treat the doctrine as arising out of the Contracts Clause; if this
seems a little inconsistent, theMerrion theory leaves plenty of room for the
Contracts Clause to govern cases like Blaisdell, Spannaus, and Energy
Reserves, which affect purely private contractual rights. As discussed
above, having an unmistakability doctrine necessitates separating the
private and sovereign actions of the government.
Private contracting parties might prefer similar standards in order to
avoid having to entertain two different sets of expectations about the
security of their contractual rights against actions by state governments on
the one hand and federal government agencies on the other. But this desire
for uniformity in expectations is undermined somewhat by the Contracts
Clause's exclusive application to the states. The Supreme Court has
consistently applied rational basis review and upheld federal laws that
trample quite blatantly on private contractual obligations.'5 This deference
'5 Id. at 721-22.
" See, e.g., National Ry. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
RR., 470 U.S. 451 (1985) ("AMTRAK') (upholding a federal law changing the
rules about how much AMTRAK could charge other railroads for their employees
to ride on AMTRAK despite the contractual agreements already in place); Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (finding no
violation of due process in requiring a retroactive contribution by an employer to
a pension insurance fund upon the employer's withdrawal from the pension plan);
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding a federal law
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to governmental action is probably more permissive than the Contracts
Clause standard under Spannaus and Energy Reserves.
At this point, it is probably helpful to categorize the various standards
that a governmental unit must meet to defend legislation infringing on
contractual obligations:
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO UPHOLD GOVERNMENTAL
INFRINGEMENT ON CONTRACT RIGHTS:
HIGH, MEDIUM OR Low?
State Government: Federal Government
Contracts Clause Due Process Clause
Private Contractual Medium standard: Low standard:
Obligations Compare Spannaus with Usery, Mottley, et al.
Energy Reserves
Regulatory/Govern- Low standard: Low standard:
mental Obligations Rogers Park, Los Angeles Merrion
City Water I
Completely uniform standards between state and federal governments
would require a moderate revision of the Court's economic due process
jurisprudence, at least if the resulting uniform standard were permissive of
government interference with contract rights. 4 But the fact that Blaisdell
requiring mining companies to compensate former workers who contracted
pneumoconiosis even though miners left the job prior to passage of the law);
Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); United States v. Bankers
Trust Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (two of the "Gold Clause Cases") (upholding the
federal government's move away from the gold standard despite the alleged
infringement of obligations in private bonds requiring payment in gold-backed
currency); New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922) (holding that the
Contracts Clause does not apply to federal regulations requiring state-chartered
railroads to charge more than the maximum allowed in their charter); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911) (holding that a lifetime railroad
pass later banned by statute held not enforceable). The Court in Pension Benefit
specifically rejects the notion that investment-backed expectations need be uniform
relative to actions by either state or federal government. See Pension Benefit, 467
U.S. at 729.
'-'Moreover, any attempts to imposerestrictions on the federal government like
those applicable through the Contracts Clause will need to leave room for the
federal government's express power to enact bankruptcy laws, which quite
expressly infringe the obligation of contracts. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
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set a higher standard for some time without disastrous consequences for
contractual expectations indicates that doctrinal consistency is not much of
a necessity, at least as long as any differences in the standards make sense
independently. Therefore, there seems to be no strong reason to argue for
uniform unmistakability standards between state and federal governments.
There are several reasons why the unmistakability standards, like the
standards for private contractual rights, could be different (i.e., reasons
other than Stevens' views on tribal sovereignty in Merrion). For one, the
Supremacy Clause"'5 provides that federal laws prevail over contrary state
laws. This suggests that the governmental interest could weigh more
heavily in the federal unmistakability doctrine than in the state version.
Admittedly, it is difficult even to conceive of a lower standard than Rogers
Park that could still claim to include in its balancing the private parties'
rights against the governmental interest. Rather, the upshot of comparing
the standards is that, ifthe standards were to diverge, one would expect the
federal standards to be more pro-government than the state standards. 56
With that in mind, one can now appreciate the difficulties presented by
two Depression-era cases that certainly belong in a discussion of the
unmistakability doctrine even though neither one mentions or uses it.
Indeed, these are the federal analogues to the Cleveland City Railway line
of cases on the state side. In Lynch v. United States, the Court found that
Congress violated the Due Process Clause by repealing insurance coverage
that was provided earlier for war veterans. Justice Brandeis began the
Court's analysis by findingthat the insurance policies constituted contracts,
supported by separate consideration in the form of monthly premiums.
True, these contracts, unlike others, were not entered into by the United
States for a business purpose.... But the policies, although not entered
into for gain, are legal obligations of the same dignity as other contracts
of the United States and possess the same legal incidents.
Warriskinsurance, while resembling inbenevolentpurpose pensions,
compensation allowances, hospital and other privileges accorded for
former members of the army and navy or their dependents, differs from
them fundamentally in legal incidents. Pensions, compensation allow-
ances and privileges are gratuities. They involve no agreement of parties;
'
55 See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
156 This scenario should not offend Madisonian notions of faction either, since
the larger federal government, for all its many failings, does seem at least a little
less vulnerable to the sort of self-dealing that befell Georgia in the Yazoo land
scandal in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
117 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
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and the grant of them creates no vested rights. The benefits conferred by
gratuities may be redistributed or withdrawn at any time in the discretion
of Congress.158
This language depends on the distinction between the business and
sovereign roles of the government; here, Brandeis clearly sees the
government acting in a business or proprietary capacity. 1 9 Then, just as the
Court did in Cleveland City Railway, Brandeis applies the reverse
presumption from the traditional unmistakability doctrine: "But no power
to curtail the amount ofthe benefits which Congress contracted to pay was
reserved to Congress[.]"' 16
Brandeis goes into great depth comparingthe government's obligations
in contracting to those of private parties, but the ambiguity of his language
unfortunately did little to resolve the threshold issues of when the
unmistakability doctrine should apply, or when the government is acting
in a sovereign capacity as compared to a business capacity. For example:
"When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties
therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between
private individuals. '6 This begs the question of when the "relations"
qualify as "contract relations" as opposed to, say, "regulatory relations."
But compare what Brandeis wrote a few pages later:
Contracts between individuals or corporations are impaired within the
meaning of the Constitution whenever the right to enforce them by legal
process is taken away or materially lessened. A different rule prevails in
respect to contracts of sovereigns. "The contracts between a Nation and
an individual are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign and
have no pretensions to compulsive force. They confer no right of action
independent of the sovereign will."162
Brandeis resolved the dilemma arising from his logic by distinguishing
between the contractual rights created by the government and the legal
158 Id. at 576-77.
159 This is consistent with language in the Sinking Fund Cases. See Union
Pacific KR. v. United States and Central Pacific KR. v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 700,724
(1878) ("The United States occupy towards this Corporation a two-fold
relation-that of sovereign and that of creditor."). Brandeis did not cite this
language or case, however.
160 Lynch, 292 U.S. at 578.
161 Id. at 579.
162 Id. at 580-81 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton))
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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remedies the government makes available to enforce them. Brandeis
reasoned that the federal government can never give up the power to
reclaim its sovereign immunity, 63 and therefore, Congress could have
restricted the pensioners access to federal court to enforce their contracts
with the government. But Congress could not simply extinguish the right
itself."' This is hardly a satisfactory resolution or distinction.'65 As a
practical matter, the distinction between right and remedy breaks down at
the margin. Moreover, it seems unwise to encourage Congress to drop out
of unwanted contracts in such a backhanded way as to restrict access to the
courts. Nevertheless, few would argue with the result. By making separate
contracts supported by separate consideration, the government tried to act
as a private contracting party and should have been held to its contract. But
the decision in Lynch ultimately did nothing to clarify the threshold issue
of when the government should get to use the unmistakability doctrine.
The finding of liability in Lynch contrasts with the findings of no
liability in the three Gold Clause Cases of 1935.'" These cases arose after
Congress stripped the nation's currency of its backing in gold, doing away
with the gold dollars that had traditionally been the nation's hard currency.
Though the legislation tried to maintain a loose connection between the
value of the dollar and gold (by committing to stable foreign exchange
rates based on gold), it also banned private ownership of gold, effectively
making money itselfthe store of value, whereas before, money's value was
understood to derive from the supposedly intrinsic value of the metal. Prior
to this time, contracting parties often differentiated between payment in
dollars and payment in gold. Countless thousands of these so-called "gold
clauses" were thrown into doubt by this legislation, in a more fundamental
way than earlier changes in the currency. 67 The three Gold Clause Cases
'
63 See id. at 581 ("The rule that the United States may not be sued without its
consent is all embracing.").
'6 See id. at 581-83.
165 Cf Schwartz, LiabilityforSovereignActs, supra note 13, at 679-80 (arguing
that Lynch can be read to mean that government can not repudiate its own debts
"simply in order to save money," but can for "collateral public policies"). Professor
Schwartz's argument seems like a version of the sovereign acts doctrine under
which broad legislation that incidentally infringes on relatively few contracts is
sustained. See infra Part II.A. But see Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualking Sover-
eign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1576 (1992) (arguing that the repeal of
insurance "affected only several hundred policy holders").
1See supra note 153.
167 For example, during the Civil War, the government issued "greenback"
currency which was not backed at all by gold and which consequently suffered
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all refused to award damages against the government, in three representa-
tive fact patterns. Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,16 involved gold
clauses in private contracts, specifically the private bonds of the Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad. Nortz v. United States69 involved gold certificates that
the government issued attesting that certain quantities of gold were set
aside for the beneficiary of the certificate. Perry v. United States"°
involved Treasurybonds payable in gold dollars accordingthe gold clauses
in the bonds. Even though all three cases were decided by the same 5-4
vote, Perry stands as the most controversial.
In Norman, the government essentially admitted that the legislation
devalued the old, gold-backed currency, but countered that everyone now
held the same currency. For example, the government argued that, "It
would be impractical to eliminate the gold clause from future issues only,
since investors would prefer the old issues, public or private, to such an
extent as to require prohibitive rates on the new."'' The Court analyzed the
case as a conflict between private contractual rights and the federal
government's power under the Commerce Clause and reasoned that the
federal power simply overcomes these contractual rights: "Contracts,
however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the Con-
gress.... Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of
dominant constitutional authority by making contracts about them."'
'
Norman is the federal analogue to Blaisdell and, consistent with Mottley
and Usery, stands for the supremacy of the Commerce Clause power over
private contractual rights. Professor Schwartz argues convincinglythat the
gold clause cases are better understood as examples of the sovereign acts
doctrine working to shield the government from liability.17 This makes a
from inflationary tendencies. See, e.g., Gregory v. Morris, 96 U.S. 619 (1878)
(upholding a lower court judgment payable in gold bullion); Trebilcockv. Wilson,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 687 (1871) (holding that when a contract for money is by its
terms made payable in specie or in coin, judgment payable in coined dollars is
appropriate); Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870) (holding the Legal
Tender Acts constitutional as applied to contracts made both before and after their
enactment); Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 229, 251 (1868) (holding that
payment in greenbacks in 1865 for debt arising from a 1861 contract which called
for gold coin is not sufficient-gold coin is required).
168 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R, 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
169 NortZ v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935).
'
70 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
171 Norman, 294 U.S. at 275.
7 Id. at 307-08.
7 See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 680-82.
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great deal of sense because the government relied on the fact that devalua-
tion affected everyone equally as its defense. The sovereign acts doctrine
provides a defense for the government when the breaching legislation has
"public and general" effects well beyond simply breaching plaintiffs's
contracts. 74
In Nortz, the plaintiffs argued that the government acted in is
"corporate or proprietary capacity" in issuing the gold certificates.175 The
Court found that the certificates were not contracts, 7 6 but then relied on a
technical flaw in the facts supporting plaintiffs claims. Plaintiffs first
demanded the gold on January 17, 1934, yet by this time the new legisla-
tion alreadyprohibitedplaintiffs from possessing gold. The devaluation did
not occur until two weeks later on January 30, 1934, so the dollars
disbursed on January 17, 1934 were not yet devalued.1" This reasoning, by
itself, might have left open the possibility that another plaintiffwho waited
to withdraw his gold might do better in litigation, but the combined
holdings of Norman and Perry squashed that hope.
In Perry, the contracts at issue were bonds issued by the Treasury.
Writing forthe majority, JusticeHughes distinguishedbetweentwo powers
of the government:
There is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control
or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the
exercise of its constitutional authority [i.e., Norman], and the power of
Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements when
it has borrowed money under the authority which the Constitution
confers.
178
This distinction is not exactly the same as the sovereign/business role
distinction. Under Hughes' distinction, the government will be bound
whenever it borrows money "on the credit of the United States."1 79 This
follows from Hughes' interpretation of the word "credit": "[t]he binding
quality of the promise of the United States is of the essence of credit which
is so pledged."' 80 The gold clauses in the government bonds therefore
'
74 See Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925).
175 See Nortz, 294 U.S. at 318.
176 See id. at 326.
'77 See id. at 328-29.
178 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350-51 (1935).
1791 Id. at 351 (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 2).
8O Id. at 353.
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bound the government, and the currency legislation breached the
government's obligations.
Perry clearly sets forth a rule that when the federal government
borrows money, it will be bound just as if it were a private contracting
party.' But, as with the other cases discussed herein, the opinion does not
articulate a broader rule for distinguishing generally when the government
will be treated as a private party and when it may use special governmental
defenses. Congress has the power to "control or interdict the contracts of
private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional
authority[.] ' 182 But, the government should not escape liability simply
because it exercises "constitutional authority," as this would be a wildly
underinclusive rule. For example, if the government contracted to buy
boots for the army, promised to pay cash, and later breached the contract
due to subsequent legislation enacted pursuant to constitutional power, no
borrowing on the government's "credit" is involved, but we would expect
the government to be bound just as if it were a private party. Perry includes
its own rendition ofthe question-begging language that runs through many
of these cases: "When the United States, with constitutional authority,
makes contracts, it has rights and incurs responsibilities similar to those of
individuals[.] 183 In light of what we know from the unmistakability
doctrine cases, we are left to wonder when the government makes
"contracts" and when it makes other kinds of agreements that enable it to
use its special contract defenses.
Despite the finding of breach in Perry, the government nevertheless
escaped from paying damages because the Court found that plaintiffs could
not prove any damages. The legislation's universal effect on all actors in
the domestic economy made it impossible for plaintiffs to come up with a
factual comparison that showed how they were worse offthan others. Since
the "free domestic market for gold was nonexistent," plaintiff could not
establish "that in relation to buying power he has sustained any loss
whatever." ' The Court implicitly recognized the relative value of money




' Id. at 352 (emphasis added). The Court cited the Sinking Fund Cases and
Lynch. Compare this language to that from Lynch: "When the United States enters
into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed generally by the
law applicable to contracts between private individuals." Lynch v. United States,
292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
I" Peny, 294 U.S. at 357 (emphasis added). At the time of breach,
[a] free domestic market for gold was non-existent. ... That equivalence or
worth [necessary for proving damages] could not properly be ascertained
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and reasoned that since all money had been equally devalued, everyone
ended up with the same buyingpower l 5 Access to the international market
does not undermine this logic because the legislation first made it illegal
to possess gold, shutting off the plaintiff's effective access to the overseas
gold markets. The Court's reliance on the universality of the effects
strongly supports Professor Schwartz's interpretation that Perry is better
understood as an example of the sovereign acts doctrine." 6
Neither the Gold Clause Cases norLynch explain whythe unmistakabi-
lity doctrine does not apply. These decisions ultimately reflect the same
failure of the case law to establish a general rule for determining when the
government may assert the unmistakability doctrine and when it may not.
As I argue in Part II, much more sense can be made out of the distinction
between the government's sovereign versus proprietary roles, and the
decisions in Lynch and the Gold Clause Cases are consistent with this
general theory. Consistent with this distinction is the Court's decision to
issue separate opinions and reasonings for Norman, where the bonds were
privately issued, and Petiy, where the bonds were issued by the govern-
ment. But for the present purpose of understanding the Winstar decision,
the more important point is the lingering ambiguity in the threshold issue
of when the unmistakability doctrine applies.
Another manifestation of this ambiguity is the differing views over
how broadly the Court's inquiry should range. In Norman, the Attorney
General thought the issues are broad: "Those who insist upon the strict
letter of the bond are insisting upon it in a matter dealing with gold, and
gold lies at the basis of our financial structure. Gold is the subject of
national legislation.... Gold is affected with the public interest."'1 7 In
viewing the issue as whether the government acted according to its
constitutional powers, the government wanted to include in its analysis the
broader context supporting the rationality of the legislation and its
interpretation of the Constitution. By contrast, plaintiffs viewed the issue
as a contract dispute and wanted the Court to limit its inquiry to recon-
save in the light of the domestic and restricted market which the Congress
had lawfully established. In the domestic transactions to which the plaintiff
was limited, in the absence of special license, determination of the value of
.the gold coin would necessarily have regard to its use as legal tender and as
a medium of exchange under a single monetary system with an established
parity of all currency and coins.
Id.
'
5 See id. at 358.
"
6 See Schwartz, Liabilityfor Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 682.
... Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 294 U.S. 240, 257 (1935).
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structing the intent of the contracting parties. As with the threshold issue
of whether the unmistakability defense applies, the two sides of this issue
seem to talk past one another.
In sum, the federal cases illustrate the same three themes as the state
unmistakability cases. First, the strongest examples of the unmistakability
doctrine's interpretive presumption appear inRogers Park for the state side
and Merrion for the federal side. In both. cases, the government agreed to
a certain rate structure and made no additional express promise that it
would not later exercise its sovereign power to change those rates. The
Court read that silence as being ambiguous and then held in favor of the
government. Second, there are parallel examples, where the Court held the
government liable: Cleveland City Railway on the state side and Lynch on
the federal side. These parallel lines of cases do not mention unnistakabi-
litynor offer ageneral explanation ofwhythe unmistakability defense does
not apply. Third, the Court has established different tests for upholding
government infringement on contract rights in cases like Spannaus and
Energy Reserves, where the state infringes on contracts between private
parties, andMottleywhere the federal government does the same thing. The
resulting two-by-two grid of liability standards results in moderate
definitional pressure to clarify when each standard applies, especially in
two specific examples. To keep clear whether Spannaus and Energy
Reserves controls, or if Rogers Park applies, it would seem important to
distinguish when the government is acting in a sovereign capacity from
when its contracts are treated as private contracts. 188 Although it is unclear
whether the unmistakability defense should operate equally for the states
as for the federal government, it seems clear that if the defenses differ, the
federal government should benefit from a stronger version.
2. The Government's Reputation as Contracting Partner
Several of the cases discussed above that adopted a congruence
approach and which did not mention the unmistakability doctrine reasoned
that the government's contracts must be enforced just as private contracts
in order to protect the government's reputation as a contracting partner."9
Without a dependable reputation, the government would need to pay more
or offermore concessions to get the same things andthis would, ultimately,
cost the taxpayers more than it should. A typical example comes from
Lynch: "Punctilious fulfilment of contractual obligations is essential to the
This is the same question raised by the threshold issue.
1 See, e.g., Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 184 U.S. 368 (1902).
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maintenance of the credit of public as well as private creditors."'" The
Court went further in Peny and found that Congress' constitutional
authority to "borrow money on the credit of the United States"'91 necessar-
ily means that the United States must honor all its debts.
But the nation's credit reputation is somewhat self-policing in that any
Congress that reneges on government obligations, to the extent that the
government's credit rating suffers, will certainly risk a powerful political
backlash. One need only recall the budgetary game of chicken played
recently by congressional Republicans and President Clinton to see the
political check in action. As a textual matter, "credit of the United States"
need not imply a perfect credit rating.' 92 Moreover, some sort of escape
valve is probably wiser policy, if the threshold is set high enough. Indeed,
this may be the best reading of Charles River Bridge. In that case, the
bridge proprietors who obtained the franchise at issue, and their financial
backers, were certainly long since dead when the state chartered the
competing bridge.193 Given that several generations had passed and that
Boston residents paid a steep price in tolls and inconvenience to the
successors-in-interest of the charter,"9 it hadto be a close call as to whether
the state minimied its costs to its taxpayers by chartering anew bridge and
risking a higher premium on its credit. The public policy advantages in
breaching the agreement so overwhelmingly outweighed the risk of harm
to the state's reputation as a contracting partner. The lesson to future
contractors is not beware of contracting with the state, but rather, don't
count on bargains that make you and several generations of your assignees
unreasonably wealthy.
This issue is closely related to the one of how best to represent the will
of the people when the current will clashes with the will of a prior
generation. Perry ignores this completely and simply presumes that the
prior generation controls: "The Congress as the instrumentality of
sovereignty is endowed with certain powers to be exerted on behalf of the
people in the manner and with the effect the Constitution ordains. The
Congress cannot invoke the sovereign power ofthe people to override their
110 Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,580 (1934).
191U.S. CONST. arL I, § 8, cl. 2.
192 Early Supreme Court decisions afrfiming the states' debts went a long way
to stabilizing the country and were undoubtedly the correct outcomes at the time.
See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
'
93 See Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,
537-38 (1837).
194 See id. at 456 and 491.
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will as thus declared."' 95 Similarly, in Fletcher v. Peck," the Court
reasoned that:
[T]he framers of the [C]onstitution viewed, with some apprehension, the
violent acts which might grow out of the feelings of the moment; and the
people of the United States, in adopting that instrument, have manifested
a determination to shield themselves and their property from the effects
of those sudden and strong passions to which men are exposed.1
97
This reasoning begs the question as to which legislature is affected by the
"sudden and strong passions" and which is guided by sounder, more sober
judgment. A priori, the second legislature probably has more time and more
information, including about any effects on the sovereign's credit rating
from any previous repudiations, with which to reach a decision. Moreover,
at the time of Fletcher, the young government was, for good reason, much
more concerned with developing a strong reputation as a contracting
partner. Now that the government has established just such a strong
reputation, the question is no longer whether the government may ever
break its regulatory agreements, but rather, what circumstances and legal
standards should govern. Surely the standard must be set high in cases
involving the government acting in a private capacity, as it did in Fletcher
and Perry.
In this light, one can see how the often-quoted language in United
States v. Bekins,19 does little to clarify the issue. In Bekins, the Supreme
Court upheld a federal bankruptcy law that authorized municipal taxing
districts to reorganize even though the reorganization necessarily involved
direct infringement on the contract lights ofthe municipality's creditors. In
language cited by Souter in Winstar, the Court reasoned:
It is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make contracts and give
consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental power. This is
constantly illustrated in treaties and conventions in the international field
by which governments yield their freedom of action in particular matters
in order to gain the benefits which accrue from international accord. 19
'
95Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).
'
96Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
117 Id. at 137-38.
198 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
19Id. at 51-52.
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The Court then listed two more examples of government "contracting":
states making "compacts" with each other and States contracting with
individuals.2" In the first two examples, the contracting parties relate to
each other as legal equals. Their agreement is the only basis for enforce-
ment of the contract against the other. The last example, however, offers
an ambiguous situation because the state has sovereign, regulatory power
over individuals, but it can also enter into a contract with individuals, for
example by hiring them. In the situations where the government contracts
with legal equals, such as employees it hires, its reputation as a contracting
partner is clearly very important. Individuals entering into subsequent
contracts have full freedom to extract a premium for the government's poor
reputation."1 But when the government reaches a regulatory agreement
with someone directly regulated, the concern with protecting the
government's reputation as a contracting partner amounts to a concern that
the government will either not change its regulation or will bargain for the
right to do so. The strength of the unmistakability doctrine is that it retains
for the government the right to act as a sovereign, without having to seek
permission to change course or purchase the right. Without mentioning any
of the limitations of the Bekins language, Justice Souter cites the quoted
language for the proposition that all government agreements, including
regulatory agreements, are treated as private contracts: "[T]he Govern-
ment's practical capacity to make contracts [is] . . . 'of the essence of
sovereignty' itself."02 Sovereignty, in fact, is better understood as the
antithesis of contracting. The distinction between the sovereign and
200 See id. at 52.
" One wonders, for example, whether the Federal Reserve System will suffer
a damaged reputation as a contracting partner for successfully claiming sovereign
immunity from contract claims, even where it entered into the government contract
in its private capacity. See Research Triangle Institute v. Board of Gov. of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 132 F.3d 985 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 44 (1998)
(finding that the Tucker Act did not apply to the Federal Reserve Board, so
background sovereign immunity applied against a contract claim brought by a
reseach institute hired by the Federal Reserve Board to collect data about small
business use of financial services). The contract at issue in Research Triangle
Institute did not involve the Federal Reserve Board's regulatory authority, if any,
over Research Triangle Institute. There seems little to stop the Federal Reserve
Board from raising its win inResearch Triangle Institute as a defense to paying any
contract claim in the future, at least in the Fourth Circuit.
" United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 884 (1996) (quoting Bekins,
304 U.S. at 51-52).
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proprietary roles of the government is discussed more fully in Part II
below. For now, the key point is that although the government's reputation
as a contracting partner needs protection, this need does not conflict with
the unmistakability doctrine.
3. The Unmistakability Doctrine Should Have
Given Mixed Results in Winstar
This section applies the unmistakability doctrine, as understood by
Rogers Park and Merrion, to the facts of Winstar and concludes that the
Court in Winstar reached the correct conclusion for only one of the three
plaintiffs. The analysis here is limited to my application of the
unmistakability doctrine to the relevant agreements; the next sections
criticize Winstar's reasoning in detail.0 3 To apply this defense, one must
analyze the language of the agreements entered into by the governmental
agency and the thrifts.
The first of the three plaintiff thrifts in Winstar, Glendale Federal
Bank, FSB ("Glendale"), entered into a "Supervisory Action Agreement"
with the FHLBB in 1981 in order to acquire an insolvent thrift and secure
goodwill capital from the Bank Board.2" The Supervisory Action
Agreement incorporated "the Agreement of Merger and any resolutions or
letters issued contemporaneously herewith," which included "a stipulation
that any goodwill arising from this transaction shall be determined and
amortized in accordance with [Bank Board] Memorandum R 3 lb," which
permitted goodwill underthepurchase method of accounting and amortiza-
tion thereof.2 5
Because there is no language inthe SupervisoryActionAgreement that
in any way discusses the FHLBB's authority to regulate capital accounting,
the agreements should be read as silent on the issue of government power.
Therefore, nothing should overcome the unmistakability doctrine's
presumption that the FHLBB retains all its regulatorypower over Glendale.
203 See discussion infra Parts I.D. and E. I assume that the unmistakability
defense applies because the nature of the government's regulatory role appears
much more in line with the unmistakability cases, such as the water utility cases,
than cases like Lynch. My full argument appears in Part II; to put that argument
here, before discussing Winstar, would run the risk of improperly implying that
Winstar simply misread the unmistakability doctrine. Instead, I argue later in Part
I that Winstar took advantage of ambiguities in the unmistakability case law and
that its interpretation poorly serves our administrative system of government.204 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 861.
205 See id. at 862.
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Justice Souter, writing the lead opinion for a plurality of the Court in
Winstar, denied the government the protection of the unmistakability
defense against the Glendale plaintiffs.2°6
The second plaintiff, The Statesman Group, Inc. ("Statesman"),
acquired an insolvent Florida thrift and three weak Iowa thrifts in 1988.
Regulatory agreements provided for substantial cash infusions into the
thrifts from Statesman and the FSLIC as well as supervisory goodwill and
a commitment by Statesman to infuse additional capital if the thrifts fell
below regulatory capital minimums.0 7 The provision governing goodwill
stated: "For purposes of this Agreement, any determination of [States-
man's] Required Regulatory Capital . . . shall include . .. amounts
permitted by the FSLIC in the Assistance Agreement and in the forbear-
ances issued in connection with the transactions discussed herein."0 8
Statesman also agreed to "comply in all material respects with all
applicable statutes, regulations, orders of, and restrictions imposed by the
United States or... by any agency of [the United States]."2°9 Similar to the
Glendale agreement, the Statesman agreement with the FHLBB included
no unmistakable promise not to change the regulatory treatment ofthe new
thrift. Furthermore, Statesman's agreement to comply with all applicable
regulations seemed to reserve the FHLBB's the authority to change its
regulations. Again, however, Souter's opinion denied the government its
defense of the unmistakability doctrine with respect to Statesman.2 0
The third plaintiff, Winstar Corporation ("Winstar"), had a stronger
case. Winstar sought to take over Windom Federal S&L, a weak thrift in
Minnesota. Like the other plaintiffs, Winstar entered into several agree-
ments with the FHLBB. Goodwill capital was provided for in an "Assis-
tance Agreement," which incorporated a forbearance letter issued on same
date as the BankBoard resolution approving the merger.' The forbearance
letter provided for recognition of goodwill: "For purposes of reporting to
the Board, the value of any intangible assets resulting from accounting for
the merger in accordance with the purchase method may be amortized by
[Winstar] over a period not to exceed 35 years by the straight-line
method."1 The Assistance Agreement provided that generally accepted
206 See id. at 887.207 See id. at 866-67.
208 Id. at 867.
21Id. at 868.
210 See id. at 887.
211 See id. at 864.
212 d. at 864-65.
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accounting principles would control the accounting practices of the new
thrift, except where contradicted by Bank Board regulations or by the
Assistance Agreement: "Ifthere is a conflict between such regulations and
the Bank Board's resolution or action, the Bank Board's resolution or
action shall govern. '213 This last provision can only mean that if the Bank
Board attempted to change its regulation of goodwill by adopting new
regulations requiring a different accounting treatment, the new regulations
would not apply to Winstar. Although this last provision does not use the
same style of language as that from Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water
Co.,214 the meaning seems unescapably clear, and this ought to overcome
the presumption from the unmistakability doctrine. In sum, the traditional
unmistakability doctrine probably should have protected the government
from contract liability in the cases of Glendale and Statesman, but not
Winstar.
4. Winstar All But Erases the Unmistakability Doctrine
a. Souter Lets the Plaintiffs Avoid the Unmistakability Doctrine
Writing for the plurality, Justice Souter refused to apply the
unmistakability doctrine to the agreements entered into by the thrifts and
the regulatory agencies.2" 5 Instead, Souter affirmed the holding of the en
bane Federal Circuit panel, which found that the unmistakability doctrine
should not apply where the plaintiffs seek damages because damage awards
do not completely block the government's ability to enact new laws.216 The
lower court reasoned that the unmistakability doctrine aims to balance the
government's powers to legislate with the interests of private parties who
rely on government promises; since the government can pass new laws and
pay damages at the same time, there is no need for the unmistakability
doctrine where plaintiffs do not seek an injunction against application of
the new law to them. Only an injunction would actually limit the
government's sovereign power.21 7 Souter refined this reasoning by adding
the proviso that a damages claim could be effectively equivalent to an
injunction if, for example, the new law revoked a promise not to levy a
213 Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
214 Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U.S. 558,560 (1900) ([The
city] "shall not so reduce such water rtes... less than those now charged.").215 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 887.
216 See Winstar v. United States, 64 F.3d 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane).
217 See id. at 1547-48.
211 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 878-80.
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certain tax. In such a case, the damages award for paying the tax and
injunction against the tax amount to the same thing, and therefore, the
government could raise the unmistakability doctrine under Souter's new
rule. In the absence of the unmistakability doctrine, Souter applies what he
describes as the "traditional" method of construing contracts.219
This section criticizes Souter's dismissal of the unnistakabi-
lity doctrine as a radical revision of the doctrine, even considering its
ambiguities. Although Souter's logic is not flatly contradicted by any
specific holdings, this is a product of the failure of the cases to articu-
late rules to resolve the ambiguities discussed above and the relative
paucity of cases on the federal side. Souter's rule is impossible to recon-
cile with the state unmistakability cases because he reduces the doc-
trine almost to the vanishing point. From the perspective of pure logic,
Souter's rule, while somewhat convoluted, does avoid self-contradiction,
but one should question the broader wisdom of eliminating this important
doctrine.
Souter begins his analysis of the unmistakability doctrine with a
straight-forward historical summary of the doctrine's origins. "This
doctrine marks the point of intersection between two fundamental
constitutional concepts, the one traceable to the theory of parliamentary
sovereignty made familiar by Blackstone, the other to the theory that
legislative power may be limited[.]"'20 That legislative power is limited by
constitutional guarantees, such as the Contracts Clause, is sometimes called
the American rule in this context, and Souter properly describes Fletcher
v. Peck"2 as the first major example ofthe American rule.m Fletcher arose
out of the Yazoo land scandal in Georgia. The state legislature sold off
most of what became Mississippi and Alabama at fire sale prices to a few
landholding companies in New England.' "All but one member of the
Georgia legislature personally profited from the deal, and several made
substantial fortunes."'24 The next year, after the scandal had swept the 1795
legislators out of office, the newly elected legislature promptly rescinded
the sales in an attempt to reclaim the land for the state.m The landowners,
219 See id. at 904.
120 Id. at 872.
'2' Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
m See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 873.
m2 See JEAN EDwARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION 388
(1996).
24 Id. at 388-89.
m See id. at 389.
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who, by now, were not the original purchasers, 6 sued and eventually
prevailed in the famous decision by Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall
reasoned that the 1796 legislation violated the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution because it attempted to undo the 1795 contracts of sale, and
this was akin to rolling back time: "if an act be done under a law, a
succeeding legislature cannot undo it." It made no difference that the
contracts of sale were "executed" contracts, because: "[a] contract
executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding
on the parties. '' 8 Justice Johnson, in concurrence, preferred a natural law
basis over the Contracts Clause. He strongly suggested that the government
should owe at least some compensation to the new landowners affected by
the legislation reclaiming the land for the state. 9 Johnson's suggestion of
a takings remedy"0 gives an important clue as to why Marshall may have
felt it desirable to stretch the Contracts Clause to reach "contracts
executed"; it was the only constitutional basis for invalidating the 1796
legislation, since the Due Process Clause had not yet been incorporated
against the states." In light of the subsequent incorporation of the entire
Bill of Rights against the states, the precise holding of Fletcher could stand
some significant limitation with respect to "contracts executed" without
sacrificing any protection for private property.
Souter makes no mention of this, but for our purposes the more
important point is that he is careful to explain that Marshall saw two
distinct limitations on the sovereignty of the 1796 Georgia legislature.
According to Souter, Marshall based his conclusions on "the two distinct
reasons that the intrusion on vested rights by the Georgia Legislature's Act
ofrepeal might well have gone beyond the limits of 'the legislative power,'
2 6 See id. at 389-90.
2v Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810). Professor Griffith
points out that Marshall never really "reconciled the tension between this principle
[i.e., that one legislature cannot bind the next] and the contract clause." Griffith,
supra note 43, at 289.
8 Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 137.
229 See id. at 143-48 (Johnson, J., concurring).
230 id. at 145 (Johnson, J., concurring).
231 Compare Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet) 243 (1833) (rejecting incor-
poration of the Bill of Rights against the states); with Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78 (1908), overruled inpart by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying
principles from the Due Process Clause); and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319 (1937) (incorporating the Due Process Clause against the states). This pro-
bably explains Johnson's reluctance to argue more directly for a takings remedy as
well.
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and that Georgia's legislative sovereignty was limited by the Federal
Constitution's bar against laws impairing the obligation of contracts. '2 32
The first basis is the American rule of limited sovereignty. Thus, Souter
reads Fletcher as reflecting an inherent limitation on sovereignty, which
came to support the unmistakability doctrine. In addition, Fletcher and the
unmistakability doctrine drew support from the Contracts Clause of the
Constitution. There seems to be no need to extract out of general principles
of sovereignty the very same rule that appears in the Contracts Clause,
except to imply that the limitation in the Contracts Clause is also
fundamental to all forms of sovereign power in America, including the
federal government, even though the Contracts Clause by its terms only
applies to the states. This is why the unmistakability doctrine applies to the
federal government.
Souter explains that the unmistakability doctrine, as well as the
reserved powers doctrine, grew out of the need to balance the conflicting
goals ofprotecting sovereign power and contractual rights. He cites without
comment Providence Bank v. Billings and Charles River Bridge.233 Souter
then briefly quotes two landmark unmistakability cases, but does not
discuss the ambiguity they take on following his view that damages do not
limit sovereign power." From Minot v. Philadelphia & Baltimore
Railroad,235 Souter quotes: "All public grants are strictly construed.
Nothing can betaken against the state by presumption of inference."' z 6 This
wording of the rule would seem to require a strict construction against all
governmental promises, including promises to pay damages, because it is
apparently to be applied as the first step in construing the agreement. As an
interpretive tool, strict construction is used to discover what promises the
government made, without any reference to the type of liability to be
imposed for breach of those promises. 7 But then, from Jefferson Branch
Bankv. Skelly, 38 Souter quotes: "neither the right oftaxation, nor any other
232 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 873-74 (1996).
233 See id. at 874.
2 See id.
" Minot v. Philadelphia & Baltimore R.P., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206 (1873).
236 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 874 (quotingMinot, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) at 225). Souter
quoted the sentences separately.
23' At least one commentator uses "strict construction" as a synonym for
unmistakability. See, e.g., Mitchell, The Treatment ofPublic Contracts, supra note
65, at 196.
" Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436 (1861) (finding a
violation of the Contracts Clause).
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power of sovereignty, will be held.., to have been surrendered, unless
such surrender has been expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken."219
This passage arguably supports the same strict construction rule as the first
quote. But by speaking more directly in terms of "power" and "surrender"
of the power, the Skelly quote also supports Souter's reading that the
unmistakability doctrine is only concerned with protecting the sovereign
power to make new laws, and that damages might therefore be of less
concern. However, Souter does not mention this ambiguity in the quotes or
in the cases making up the unmistakability doctrine.
Instead, Souter asserts: "The posture of the Government in these early
unmistakability cases is important.... In each case, the private party was
suing to invalidate the abrogating legislation under the Contracts
Clause."'240 This is correct, but incomplete. First, the plaintiffs in Charles
RiverBridge and Chenango Bridge sought both an injunction and damages,
but in neither case did the Court differentiate the claims on the basis of the
effect the relief would have on the state's sovereign power.24'
Moreover, few states at the time had waived their sovereign immunity
against damages for contract actions, and it does not appear that
Massachusetts or New York were among the early few.242 If, as seems
likely, Massachusetts and New York had not waived sovereign immunity
against contract claims, then the only basis for suit would have been the
Contracts Clause, which does not provide for damages.243 It therefore
239 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 874-75 (quoting Jefferson Branch, 66 U.S. (1 Black)
at 446).240 Id. at 875.
24 See Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,
427-28 (1837); Chenango Bridge Co. v. Binghamton Bridge Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
51, 72 (1865).
242 Massachusetts law permits contract claims against the commonwealth, see
MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 12 (1992), but this provision was enacted in 1979. Cf
Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812) (recognizing the sovereign immunity
defense). New York's current waiver of sovereign immunity was enacted in 1920.
See N.Y. Cr. CL. Act art. II, § 8 (McKinney 1989). See also Enrico G. Gonzalez,
Note, ContractLaw/Sovereignlmmunity-theDemise ofSovereign Immunity in the
Contractual Battle Against State Agencies-Champagne-Webber, Inc. v. Fort
Lauderdale, 519 So. 2d 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988), 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 899,
904 (1990) (mentioning states' efforts to restricttheir sovereign immunity); Renna
Rhodes, Principles of Governmental Immunity.in Texas: The Texas Government
Waives Sovereign Immunity When it Contracts-or Does It?, 27 ST. MARY'S L.J.
679, 681-82 (1996) (same). The federal government did not do so until 1898 with
the passage of the Tucker Act.
243 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
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makes little sense to distinguish these cases on the basis of the remedy at
issue.
Souter appears to consider the state unmistakability doctrine cases as
somehow informative but not controlling. Souter goes on to acknowledge
that it is unclear how much the unmistakability doctrine case law should be
read to apply to the federal government: "Although the Contracts Clause
has no application to acts of the Unites States, it is clear that the National
Government has some capacity to make agreements binding future
Congresses by creating vested rights. The extent of that capacity, to be
sure, remains somewhat obscure."2" Souter then discusses in some detail
the three federal unmistakability cases analyzed above-Merrion, POSSE,
and Cherokee Nation. He does not similarly summarize any state cases,
other than Fletcher, in his introductory paragraphs. This murky status of
the state cases reflects a potential dilemma for Souter; if the state cases
applied to the federal government, for example, because the unmistakabi-
lity doctrine arises from inherent principles of sovereignty and so applies
to all levels of government, then the plurality opinion contradicts the
holdings of Charles River Bridge and Binghamton Bridge and ignores the
analysis of the Rogers Park line of cases.2 5 If the state unmistakability
doctrine cases do not apply, for example because they are grounded in the
Contracts Clause, then Winstar has made it much more difficult for the
federal government, relative to the states, to escape contract liability for
regulatory agreements.
Souter does not address this internal tension in his reasoning, but
instead moves on to summarize his unmistakability rule:
Merrion, Bowen [i.e., POSSE], and Cherokee Nation thus announce no
new rule distinct from the canon construction adopted inProvidenceBank
and Charles River Bridge; their collective holding is that a contract with
a sovereign government will not be read to include an unstated term
exempting the other contracting party from the application of a
subsequent sovereign act (including an Act of Congress), nor will an
ambiguous term of a grant or contact be construed as a conveyance or
surrender of sovereign power[.]2"
This phrasing of the rule focuses on the government's subsequent use of
power, not on the presence or absence, in the initial agreement, of any
244 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 875-76 (citations omitted).
245 Cf id. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring) (contending that the plurality's
treatment of unmistakability doctrine "has several difficulties, the first being that




promises by the government. In this way Souter's rule tracks the language
in Skelly; again this is done without commentary.
Souter's emphasis on the government's ability to apply the new law to
the plaintiff is the key to both his statement of the unmistakability doctrine
and his rule as to whether the doctrine applies.
The cases extending back into the 19th-century thus stand for a rule that
applies when the Government is subject either to a claim that its contract
has surrendered a sovereign power (e.g., to tax or control navigation), or
to a claim that cannot be recognized without creating an exemption from
the exercise of such a power (e.g., the equivalent of exemption from
Social Security obligations). The application of the doctrine thus turns on
whether enforcement of the contractual obligation alleged would block
the exercise of a sovereign power of the Government.247
This language seems craftedto sound generally applicable, like the general
rule from the unmistakability cases, even though it significantly narrows
the focus of the doctrine as much as possible without directly contradicting
the federal cases in which the Court did in fact apply the unmistakability
doctrine.
Souter squares Cherokee Nation and Merrion with his theory by
explaining that both involved claims for damages and therefore there was
no danger of blocking the government's ability to exercise a sovereign
power. This does explainMerrion, since the plaintiffs alleged the tribe had
promised not to impose the disputed tax. Awarding damages for having to
pay the tax is logically equivalent to an injunction against applying the tax
to plaintiffs. This does not work quite so neatly with Cherokee Nation,
however. In Cherokee Nation, plaintiffs brought a takings case seeking
damages for the government's dredging of a navigational channel in the
tribe's riverbed.248 The problem was that the Court reversed the lower court
for using an improper balancing test to decide whether compensation was
due. "Applying this [balancing] test, the [lower] court concluded that
though the Cherokee Nation could not interfere with the United States'
exercise of the navigational servitude, it had a right to compensation for
any consequent loss of property or diminution in value." '249 This
distinction, which was overruled by the Supreme Court, parallels the
reasoning of the circuit court in Winstar, which Souter upheld: enforcing
'
7 Id. at 878-79 (footnote omitted).24 See United States v. Cherokee Nation, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987).
249 Id. at 703 (referring to Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871,877
(1986)).
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the alleged contract by paying damages would not prevent the exercise of
the sovereign power that gave rise to damages. Certainly, Cherokee Nation
is concerned with rejecting the incorrect balancing test, but the decision
also shows the Court using the unmistakability doctrine to interpret the
government's promise. Cherokee Nation does not support the distinction
between damages and an injunction that Souter puts forth to decide whether
the unmistakability doctrine applies.
Souter's rule on applicability depends on the Court performing an
interpretative step of its own as a way of deciding whether to apply the
unmistakability defense:
So long as such a contract is reasonably construed to include a risk-
shifing component that may be enforced without effectively barring the
exercise of [agovernmental] power, the enforcement ofthe risk allocation
raises nothing for the unmistakability doctrine to guard against, and there
is no reason to apply it.750
In performing this initial interpretation, however, Souter intends that the
Court should read into the contract governmental promises to pay damages.
This is clear from Souter's approach of interpreting the regulatory
agreements before analyzing the unmistakability doctrine:
We read this promise as the law of contracts has always treated promises
to provide something beyond the promisor's absolute control, that is, as
a promise to insure the promisee against loss arising from the promised
condition's nonoccurrence. Holmes's example is famous: "[i]n the case
of a binding promise that it shall rain tomorrow, the immediate legal
effect of what the promisor does is, that he takes the risk of the event,
within certain defined limits, as between himself and the promisee. 251
Thus, the Holmesian interpretive presumption is to find a promise to pay
damages whenever a promisor promises anything "beyond the promisor's
absolute control." In combination, these passages mean that the Court
250 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 880 (emphasis added).
' Id. at 868-69 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW
(1881), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JUSTICE HOLMES at 268 (S.
Novick ed., 1995)) (footnote omitted).
2 The fact that actions of Congress are beyond the absolute control of an
agency raises another issue, ignored by Souter, that is addressed below in
discussion of the express delegation doctrine.
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is to apply the Holmesian presumption of damages and then ask whether
the Court can conceive of a damages remedy that would still allow the
government to apply the new law to the plaintiffs. If the Court can find
such a damages remedy the government may not raise the unmistakability
defense23 As a practical matter, the only occasions where Souter's rule
could allow the unmistakability defense are the tax cases or situations, like
POSSE, that amount to a specifically targeted tax or fee for participation
in a government program.'
b. The Plurality's Rule is Inconsistent with Unmistakability Case Law
and Neighboring Jurisprudence ofEconomic Due Process
As discussed above, the early state cases applied the unmistakability
doctrine in their initial analysis ofthe contract. Application did not depend
on the nature of the claim. Indeed, in Charles River Bridge and Chenango
Bridge plaintiffs sued for both damages and injunctions, but this fact did
not in any way affect the Court's analysis. Unfortunately, the unmistaka-
bility cases, andtheparallel cases that refusedto apply unmistakability, did
not engage in any dialogue that might have clarified when each analysis
should apply. This failure to define the threshold question left the door
open for Souterto create a new rule for when to apply the doctrine, without
having to explain away any competing analysis about when the doctrine
should apply. On balance, the state unmistakability case law is better
described by the rule from the Delaware Railroad Tax Case-strict
construction-than by the language about preserving sovereign "power"
from Skelly. Souter quotes both and does not mention their key difference
in scope; the better reconciliation of the two quotes is that the language
3 Schwartz is surely correct to criticize Souter for trying to de-emphasize the
importance of the Holmesian presumption in reaching his construction of the
agreements: "[T]he contracts were construed not to constrain the Government's
sovereign authority only because of reliance on Holmes's approach to reading a
contract[.]" Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 507
("Justice Souter turns a blind eye to the fact that, under his own account, the
Government never made the promise he posits."). Id. at 537. Breyer ignores this
aspect of Souter's analysis.
' But cf. Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 497
(concluding that Souter would apply unmistakability doctrine "only when
injunctive relief is sought ... [or] when damages are sought that would be
tantamount in practical effect to such injunctive relief). Neither Schwartz nor
Souter seem to appreciate the extent to which this equivalency notion is
manipulable by plaintiffs. See infra text accompanying notes 284-285.
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about preserving power from Skelly is merely the rationale behind the rule
of strict construction. The unmistakability cases seem to have assumed all
along that even damages remedies have some effect on sovereign power.
It seems clear that Souter's rule would require reversal of most of the
state unmistakability cases. Most of these involved regulation of utility
rates charged to retail customers. These cases did not involve payment of
taxes or fees to the government. Subsequently lowering the permissible
rates below the maximums set in the charters presumably reduced profits.
But requiring the government to pay damages for lost profits would not be
the functional equivalent of an injunction against the new lower rates. The
injunction would not seem to have any direct affect on the municipality's
budget, in any event. Presumably there could be indirect budgetary effects
supporting the city's need to change its rate regulations, but this is the
traditional rationale for why we need an unmistakability doctrine (not why
we need to be done with it). Souter's revision of the unmistakability
doctrine thus contradicts most of the state unmistakability holdings.
A majority of the Court criticized Souter's adoption of his new rule.
Scalia wrote in concurrence: "[Souter's] approach has several difficulties,
the first being that it has no basis in our cases, which have not made the
availability of these sovereign defenses (as opposed to their validity on the
merits) depend upon the nature of the contract at issue." 55 In dissent,
Rehnquist criticized Souter's rule as contrary even to the federal
unmistakability cases. 56 Souter himself comes close to admitting the
newness of his rule when he explains why there are so few federal
unmistakability cases:
But the want of more developed law on limitations independent of the
Contract Clause is in part the result of applying the unmistakability canon
ofconstruction to avoid this doctrinal thicket, as we have done in several
cases involving alleged surrenders of sovereign prerogatives by the
National Government and Indian tribes.2V
So while the Court has applied the doctrine "several" times in the past,
under Souter's new rule it is clear that the unmistakability doctrine
would not apply in the cases he refers to, i.e. POSSE, Cherokee Nation,
and Merrion. When judged against prior cases, then, Souter's rule is a
major departure. Although it does not flatly contradict specific language in
211 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'5 See id. at 926 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 876 (emphasis added).
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any unmistakability case, this is due more to the ambiguities in the
threshold issue in the unmistakability cases than to Souter's fidelity to their
holdings.
Souter might have chosen the different strategy of putting the federal
unmistakability doctrine on a different footing than the state unmistakabi-
lity doctrine. This is the course suggested by Breyer in his concurrence.
Breyer argues that the federal cases relied on weak interpretive
presumptions.218 This seems correct for POSSE and Cherokee Nation, as
explained in the section above, though not for Merrion.1 But if Souter
followed this strategy, he would run into two problems previewed in the
previous section. First, more visibly relying only on federal cases would
highlight the doctrinal problems Winstar creates. Winstar creates a new
tension between the unmistakability defense available to the states and that
available to the federal government. Souter began his unmistakability
analysis by noting that the doctrine applies to all levels of sovereignty in
the American system, and by hinting that the state cases are equally
informative of the doctrine. But his much more careful analysis of the
258 See id. at 914-16.
11 Breyer employs circular logic in explaining away Merrion. He correctly
notes that Merrion viewed the "silence" in the lease agreement about the tribe's
taxation power as ambiguous as to whether any promises had been made about
taxation, and that the unmistakability doctrine required such ambiguities to be read
in favor of the government. Breyer then reasons:
Though the opinion contains language of "umistakability," the Court was
not called upon in Merrion to decide whether a sovereign's promise not to
change the law (or to pay damages if it did) was clear enough to justify
liability, because there was no evidence of any such promise in the
"contiacts" in that case.
Id. at 914-15. But the Court in Merrion found no such evidence precisely because
it applied the unmistakability doctrine. Even more indicative of this circularity is
Breyer's dependence on the Holmesian presumption of damages as the "evidence"
that the government intended to bind itself to recognition of goodwill:
To be sure, it might seem unlikely, in the abstract, that the Government
would have intended to make a binding promise that would oblige it to hold
the thrifts harmless from the effects of future regulation (or legislation) in
such a high-risk, highly regulated context as the accounting practices of
failing savings and loans. But, as the plurality's careful examination of the
circumstances reveals, that is exactly what the Government did.
Id. at 918. Cf id. at 936 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing Breyer for rely-
ing on an implication-in-law that Breyer mistakes for a factual finding of the
Court).
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federal cases strongly suggests that he deems it necessary to reconcile his
new rule only with holdings from the federal government cases. After all,
Souter would have faced insurmountable difficulty reconciling his theory
with the state unmistakability cases, such as Rogers Park, had he analyzed
them in the same depth. Therefore, the states are left with the Rogers Park
line of cases as the unmistakability defense, while the federal government,
under Winstar, has essentially no unmistakability defense left. As explained
above, to the extent these differ, one would expect the federal government
to have the stronger defense, yet Souter's rule leaves the states with the
stronger defense against liability, at least against damages.
An aggressively conservative reading of Winstar might argue that
Winstar did in fact overrule Rogers Park on the state side. This argument
would rely on the language from Merrion and the Sinking Fund Cases that
the federal government enjoys only the same unmistakability defense to
contract liability as the states. But this argument would only cure the
inconsistency with Rogers Park, it would do nothing to cure the other
glaring doctrinal inconsistency created by Winstar. Now the federal
government faces a much more difficult liability standard when it impairs
regulatory agreements than when it impairs private contractual rights. A
look at the new grid may be useful:
CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS TO UPHOLD GOVERNMENTAL
INFRINGEMENT ON CONTRACT RIGHTS:
HIGH, MEDIUM OR Low?
State Government: Federal Government:
Contracts Clause Due Process Clause
Private Contractual Medium standard: Low standard:
Obligations Compare Spannaus with Usery, Mottley, et al.
Energy Reserves
Regulatory/Govern- Low standard: High standard
mental Obligations Rogers Park, Los Angeles (to avoid damages):
City Water (or High Winstar
standard: Winstar)
Doctrinally, Winstar creates a great deal of definitional pressure to
distinguish the Usery line of cases, which set low standards under the Due
Process Clause to uphold federal legislation, from the new Winstar rule
which makes it very difficult for the federal government to escape liability.
Souter does not mention this problem, probably because he rejects the
distinction between regulatory agreements and private contracts as
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incoherent,26 ° even though this is evidently the major distinction between
Winstar and the economic due process cases. Thus, even under an
aggressively conservative reading, Winstaris inconsistent with surrounding
economic due process doctrine. Moreover, on a logical level, one would
expect the government (state or federal) to face a more lenient standard
when it reneges its regulatory promises because there is a strong public
interest in protecting the government's ability to enact new legislation and
amend regulatory strategies and goals.
The second major problem with setting Winstar upon a separate,
federal basis is that regulatory agreements do not appear to fit neatly within
the Tucker Act. As noted above, Souter simply sets aside the "anterior
question whether there were contracts at all between the Government and
respondents.1261 Given the depth of Souter's analysis, it is disappointing
that he does not explore the issue of whether the regulatory approvals
should be considered contracts at all. For example, criminal plea
agreements have never been held to support contractual damages under the
Tucker Act, even though courts generally use contractual canons of
construction to interpret the provisions of plea agreements. Regulatory
agreements are more like plea agreements than private contracts in the
sense that they do not generally make any provision, either expressly or
implicitly, for payment of damages.
Moreover, Souter's use of the Tucker Act to support contract damages
for breach of regulatory agreements seems to run afoul of the Anti-
Deficiency Act,262 which requires appropriations for funds paid out for
judgment liabilities on government contracts. The dissent in Winstarargues
that the plurality's use of the Holmesian presumption "seems the very
essence ofa promise implied in law, which is not even actionable under the
10 Justice Rehnquist raises the "dual roles of Government' in discussing the
sovereign acts doctrine. Id. at 931 (emphasis in original). Justice Souter responds:
"Such a distinction would raise enormous analytical difficulties[.]" Id. at 886.261 d. at 860.
22 The Anti-Deficiency Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1341, provides:
(a)(1) An officer or employee of the United States Government or of the
District of Columbia government may not-
(A) make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an
amount available in an appropriation or fund for the expenditure or
obligation;
(B) involve either government in a contract or obligation for the
payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by
law.
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
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Tucker Act, rather than a promise implied in fact, which is."263 By treating
the government's contractual liability as based on fundamental attributes
of sovereignty, Souter can sidestep this flaw in his reasoning without
attracting a great deal of attention.
After all, Souter could easily have based his analysis in part upon the
Due Process Clause. His analysis of the unmistakability doctrine relies not
on the Tucker Act but on inherent limits of sovereignty under the American
rule,214 apparently because the state unmistakability cases relied on the
Contracts Clause, which does not apply to the federal government. 265 In his
section on the sovereign acts doctrine, Souter cites a famous due process
decision and defends the citation against the dissent's criticism by saying:
"it would be surprising indeed if the sovereign acts doctrine, resting on the
inherent nature of sovereignty, were not shaped by fundamental principles
about how sovereigns ought to behave."26 Souter could easily have argued
that fundamental fairness requires the government to keep its promises, but
he stopped well short of this.
Direct reliance on the Due Process Clause would raise the question of
why private parties do not assume the risk of regulatory change in heavily
regulated industries. This is a traditional due process notion, labeled by one
critic the "heavily regulated industry doctrine, '2 67 which has been applied
widely in both contract law and criminal law. There is much less concern
for protecting findamental fairness in heavily regulated industries because
private parties should reasonably expect changes in regulation and so
should not rely on a given regulatory environment remaining constant.
Starting with a due process perspective, therefore, inevitably tends to favor
the government's position in Winstar. For Souter to avoid this pitfall, he
261 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 930 (citing Hercules v. United States, 516 U.S. 417
(1996)).
21 In analyzing the Court's holding in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87
(1810), Souter wrote that ChiefJustice Marshall based his conclusions on "the two
distinct reasons that the intrusion on vested rights by the Georgia Legislature's Act
of repeal might well have gone beyond the limits of 'the legislative power,' and
that Georgia's legislative sovereignty was limited by the Federal Constitution's bar
against laws impairing the obligation of contracts." Id. at 873-74.
11 The only alternative would have been a different rule for the states and
federal government.
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 898 n.43.
7 Robert A. Graham, Note, The Constitution, the Legislature, and Unfair
Surprise: Toward a Reliance-Based Approach to the Contract Clause, 92 MICH.




must implicitlytreat the government as any other private, contracting party,
and apply contractual principles-that limit the context which the court may
analyze in reaching its decision. Souter is hardly the first to take advantage
of this style of argument, to be sure. Each of the state cases, like Detroit
Citizens', that found the state liable without consideration of the
unmistakability doctrine employed similar reasoning. Souter's reasoning
carefully minimizes the risks of exposing each of these potential flaws in
his analysis.
Professor Schwartz argues that Winstar amounts to the victory of
congruence over exceptionalism in interpreting regulatory agreements.268
This aptly describes the net results of Souter's reasoning and his common
ground with Scalia. Perhaps a slightly deeper explanation is that Souter's
analysis demonstrates the internal logic that can be achieved by starting
from the premise that regulatory agreements should be treated as contracts.
One hazard to avoid is mentioning the parallel universe of analysis that
begins with a due process emphasis on the actions of the government as a
sovereign. The contractual analysis (e.g., theHolmesianpresumption about
promises it will rain tomorrow), excludes the broader context necessary to
analyze the fundamental fairness of governmental actions. The only
relevant context in contractual analysis is intent of the parties.269 The
contractual analysis ignores the public policy rationale for applying
different contract rules to the government. But the fact that the taxpayers
must pay for any contract damages incurred by the government has
rightfully justified the many different rules for government contracting.
However, because regulatory agreements such as the merger approvals
in Winstar involve governmental exercise of sovereign powers, the
agreements can also be analyzed from the due process perspective of
fundamental fairness. This perspective starts from the presumption that the
government has broad latitude to exercise sovereign control, subject to
certain limits. The key difference from contractual analysis is that due
process analysis looks much more broadly to the full context of the
government's actions; it does not look only at the intent of the parties.
Perhaps the most disappointing aspect of Souter's analysis is that it
268 See Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 481.
Schwartz uses "congruence" to mean applying the same contract rules the
government as to private parties, and "exceptionalism" to mean allowing the
government to use special defenses. See id.269 It is interesting to note that Holmes penned his contractual analysis prior to
enactment of the Tucker Act, when there was no reason to think that such
contractual analysis would be applied to the federal government
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repeatedly buries the deeper threshold issues of whether the agreements are
contracts and whether the appropriate starting place is contractual analysis
or due process analysis.
Souter's unmistakability rule blazes bold new ground by drastically
limiting the availability of the unmistakability defense. While his analysis
does not contradict the specific language in any unmistakability cases, this
is enabled by the cases' failure to answer the threshold question of when
the doctrine applies. It seems clear that Souter's analysis would reverse
most, if not all of the state unmistakability cases, but the opinion does not
own up to this. The plurality's rule creates important and illogical
inconsistencies with respect to both the state uni istakability doctrine and
the federal economic due process jurisprudence. Finally, Winstar fails, like
most unmistakability cases, to answer the key underlying questions of
when it makes more sense to apply congruence-based contract rules to the
government and when it makes more sense to start with the due process
perspective that looks more broadly to the full context surrounding the
government's subsequent legislation.
c. The Concurrences ofBreyer and
Scalia Fear the Unmistakability Doctrine Allows
the Government to Make Illusory Promises
Justice Breyer signed onto the lead opinion but also filed his own
concurring opinion. Breyer's analysis focuses purely on the contractual
intent of the parties. Breyer does little to explain why this perspective is
superior to the due process perspective described above, other than to note
that the contracts involved in Winstar "resembl[ed]" those in Lynch and
Perry.
Instead, Breyer puts forth two main reasons why the unmistakability
rule does not save the government here. First, as noted above, the decisions
involving federal or tribal governments did not rely on a strong interpretive
presumption; a persuasive argument for POSSE and Cherokee Nation but
not for Merrion. Second, Breyer argued that the government could not
explain why the unmistakability doctrine would not apply to all
government contracts. Souter raises essentially the same issue when he
criticizes the dissent for failing to persuasively distinguish Lynch.270
The government's brief did little to allay this fear when it argued that
any "substantial damages" award against the government implicates the
270 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 885.
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sovereign power protected by the unmistakability doctrine' Breyer
responded:
But this rationale has no logical stopping point. It is difficult to see how
the Court could, in a principled fashion, apply the Government's rule in
this case without also making it applicable to the ordinary contract case
(like the hypothetical sale of oil) which, for the reasons explained above,
are properly governed by ordinary principles of contract law.272
Breyer's brief summary of the government's argument does no significant
disservice to the government's position. Like most of the unmistakability
cases, the government's brief failed to put forth much of a rationale for
deciding when to apply the unmistakability doctrine and when to treat
government agreements like private contracts.
Breyer's second argument invokes the very legitimate fear that a
contrary result would allow the government to make illusory promises in
its regulatory agreements. Perhaps the most unfortunate example from the
government's brief appears in its analysis of the goodwill agreement in
Winstar. Unlike Glendale's or Stateman's, Winstar's agreement contained
a clause explaining that the goodwill agreement would apply instead of any
contrary regulations. But the government's brief argued:
The integration clause did not make the forbearance letter and Bank
Board Resolution into contractual promises that Winstar could continue
to capitalize goodwill in the future, even if regulatory policy or the
governing statute should change. Those documents reflectedthen-current
regulatorypolicy and stated the steps Winstar needed to take to capitalize
goodwill-and the amortization schedule that could be used in doing
so-under that policy.273
The government's brief emphasized its interpretation throughout that the
agreements merely reflected the "then-current" policy. It is very difficult
to see daylight between this argument and the conclusion that the
government made illusory promises. After all, if regulatory agreements are
not contracts, what are they and when should courts enforce them? Part II
271 See id. at 917 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at *21, United States v. Winstar
Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (No. 95-865) (1996 WL 99716)).27 Id. (citation omitted).
273 Petitioner's Brief at *29, United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839
(1996) (No. 95-865) (1996 WL 99716) (emphasis added).
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of this Article attempts to answer this question, which is but another
restatement of the lingering ambiguity in the unmistakability cases and
doctrine. The government's failure to provide a convincing theory for this
explains, perhaps more than any oflier reason, the Court's reluctance to use
the unmistakability doctrine to shield the government from liability.
Justice Sealia filed a concurring opinion joined by Justices Kennedy
and Thomas. Scalia's opinion styles itself as quite different from Souter's
lead opinion, but the net result is strikingly similar. Scalia criticizes the
plurality for making up a new rule governing applicability of the
unmistakability doctrine. Scalia then purports to apply the unmistakability
doctrine.274 Scalia describes the doctrine as "simply a rule of presumed (or
implied-in-fact) intent" 75 that takes into account the fact that "[g]ovem-
ments do not ordinarily agree to curtail their sovereign or legislative
powers[.]" '276 Scalia is persuaded, however, that the plaintiffs have
overcome this presumption:
Their claim is that the Government quite plainly promised to regulate
them in a particular fashion, into the future. They say that the very subject
matter of these agreements, an essential part of the quidpro quo, was
Government regulation; unless the Government is bound as to that
regulation, an aspect of the transactions that reasonably must be viewed
as a sine qua non of their assent becomes illusory. I think they are
correct.2 "
Scalia argues that since the core of the agreement was government
regulation, the government's promise to regulate this way is clear enough
to overcome the unmistakability doctrine. This clearly ignores that all
unmistakability cases involve agreements about government regulation.
Scalia's blatant revision of the unmistakability doctrine would shock the
conscience if it were not backed up by the same fear of illusory promises
that apparently drove each of the majority's other opinions: "Indeed, it is
hard to imagine what additional assurance that the course of regulation
would not change could have been demanded-other than, perhaps, the
Government's promise to keep its promise.' 7 8 Such a second promise is
essentially what Rogers Park and Los Angeles City Water required. But
274 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 920.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 921.




without a theory as to when to apply the doctrine, it appears to give the
government the power to make illusory promises.
d. Rehnquist's Dissent
In addition to criticizing the plurality's restriction of the unmistakabi-
lity doctrine, Justice Rehnquist attacks Souter's lead opinion on a purely
logical level. First, Rehnquist criticizes Souter for interpreting the
agreements first and only later deciding whether to apply the unmistakabi-
lity doctrine. "[I]f a canon of construction cannot come into play until the
contract has first been interpreted as to liability by an appellate court, and
remanded for computation of damages, it is no canon of construction at
all."279 But the problem with Souter's interpretation is less a logical one
than infidelity to precedent. As discussed above, the unmistakability cases
applied the doctrine in order to reach their interpretation of the contract. As
a matter of logic, however, damage awards and injunctions often face
different requirements and analysis. And it is certainly true that damages,
as a general matter, have less impact on government's sovereign power to
govem than injunctions.280
Souter responds to the dissent with a footnote explaining that there is
no "question-begging" in applying different rules of construction to the
same agreement: "A contract may reasonably be read under normal rules
of construction to contain a [risk-shifting] provision that does not satisfy
the more demanding standard of unmistakable clarity. If an alleged term
could not be discovered under normal standards, there would be no need
for an unmistakability doctrine."281 There is no internal contradiction in
first applying the Holmesian presumption of promises to pay damages first
and then, if no such promises are found, allowing the unmistakability
defense., While this may be a little more post-modem than one would
expect from Souter, it clearly answers any concern over his analysis
contradicting itself logically. The net result is simply that the unmistakabi-
279 Id. at 930-31.
280 This distinction assuredly breaks down in the face of the huge liabilities
likely to be imposed as a result of Winstar, which certainly would have given
Congress pause if it had known about them in advance. Accord Krent, supra note
165, at 1537, 1568-78 (arguing that damages would affect Congress's decision
making); but see Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate
Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific
Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 159 (1998) (contending that the specific
performance remedy is "more intrusive" on government).
281 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 880 n.24.
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lity defense will seldom, if ever, be available. Winstar creates a new,
broadly available cause of action against the government, and this raises
serious questions about the Court's purported commitment to judicial
restraint.282 One could certainly question the wisdom of this regime, but
there is no internal contradiction to its analysis.
Rehnquist also argues that Souter's rule allows future plaintiffs to draft
their pleadings strategically to avoid the unmistakability doctrine:
But sophisticated lawyers in the future, litigating a claim exactly like the
one in St. Louis [a tax exemption case], need only claim that the sovereign
implicitly agreed not to change their tax treatment, and request damages
for breach of that agreement. There will presumablybe no unmistakability
doctrine to contend with, and they will be in the same position as if they
had successfully enjoined the tax.283
Souter responds that the determination of whether damages are equivalent
to an injunction is made by the Court, not by the plaintiffs request for
remedy, 4 and Rehnquist's analysis does not appear to take this fully into
account. But there is considerable wiggle room left in Souter's theory
because future plaintiffs need only posit a slight difference between their
damages theories and an injunction for the Court to have grounds to avoid
the unmistakability doctrine. Given the variety of contract damages
theories, as exemplified in the dispute raging in the Winstar remands, 25 this
should not be too challenging. The most common theory of contract
damages-lost profits based on an expectation theory-might very well
work even in a tax exemption case because the plaintiff could argue that it
suffers more loss than the additional tax revenue by losing the opportunity
to reinvest those funds in its profitable enterprise. Thus, under an
expectation damages theory, the loss to the plaintiff is greater than the gain
to the government collecting the tax, and the damages award is not
equivalent to an injunction.
2 Indeed, Souter's theory looks like an example of the Court creating a new
cause of action. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing damages actions for violations of
constitutional rights).
211 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 928.
214 See id. at 880.
2s See, e.g., Decision is Deferred in Key Goodwill Case, AM. BANKER, Jan. 6,
1999, at 3 (summarizing the three major damages theories: (1) lost profits; (2)
amount saved by the government for avoiding initial closing of the failing target
thrifts; and (3) out-of-pocket costs incurred as a result of nixing goodwill).
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Rehnquist's dissent otherwise fails to shake the foundation of the
majority's various arguments, largely because Rehnquist attacks from
within the structure laid out by Souter instead of imposing an entirely
different analysis upon the case. For example, Rehnquist discusses the
unmistakability doctrine by analyzing in depth only the cases involving
federal or tribal regulatory agreements. This leaves his argument open to
Breyer's response that the interpretive presumption necessary in those
cases was weak and Souter's proviso that the damages in Merrion were
equivalent to an injunction. Rehnquist similarly falls into the majority's
analytic structure in analyzing the sovereign acts doctrine. As argued
above, the underlying clash in Winstar and the other unmistakability cases
is the threshold question of whether it makes sense to apply the doctrine
and, so far at least, this question has boiled down to a choice between two
parallel analyses: the pro-government analysis based on due process and
the pro-liability analysis based on traditional private contract doctrine.
e. Concluding Remarks on Unmistakability
The idea of paying damages for the "taking" of contract rights has been
floated by several scholars as a way to fill the gap between the Takings
Clause and the Contracts Clause.286 By allowing, and indeed encouraging,
payment of damages, Souter's reasoning effectively answers the call of
these scholars byproviding for money damages even though plaintiffs have
not made out a case of a government taking. Souter relies on traditional
takings argumentation for his unmistakability analysis:
Just as we have long recognized that the Constitution "'bar[s]
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,"' so we must reject the suggestion that the Government may
simply shift costs of legislation onto its contractual partners who are
adversely affected by the change in the law, when the Government has
assumed the risk of such change.2 87
11 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 128, at 703; J.D.B. Mitchell, A General Theory
ofPublic Contracts, 63 JURID. REV. 60, 86 (1951) [hereinafter Mitchell,A General
Theory] ("The result of the general principle here advanced is therefore that the
public authority may be exempt from performing its contract according to its strict
expression but that where this exemption results in loss to the individual contractor
compensation should be payable save where that payment would offend the
principle.").
27 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 883 (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
384, 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2316, 129 L. Ed. 2d 304 (1994) (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 80 S. Ct. 1563, 1569, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1554 (1960))).
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Dolan and Armstrong, quoted in Winstar, are landmark takings
decisions and the plurality's rule certainly functions just like a regulatory
takings regime. Regulatory takings refers to the theory put forward by
several conservative scholars that any diminution in property value caused
by changes in government regulation should be compensable by the
government under the Takings Clause.2 8 The rationale is apparently that
this would impose a strict cost-benefit discipline on the government
because the government would only be able to afford those regulations that
resulted in a net increase in the total property values of the polity and
therefore an expansion of the government's tax base.289 Regulatory takings
must therefore make an exception for government regulation in the form
of taxes. Property taxes obviously reduce the value of real estate, but the
regulatory takings theory must allow for this form of regulation to go
uncompensated so that the theory does not bankrupt government ab initio.
The Court has yet to recognize this theory of regulatory takings explicit-ly.290
288 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1630 (1988); W. Keith Noel, Just Compensation: The Constitutionally
Required Remedy for Regulatory Takings, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1237 (1987);
ROBERT NozicK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
"9 Among the obvious problems with this theory is its reduction of the'value
of all government programs to the financial dimension. Environmental regulation,
for example, would only "create value" if it showed up in higher land values or
longer life to taxpayers. Less quantifiable criteria like morality are ignored. There
is also a significant lag between a regulation's implementation and such increases
in value, which government might have difficulty financing in the face of
immediate claims for compensation. Of course, there are also huge feasibility
problems: one can easily imagine a bureaucracy much like an anti-IRS would be
necessary to process the millions of annual claims that would be created.
Regulatory takings theory has many critics. See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander,
Takings and the Post-Modern Dialectic ofProperty, 9 CONST. COMMENTARY 256
(1992); J. Peter Byrne, Ten Argum ents for the Abolition ofthe Regulatory Takings
Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 89 (1995); William B. Stoebuck, Police Power,
Takings, and Due Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1057 (1980); Richard G.
Wilkins, The Takings Clause: A Modern Plot for an Old Constitutional Tale, 64
NOTREDAMEL. REV. 1(1989); Note, TakingBack Takings: A Coasean Approach
to Regulation, 106 HARv. L. REV. 914 (1993). Cf Frank I. Michelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
2 But cf Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 118 S. Ct. 2131 (1998) (the four vote
plurality endorsed a regulatory takings theory). Interestingly, Souter dissented in
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Souter's unmistakability rule parallels regulatory takings theory.2 91 The
only additional requirement for compensation under Souter's unmistaka-
bility rule is an agreement with the government. But the breadth of Souter's
reasoning-and his failure to address the threshold issue-suggests that
almost any sort of government permit, license, grant, or approval will
suffice. Souter's reasoning does not seem to exclude, for example, the
building permit issued to David Lucas, the real estate developer in South
Carolina who won a recent takings claim in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Commission.292 Much of the reasoning in Lucas focused on the fact
that the environmental regulation that prevented Lucas from building
houses on his land destroyed all economic value of his land.2 93 One of the
several problems with the Court's opinion in Lucas was its reliance on this
odd factual finding of the state trial court, and Lucas almost certainly
would not have prevailed without the finding that his land's value was
completely destroyed. Yet another case, identical to Lucas but for a more
reasonable finding of diminution in value, could seemingly make out a
contract claim under Winstar. Lucas' contract with the state was his
building permit, and the government breached by enacting the wetlands
protection legislation that barred him from developing the property he
purchased. Instead of calling it a taking, the plaintiff would allege breach
of contract and refer to his demand for payment as "damages" instead of
"compensation." Given the difficulty in rationalizing takings law, and the
resulting difficulty in imposing a regulatory takings regime upon the
jurisprudence, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Winstar represents a
first step toward an end-run around the takings morass to establish
regulatory takings through a contract theory.
In sum, Winstar preserves very little of the unnistakability doctrine.
Its new damages cause of action creates tremendous definitional pressure
relative to economic due process jurisprudence. Although the analyses of
Justices Souter and Scalia style themselves as different, in reality they
Eastern Enterprisesjoining two separate dissenting opinions. One of these, written
by Justice Stevens, emphasized the fact that the company plaintiff had reached an
agreement to provide its employees with lifetime health benefits, implying that
later federal legislation ordering plaintiffs to do so did not undermine their
reasonable expectations. See id. at 2160.
291Butcf West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848) (rejecting
a Contracts Clause claim where the state condemned a bridge it had chartered with
exclusivity provisions similar to those in Charles River Bridge, reasoning that the
remedy lies solely in the Takings Clause).
292 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
293 See id. at 1017.
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function very similarly. Both would require the reversal ofmost ofthe state
unmistakability cases, though they leave it ambiguous whether they intend
to reverse the state cases or to differentiate the unmistakability defense
available to the states from that available to the federal government.
Winstarmanages all this without directly contradicting the language in any
of the earlier unmistakability cases, largely because the earlier cases avoid
the threshold issue ofwhen the doctrine applies. Winstar effectively avoids
this issue by making the defense almost impossible to raise, but more
importantly, the majority decisions also avoid the fundamental threshold
issue from which perspective to begin the analysis: from a contractual
analysis that consciously ignores any context beyond intent of the parties,
or from a due process analysis that looks to the broader context necessary
to decide if a government is acting consistent with the minimum standards
of fundamental fairness. The next section explores what should have been
the government's strongest defense in Winstar: the express delegation
doctrine. This defense should have carried the day, in part because its
seminal case, Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles,219 is the
only Supreme Court decisionthat successfully addresses (albeit in a limited
way) this threshold issue.
D. Express Delegation Doctrine
More so than the other two defenses considered in Winstar, the unmis-
takability and express delegation doctrines are best understood in relation
to each other. Both doctrines arose in Contracts Clause cases having similar
fact patterns, and both balance similar concerns for government
accountability in contracting. Unmistakability is a presumption used to
interpret the disputed contract, which often takes the form of legislation.
The presumption is that the government did not make promises about the
exercise or restraint of its sovereign powers unless the intent to make such
promises appears in unmistakably clear language in the legislation. For
example, in order for a state to enter into a long-term contract promising
to let a utilities company charge certain rates to customers, the legislature
will need to use unmistakably clear language in the contract that the state
is bargaining away its sovereign power to regulate that company's rates for
the period of the contract. The presumption, therefore, aims to create a
healthy disincentive for legislatures to enter into long-term contracts; for
to do so, the language in the contract or legislation must make it plain to
294Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908).
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the public that the legislators knew full well that their action would bindthe
state for the entire term of the contract.
The express delegation doctrine creates a similar pressure on state
legislators to be frank about how much they authorize cities to bind the
state through contracting. Express delegation is the presumption that a
governmental subunit, such as a municipality, does not possess the power
to bind the state, unless the state statutes that grant regulatory authority to
the city include unmistakably clear language that the city has the power to
bargain away one (or more) of its delegated powers.295 To extend the
example above, in order for a city to enter into a long-term contract with
a utilities company that binds the state, the state must have passed
legislation expressly delegating to the city the power to bargain away the
sovereign power to regulate that company's rates for the period of the
contract.
There are, therefore, three levels of contract defenses the city could
raise in this example. First, if the state's statutes gave the city no power to
regulate utility rates, the contract would be ultra vires: simply beyond the
city's regulatory powers. Second, if the city had the delegated power to
regulate rates, but not the power to bargain away that power, the express
delegation doctrine would apply and the courts should find no contract.
This distinctionis made inHome Telephone & Telegraph, discussedbelow.
Finally, if the city had the authority to regulate rates and the authority to
bargain away this delegated authority, the city's contract with the company
would need to bargain away the power in unmistakably clear language.
Otherwise, the unmistakability doctrine would apply and save the state (or
the city) from contract liability. The express delegation doctrine aims to
increase the accountability ofthe state legislators for knowingly delegating
to cities (or other governmental units) the authority to make long term
contracts that might come back to haunt the state. If several cities found
themselves at the losing end of bad bargains, the express delegation
doctrine would make it easier for the state's electorate to hold the state
legislature responsible for allowing the cities to bind the state.
The express delegation doctrine should be thought of as a subset of the
unmistakability doctrine, applicable when a governmental subunit enters
into a regulatory agreement. This is fundamentally why the two defenses
are better understood in comparison to one another. There are nevertheless
subtle differences between the two doctrines. First, unmistakability looks
at the language of the alleged contract while express delegation looks at the
statutory language authorizingthe governmental unit's regulation. Second,
295 See id.
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there are dozens of unmistakability decisions but only a few express
delegation decisions. Despite this, the strengths of the interpretive
presumptions appear essentially the same. Third, while a few cases have
recognized the federal government's ability to use the unmistakability
defense, notwithstanding that the Contracts Clause only purports to bind
the states, the express delegation doctrine has arisen only in cases involving
state governments. 29 The next two subsections describe in more detail the
strength of the presumptions employed in the major Supreme Court
decisions.
The express delegation doctrine originated in the 1908 Supreme Court
decisionHome Telephone & Telegraph.297 The express delegation doctrine
provides the government with another special contract defense when
the agreement is made by a political subdivision of a state, such as a
city, county, or utility district. Stated simply, the doctrine requires that
for a city to be bound to a regulatory agreement, not only must the promise
to regulate in a certain way appear unmistakably clear in the agreement,
but in addition, the city's statutory authority must contain unmistakably
clear language that authorizes the city to make binding promises about
its regulatory treatment. The doctrine can be thought of as a specific sub-
set of the standard ultra vires defense for corporations and government
agencies, 98 though it requires more than simply checking to see if the city
has authority to regulate. It refers specifically to the authority to contract
regarding regulation. Moreover, it employs the same sort of strict
interpretive presumption as the unmistakability doctrine, although the
express delegation doctrine applies the presumption to statutory language,
not only to the language of the alleged contract. Very much like its
predecessor, the unmistakability doctrine, the express delegation doctrine
tries to locate political accountability for governmental decisions to enter
into long-term regulatory agreements.
Two themes emerge from analysis of the express delegation doctrine.
First, the search for statutory authority to contract goes a long way toward
rationalizing the unmistakability and municipal utility cases. Treating the
two doctrines as separate, therefore, leaves both less than fully explained
and less coherent than they would be if seen as logically connected.
296 See discussion supra Part I.C. 1.
'-
7 See Home Tel. & TeL, 211 U.S. at 265.298Cf. Leo P. Martinez, OfFairness and Might: The Limits ofSovereign Power
to Tax After Winstar, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1193, 1214 (1996) (discussing the ultra
vires defense); Richard E. Speidel, ImpliedDuties of Cooperation and the Defense
of Sovereign Acts in Government Contracts, 51 GEO. L.J. 516, 519 (1963).
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Second, the doctrine treats cities as contracting entities distinct from the
sovereign state, much like administrative lawtreats administrative agencies
as distinct from Congress or the federal government. This raises the ques-
tion of what to do with promises a city or a federal agency makes but for
which the city or agency lacks the authority to bind the sovereign. Are
these promises totally unenforceable because they are unenforceable
against the sovereign? The Supreme Court decision in Southern Utilities v.
Palatka,29 suggests that an agency could be held to its promises, even
while Congress, as the sovereign, retains the authority to overrule the
agency's regulatory agreements. This theory is more fully developed in
Part II.
The majority opinions in Winstar do not purport to overrule the express
delegation doctrine, but they nonetheless dismiss it fairly quickly. This is
unfortunate because it has the potential to clarify the law of government
contracts andregulatory agreements, especiallynow that governments have
delegated so much regulatory responsibility to cities and agencies.
1. Express Delegation Doctrine Cases
The facts of Home Telephone & Telegraph parallel the typical unmis-
takability cases discussed above. The City of Los Angeles granted a fifty-
year franchise to a phone company, specifying the maximum allowable
rates the company could charge customers. Shortly thereafter, the city
lowered the maximum rates the company could charge customers, and the
phone company sued.3 ° The Court upheld the new lower rates. Justice
Moody, writing for a unanimous Court, focused on the same sort of
accountability concerns that support the unmistakability doctrine: "The
surrender, by contract, of a power of government, though in certain well-
defined cases it may be made by legislative authority, is a very grave act,
and the surrender itself, as well as the authority to make it, must be closely
scrutinized." '' Scrutiny of "the surrender itself" is a clear reference to the
unmistakability doctrine. Scrutiny of "the authority to make it" apparently
refers to the traditional notion of ultra vires acts, but the Court signaled that
it did not simply intend to analyze whether the city had the appropriate
regulatory authority: "It was decided by the judge of the court.below, and
it is agreed by the parties, that.., the charter conferred upon the city
council.., the power to prescribe'charges for telephone service." 30 2
2 Southern Util. v. Palatka, 268 U.S. 232 (1925).
300 See Home Tel. & Tel., 211 U.S. at 272.301 Id. at 273.
31 Id. at 271. The Court quoted two state statutes. The first authorized the city
"to regulate telephone service... and to fix and determine the charges for
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Instead, the Court focused more specifically on whether the state had
expressly delegated to the city the power to bargain away the regulatory
power that the state had undeniably delegated to the city:
No other body than the supreme legislature (in this case, the legislature of
the State) has the authority to make such a surrender, unless the authority
is clearly delegated to it by the supreme legislature. The general powers
of a municipality... of the state are not sufficient. Specific authority for
that purpose is required.
It has been settled by this court that the State may authorize one of its
municipal corporations to establish by an inviolable contract the rates to
be charged by a public service corporation (or natural person) for a
definite term, not grossly unreasonable in point oftime, and that the effect
of such a contract is to suspend, during the life of the contract, the
governmental power of fixing and regulating the rates. But for the very
reason that such a contract has the effect of extinguishing pro tanto an
undoubted power of government, both its existence and the authority to
make it must clearly and unmistakably appear, and all doubts must be
resolved in favor of the continuance of the power.303
The Court viewed the express delegation rule as an extension of the
unmistakability doctrine. The same sort of interpretive presumption
required by the unmistakability doctrine was brought to bear not only on
the agreement at issue, but also on the statutes allegedly authorizing the
city to bargain away its regulatory power.3° In support of the language
quoted above, the Court cited numerous unmistakability cases, a few of
which hinted at the issue of delegation. It also recognized the inconsistency
in the unmistakability holdings: "differences, slight in themselves, may,
through their relation with other facts, turn the balance one way or the
other."305
The Court then focused on the specific language in the city's charter.
The city had the power to "regulate" phone service and to "fix" rates. But
telephones and telephone service[.]" Id. The second statute gave the city authority
to charter telephone companies by ordinance. See id. at 272.3o3 Id. at 273 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
4 If a power were somehow inherent to a city, and did not come from a
delegation from the state, presumably only the unmistakability doctrine would
apply.305 Id. at 274. The Court cited Freeport, Rogers Park, and Knoxville Water as
upholding the new government regulation andDetroit Citizens 'and Cleveland City
Railway as striking it down.
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the charter did not authorize the city to enter into a contract as a legal equal
with the water company and become bound by force of their meeting of the
minds:
This is ample authority to exercise the governmental power of regulating
charges, but it is no authority to enter into a contract to abandon the
governmental power itself.... It authorizes command, but not agreement.
Doubtless, an agreement as to rates might be authorized by the legislature
to be made by ordinance. But the ordinance here described was not an
ordinance to agree upon the charges, but an ordinance "to fix and
determine the charges. '306
The Court explained that the authority to contract must appear
unmistakably in the city's charter or authorizing statutes. The Court
demonstrated how well this rule works to rationalize the seemingly
inconsistent lines of municipal regulation cases:
In Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., the contract was in specific
terms ratified and confirmed by the legislature. In Detroit v. Detroit
Citizens' Street Ry. Co., the contract was made in obedience to an act of
the legislature that the rates should be "established by agreement between
said company and the corporate authorities." . . . .In Cleveland v.
Cleveland City Ry. Co., the legislative authority conferred upon the
municipality was described in the opinion of the court as "comprehensive
power to contract with street railway companies ... ." In Vicksburg v.
Vicksburg Waterworks Co., the court said: "The grant oflegislative power
... authorizes the city.., to contract with a party or parties who shall
build and operate waterworks." 307
Thus, the precise wording of the city's authorizing statutes is the key.
Words like regulate, fix, and determine indicate that although the city has
regulatory power, it does not necessarily have the power to bargain away
the power. Words like contract, agreement, and consent of the company
indicate the city has the power to bargain away its regulatory power.08
31 Id. (emphasis added).307 Id. at 277-78 (citations omitted).
3" The Home Telephone & Telegraph opinion discussed Freeport Water Co.
v. Freeport, 180 U.S. 587 (1901), a companion case to Rogers Park, that also
upheld the city's new regulation. Home Telephone & Telegraph noted that
Freeport's authorizing statute allowed it to "contract' for the construction of
waterworks "at such rates as may be fixed by ordinance, and for a period not
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The Court's direct comparison of the unmistakability cases and the
utility congruence cases is so unusual that it may be unique among
Supreme Court decisions. The rule from Home Telephone & Telegraph
provides one way to decide when a city should be governed by the same
contract rules as private parties: when the city has express statutory
authority to contract as a private party. Home Telephone & Telegraph
deserves jurisprudential respect for the simple reason that it provides a
coherent theory of when to apply the unmistakability doctrine.
Unfortunately, the Court has done little to refine the express delegation
doctrine after Home Telephone & Telegraph. The 1944 decision in Keefe
v. Clark319 was one of the few cases to resemble Home Telephone &
Telegraph in its reasoning, but it did not even cite Home Telephone &
Telegraph. In Keefe, the state of Michigan authorized drainage districts to
issue bonds to fund draining swamps for development. In order to assure
payment to the bondholders, the legislature required each drainage district
to levy assessments on covered lands if the district's revenues were
insufficient to pay the bonds in full. Later, the legislature passed another
law allowing the sale of lands that a drainage district had seized for failure
to pay assessments, but under the new law the buyers at such sales received
unencumbered title even if the proceeds of the sale did not cover the
delinquent assessment. Bondholders sued, claiming the security backing
payment of their bonds had been eliminated in contravention of their
contractual rights created by the first statute.310 The Court found no
violation of the Contracts Clause. The Court's analysis mixed the
unmistakability presumption andreferences to the authority ofthe drainage
districts. First, the Court seemed to approve of the state court's use of a
delegation analysis suggestive of the express delegation doctrine: "The
exceeding thirty years." Home Tel. & Tel., 211 U.S. at 277 (quoting Freeport, 180
U.S. at 600). The Court resolved the ambiguity in favor of the city.
A few unmistakability cases prior toHome Telephone & Telegraph did mention
this sort of distinction between regulating and contracting, but none made it central
to their reasoning. For example, the Court in Rogers Parknoted that the ordinance
used "the language of command, not of contract; of limitation on power, not a
bargain giving power." Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624, 630
(1901). Cf Water, Light & Gas Co. v. Hutchinson, 207 U.S. 385,395 (holding that
the state law authorized the city to contract away "the privilege of furnishing light
for the streets... for any length of time not exceeding twenty-one years," but the
Court held that this did not imply that such contracts would prevent the city from
granting competing contracts during the twenty-one years). Id.
3 I Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393 (1944).3 0 See id. at 394-96.
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[Michigan supreme court] declined to read into the statute... any purpose
to permit drain districts to surrender the State's sovereign power to provide
for the sale of tax-delinquent property free of encumbrances."311 Next, the
Court set forth a simple unmistakability rule: "settled principles of
construction require that the obligation alleged to have been impaired to be
clearly and unequivocally expressed.' 32 This seems to refer to agreements
with the bondholders. Charles River Bridge was also cited as authority for
this rule.
But in the next paragraph the Court again hints that the delegation issue
is important by focusing on the authority to make the agreements on behalf
of the state: "We do not find in the provision of the drain statute.., a clear
and unequivocal purpose of Michigan to permit drain districts to bargain
away the State's power to sell tax-delinquent lands free of
encumbrances."314 The inconsistent analysis does not seriously undermine
the Court's conclusions because the concerns protected by the two
doctrines are so similar: leaving room for the legislature to change its
regulatory policies while still allowing it to make binding agreements and
at the same time locating accountability for making any promises that
freeze regulatory policies. ButKeefe's muddiedreasoning may explain why
it is seldom cited as either an unmistakability or express delegation
doctrine case. In any event, its fact pattern, holding, and reasoning do show
the strong logical connection between the two doctrines.
InNational RailroadPassenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway ("AMTRAK"), 315 the Court employed analysis very similar to
Home Telephone & Telegraph but, as in Keefe, it did not cite Home
Telephone & Telegraph. In AMTRAK, the employees of other railroads
sued AMTRAK after the federally chartered railroad stopped allowing
them to ride on AMTRAK for free or reduced rates.1 6 Like most railroad
companies, the plaintiffs' employers had long contracted with AMTRAK
for these prerequisites for their employees. In 1981, Congress completed
a series of statutory changes that specifically required AMTRAK to charge
the other railroads' employees.317 The Court upheld the changes and relied
311 Id. at 396.
312 Id. at 396-97.
313 See id. at 397.
3 14 Id.
315 National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470
U.S. 451 (1985).316 See id. at 456-57.
3 17 See id. at 457.
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on a rule that statutory language is presumed not to create contract rights:
"absent an 'adequate expression of an actual intent' of the State to bind
itself [citation omitted], this Court simply will not lightly construe that
which is undoubtedly a scheme of public regulation to be, in addition, a
private contract to which the State is a party.""31 The Court then analyzed
the specific wording of the legislation.
By its terms, the Act does not create or speak of a contract between the
United States and the railroads, and it does not in any respect provide for
the execution of a written contract on behalf of the United States. Quite
the contrary, the Act expressly established the National Railroad
Passenger Corporation as a nongovernmental entity, and it used the term
"contract" not to define the relationship of the United States to the
railroads, but instead that ofthe new, nongovernmental corporation to the
railroads.319
The Court went on to distinguish United States Trust on the basis of the
legislative language at issue there, which provided, in part, that the states
"covenant[ed] and agree[d]" 320 with the bondholders. The Court went on to
distinguish between the statute at issue in AMTRAK and the contracts
entered into bythe federally chartered companyAMTRAK andthe plaintiff
railroads.3 2' The statute created no contractual rights. Even though the
reasoning in AMTRAK would seem to help with the threshold issue in
Winstar of whether the regulatory approvals constituted contracts, the
Winstar Court did not cite AMTRAK.
It could certainly be argued that the express delegation doctrine reads
too much into the legislature's wording of the statutes authorizing
municipal regulation, but this criticism would also apply to the
unmistakability doctrine, which invokes the same scrutiny to contractual
language drafted by a governmental entity. Like the unmistakability
doctrine, the express delegation doctrine aims to highlight whom to hold
accountable for making regulatory agreements that are enforced against a
city. State legislators must risk exposing themselves to some greater share
of the blame when a city finds itself bound to unfavorable promises of
"I8 Id. at 466-67 (quoting Wisconsin & Michigan R.R. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379,
386-87 (1903)).319 Id. at 467 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
3
~o Id. at 469 ("Resort need not be had to a dictionary or case law to recognize
the language of contract."). Id. at 470 (emphasis added).
321 See id. at 470-72.
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long-term regulatory treatment. This makes sense because the legislators
should not be encouraged to draft city charters and authorizing statutes that
create traps for unwary city governments.
Without the express delegation, it is difficult to parse through whom
to hold accountable in, for example, the Sinking Fund Cases of 1879.P In
these companion cases, the Court upheld Congress's amendments to the
federal statutes authorizing the government bonds that subsidized the
transcontinental railroad companies which Congress had chartered at the
same time it issued the bonds.3" Without a theory of delegation, the Court
could not respond effectively to one of the more powerful arguments made
in the dissent of Justice Strong, who voted to strike down the amendments
to the bond statute as a violation of contract. Strong asserted that the
contract at issue appeared not in the federal statute, but in the bonds
themselves. 24 Strong's argument begged the question of whether the
governmental entity that drafted the language in the bonds did so with the
authority to bind Congress to the promises made by the bond. Presumably,
nameless bureaucrats at the Treasury were responsible for binding the
United States to the bond contracts and, therefore, the Congressmen who
enacted the original legislation bore less responsibility, if any. But this
conclusion is only apparent when the analysis of the express delegation
doctrine is superimposed upon the decision; Strong nowhere directly
addresses who bears the blame for making the contracts, and neither the
majority nor the dissenters analyze how their competing analyses would
foster greater accountability in government contracts. By focusing on the
issue of delegation, the express delegation doctrine locates responsibility
more definitively with either the Congress-for passing the buck to the
bureaucrats---or with the bureaucrats for agreeing to a bad contract, or
both.
By treating the legislature and a city as separate contracting entities,
decisions like Home Telephone & Telegraph and AMTRAK suggest an
interpretation of municipal agreements that avoids seeing them as illusory
promises even where the city lacks authority to bind the state. This second
theme in the express delegation doctrine comes out expressly in Southern
31 Union Pacific R.. v. United States, 99 U.S. 700 (1878) and Central Pacific
R. v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 727 (1878).313 See Central Pacific R.R., 99 U.S. at 727.
324 See id. at 732 (Strong, J., dissenting). This argument enabled Strong to avoid
confronting the statutory language which included a reservation of congressional
authority to amend the statute.
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Utilities v. Palatka."- In Southern Utilities, a city sued a utility to prevent
the utility from charging more than the rates agreed upon in the utility's
charter. In an unusual twist, the city argued the charter was a contact, while
the utility argued the contract was void for lack of mutuality. 26 The
utility's mutuality argument hinged on the state's lurking "unfettered
power.., to regulate rates[,]" '327 despite the language in the charter. Justice
Holmes rejected the lack of mutuality argument:
Without considering whether an agreement by the company in
consideration of the grant of the franchise might not bind the company
in some cases, even if it left the city free, it is perfectly plain that
the fact that the contract might be overruled by a higher power does
not destroy its binding effect between the parties when it is left undis-
turbed.328
Although Southern Utilities does not cite Home Telephone & Telegraph
nor mention the express delegation doctrine, it does illustrate how the
courts can avoid finding an illusory promise by distinguishing between the
levels of government involved. This analysis from Southern Utilities
dovetails nicely with the interpretive presumption employed by the express
delegation doctrine: in the absence of expressly delegated authority to bind
the state, a city may still bind itself, subject still to the unmistakability
doctrine. Unfortunately, Southern Utilities appears to be the only example
of the Court ratifying the notion that a city may enter into a regulatory
agreement that binds the city even as it does not bind the state.329
The Supreme Court has not relied on Home Telephone & Telegraph,
Southern Utilities, or the express delegation doctrine in cases involving
contractual claims against the federal government. This seems unfortunate,
because the issue of proper delegation of authority between the branches
of the federal government takes on special importance in our modem
administrative state. For example, when an agency of the federal
government enters into a contract that binds Congress, the agency, as part
of the executive branch, could improperly restrict the power of Congress
321 Southern Util. v. Palatka, 268 U.S. 232 (1925).
321 See id. at 233.
327 Id.
3 1 Id. (emphasis added).
329 Cf Mitchell, The Treatment ofPublic Contracts, supra note 65, at 224-25
&n.145 (citing Southern Utilities, 268 U.S. at 233, but setting aside the delegation
issue as beyond the scope of the Article).
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to make new laws.330 The interpretive presumption in the express
delegation doctrine is perfectly suited to avoid this kind of encroachment.
The Court in AMTRAKtouches on the issue briefly:
The [plaintiffs] do not point to any language in [the original statute]
authorizing Amtrak to bargain away anyportion ofCongress'Commerce
Clause power, or to act as the Government's agent and confer upon the
railroads the right to be free of any obligation to provide passenger
service, assuming even that Congress could make that delegation.331
It makes sense, however, to apply the insight from Southern Utilities only
to agencies of the government, not to federally chartered corporations, like
AMTRAK, or the Union Pacific as in the Sinking Fund Cases.
The express. delegation doctrine creates useful incentives for
administrative agencies as well as cities. For a city to bind a state, not only
must the legislature assume some responsibility for authorizing the city to
do so, but the city itself would be on more explicit notice that its
contracting decisions had better pan out in the long-run because they will
share in the blame if they do not. In the absence of the express delegation
doctrine, locating accountability for bad bargains assumes the difficulty
now apparent in the Sinking Fund Cases. Applying the express delegation
doctrine to federal agencies would clarify exactly which part of the
government should be held to the contract. For example, an agency that
makes an unmistakable agreement but which lacks delegated authority to
bind Congress could be held to its promise by freezing its existing
regulations without affecting Congress's power to repudiate the agreement
by changing the underlying statutory authority. In the next section, I argue
that the Court in Winstar could have done exactly that.
2. The Updated Express Delegation Doctrine Should Have
Shielded the Government from Liability in Winstar
In order to clarify application of the express delegation doctrine, it is
helpful to first analyze whether the agencies could claim an ultra vires
330 This concern probably becomes more acute when the remedy for the
government's breach is an injunction blocking the new exercise of government
power. But even where the remedy is damages paid by the government, the need
to pay damages to pay for the right to change certain laws also limits congressional
power. More on this later.
31' National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 470
U.S. 451,471 (1985) (emphasis added).
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defense. Nowhere in the banking statutes do the agencies receive express
authority to use goodwill in application of the capital requirements, but the
authority is nonetheless sufficiently apparent to prevent the govern-
ment from winning on an ultra vires defense because the ultra vires defense
does not require unmistakable clarity. The FHLBB had authority to
determine capital levels andwhat countedtowards theserequirements: "the
Board shall require all associations to achieve and maintain adequate
capital by-(A) establishing minimum levels of capital for
associations[.]"332 Several years afterthe FHLBB and FSLIC began relying
on goodwill capital, Congress sanctioned the agencies' interpretation of
their authority to do so when it enacted the National Housing Act of 1987,
part of which provided: "No provision of this section shall affect the
authority of the [FSLIC] to authorize insured institutions to utilize
subordinated debt and goodwill in meeting reserve and other regulatory
requirements. 333 The Senate Report included similar language: "It is
expected . . . that the [Bank Board] will retain its own authority to
determine... the components and level of capital to be required ofFSLIC-
insured institutions"334 Given the deference typically accorded to federal
agencies' interpretations of the statutes they administer, it seems clear that
the FHLBB and FSLIC did not exceed their authority by recognizing
goodwill capital.
The express delegation doctrine analyzes a more specific question. To
apply this defense, one scrutinizes the agencies' statutes for the authority
to enter into agreements that bind the government's regulatory power. The
statutes must authorize entering into an "agreement" or"contract," not just
"command" or "regulat[ion]," in the words of Home Telephone &
Telegraph.335 The FHLBB's capital statute requires it to "establish" capital
standards and "require" thrifts to meet those standards.336 This is not a close
call under the rule from Home Telephone & Telegraph.
This conclusion may seem unsatisfying because, much like the
unmistakability doctrine, it might appear to give the government the power
to make illusory promises. From the perspective of the private party, and
332 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(1) (1988) (repealed). See also id. § 1464(s)(2) (the
authority to establish individual capital levels exists on a case-by-case basis).
333 United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839,891 (1996) (quoting 12 U.S.C.
§ 1730h(d) (repealed 1989)) (emphasis added).
334 Id. at 891 (quoting S. REP. No. 100-19, at 55 (1987)).
33 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 274-76 (1908).336See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(1) (1994).
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under contractual reasoning, cases like Rogers Park and Charles River
Bridge essentially require that, in order to bind the government entity to a
regulatory agreement, the agreement must include language that
government will not change its mind.337 To the extent that the governmental
party intends to lock in the specified regulatory treatment, it is a fair
criticismthat theunmistakability doctrinetreats the government's promises
as illusory.
The concerns driving the express delegation doctrine are answered
equally well by applying its interpretive presumption to read the promises
of government agencies as binding only the agency, not the sovereign
legislature. Southern Utilities employs exactly this reasoning.338 Under this
view of the express delegation doctrine, the agreements in Winstar would
bind the banking agencies but not Congress. This avoids the promises being
read as simply illusory but also leaves Congress free to change the
accounting rules used by the banking agencies without incurring contract
liability for "the government." Indeed, this is probably the best reading of
the reservation of authority in Statesman's agreement whereby Statesman
agreed to "comply in all material respects with all applicable statutes,
regulation, orders of, and restrictions imposed by the United States[.] '3 9
This interpretation of the express delegation doctrine makes even more
sense for federal agencies because the separation of powers would be
undermined if executive branch agencies could restrict Congress's power
to make new laws (even if the restrictions imposed took the form of
creating liability for damage awards by passing new laws).
Accordingly, Glendale's and Statesman's agreements would not have
bound the banking agencies because they did not provide unmistakable
promises, within the holdings of the Rogers Park line of cases, that the
government was bound. Winstar, however, would defeat the banking
agency's unmistakability defense because its agreement provided that the
specified accounting treatment (which recognized goodwill) would trump
conflicting regulations. The agency is bound by its unmistakably clear
agreement. But Winstar would lose under the express delegation doctrine,
even though the same clause provided that the accounting treatment would
337 Souter, not unreasonably, refers to this as requiring the government to make
a "second promise" to keep its first promise, though under the reasoning of the
unmistakability cases, the ambiguity at issue is whether the government made the
first promise by authorizing the private grantee to engage in whatever activities.
See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 887. This is probably bestunderstood as another example
of the powerful rhetoric both sides have at their disposal in arguing these issues.
338 See Southern Util. v. Palatka, 268 U.S. 232, 233 (1925).
331 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 868.
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trump conflicting statutes, because the agency did not have the authority
to make a promise on behalf of Congress.3 O
This interpretation of the express delegation doctrine offers several
advantages. It allows agencies to make binding regulatory promises
without restricting congressional power to enact new laws. Analytically,
Home Telephone & Telegraph helps reconcile many of the unmistakability
cases. Even from within a purely contractual perspective limited to finding
the intent of the parties, this interpretation makes sense because it more
accurately identifies just who the governmental party is. Part II of this
Article attempts to construct a unified theory of government defenses to
contract liability for regulatory agreements. It is enough for now to
recognize that the express delegation doctrine contains powerful, if latent,
insights that do not deserve to be lightly dismissed.
3. Souter's Summary Dismissal of the Express Delegation Doctrine
The most persuasive interpretation of the agencies' promises is that
they meant to govern the agencies' actions within their existing authority,
but said nothing about actions by any other part ofthe government, such as
Congress, over which the agencies had no control. This interpretation
seems to most closely reflect the intention of the parties as it can be
discerned from their agreements and the existing legal context. It also
makes the most sense of the relevant pre-Winstar Supreme Court
precedents. None of the majority's opinions explore this interpretation,
however, perhaps because the government neither made such an argument
nor cited Southern Utilities in its brief.341
Such an interpretation would alleviate Souter's legitimate concerns that
it would have been "irrational" for the thrifts to accept illusory promises
from the government. Souter raised this argument in construing the first of
the three approvals, i.e., Glendale's:
31o This interpretation of the express delegation doctrine potentially allows for
an improved balance between the goals of providing room for government to
change the laws and protecting the reliance interests of private parties who have
extracted promises from the government. In cases where the governmental body
that makes the agreement is the same one that breaks it, as in Charles RiverBridge
andPOSSE, the traditional unmistakability doctrine already strikes a good balance.
Where a political subdivision or government agency makes a promise that is later
broken by the sovereign body, a weaker interpretive presumption could suffice
because the sovereign enjoys a second dimension of protection.
See Petitioner's Brief, United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996)
(No. 95-865) (1996 WL 99716).
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Although one can imagine cases in which the potential gain might induce
a party to assume a substantial risk that the gain might be wiped out by a
change in the law, it would have been irrational in this case for Glendale
to stake its very existence upon continuation of current policies without
seeking to embody those policies in some sort of contractual commitment.
This conclusion is obvious from both the dollar amounts at stake and the
regulators' proven propensity to make changes in the relevant
requirements.
342
The regulators' "propensity" refers, not inaccurately, to the agencies' track
record of changing their regulations more often than they were required to
by changes in their underlying statutory authority. Given the agencies'
apparent lack of authority to bind Congress, at least underHome Telephone
& Telegraph as it stood prior to Winstar, it is entirely possible, even likely,
that the parties agreed that the agencies intended to bind only their own
enforcement and promulgation of regulations. Nothing in the Winstar
opinions explains why this reading would have been irrational or
"madness."343 In general, an interpretation predicated on avoiding
"madness" fails upon discovery of any rational alternative interpretation.
342 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 863 (emphasis added). Justice Scalia, in his concur-
rence, makes a similar version of the same argument:
[Plaintiffs] say that the very subject matter of these agreements, an essential
part of the quid pro quo, was Government regulation; unless the
Government is bound as to thatregulation, an aspect of the transactions that
reasonably must be viewed as a sine qua non of their assent becomes
illusory. I think they are correct.
Id. at 921 (emphasis in original). The illusory aspect of the promises disappears
when one interprets the agreements as binding only the agencies.
" In his section on the Glendale approval, Souter cites Binghamton Bridge,
which he summarizes as "refusing to construe charter in such a way that would
have been 'madness' for private party to enter into it." Id. at 864. The Court in
Binghamton Bridge makes a similar error of overreaching as well, for the state
court in that case construed the charter's monopoly protection provision as binding
only other private parties that might want to build a competing bridge; the charter
need not have bound the state to have been a rational contract for the plaintiffs to
agree. See Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51 (1865). One could argue in
response that Binghamton Bridge got it right because competitors would have
needed a charter to build a competing bridge anyway (perhaps because of state
regulation of roads and highways), and so, the only effective protection from
competition would have been one that limited the state's ability to grant competing
bridge charters. But corporate charters were comparatively difficultto obtain at that
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Instead, the plurality dismisses the express delegation doctrine by
repeating its unmistakability analysis: because a promise to pay damages
does not affect Congress's power to pass new laws, there is no reason to
apply the express delegation defenses either because it too seeks to protect
sovereign power to enact new laws. "Home Telephone & Telegraph simply
has no application to the present case, because there were no contracts to
surrender the Government's sovereign power to regulate."3'
This analysis suffers the same flaws as those discussed above regarding
the plurality's treatment of the unmistakability doctrine. It limits the
express delegation doctrine's applicability to an extremely narrow type of
case. It gives plaintiffs' attorneys easy ways to avoid the doctrine
altogether even within that narrow category. It also fails to clarify whether
its basis in the inherent attributes of sovereignty means that the decision
reverses the state express delegation holdings, such as Home Telephone &
Telegraph, and it fails to address the doctrinal inconsistencies that result
from simply presuming that private contracting rules should govern
regulatory approvals.345
The alternative interpretation proposed above would, however, create
a subtle but difficult hurdle for the plurality's reliance on contractual
analysis. The proposed interpretation recognizes the agencies as
analytically distinct from the government as a whole, at least as far as
suggested by Southern Utilities. Only when the distinction between an
agency and the government is collapsed does the majority opinions' purely
time, prior to the spread of general incorporation laws, and so forcing a competitor
to obtain a charter could easily have provided enough monopoly protection to make
the agreement reasonable for the private party to agree to. In any case, the response
does not survive the advent of general incorporation laws and the concomitant use
of other regulatory statutes, besides corporate charters, to regulate corporate
activity. This practice is generally the rule even in banking, one of the few
industries where regulatory restrictions are still sometimes imposed as part of the
institution's charter.
3" Winstar, 518 U.S. at 889-90.
" Moreover, one of the three regulatory agreements, Winstar's, seems to
contradict Souter's "no surrender" interpretation because Winstar's approval
agreement provided that if the agreement's recognition of goodwill contravened
any regulations, the agreementwould govern. Only under Souter's strained reading
of"no surrender" does this make sense because the agency is left free to change the
rule if it wants, despite the language in the approval (as long as the Treasury pays
the necessary damages). Not surprisingly, Souter does not mention the odd
incentive this could create if the damages are paid directly out of the Treasury and
not the agency's budget.
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contractual analysis make sense, for only then can the agency, as the
governmental party, agree to make a promise to pay damages. Recognizing
the separation of functions between the federal agencies, as part of the
executive branch, and the Congress as the law-making arm of the
government, raises the sort of concerns that are the province of
administrative law-whether or not the agency has acted within its
statutory authority. Recognition of the agency as a separate actor implies
judicial review based on the Administrative Procedures Act. In addition to
the more deferential review under the Administrative Procedures Act,
however, is the different remedy: an injunction against the agency blocking
the new regulation. The analytic step of recognizing the agency as a
separate actor, then, leads to the conclusion that damages are not available.
Damages for contract liability come into play, under the Tucker Act, only
when the government makes promises. Whether an agency can make a
promise on behalf of the government is precisely the question addressed by
Home Telephone & Telegraph and avoided by Winstar.
A federal agency cannot bind the government to contract liability for
damages unless it has authority to do so. In addition to ordinary ultra vires
limitations on agencies is the Anti-Deficiency Act. A few months earlier
in the same 1996 term, the Court decided Hercules, Inc. v. United States,34
which denied a Tucker Act claim brought by manufacturers of Agent
Orange. The manufacturers filed suit against the federal government just
after they settled class action tort claims brought by victims of Agent
Orange exposure. The manufacturers argued that their procurement
contracts with the government included indemnification protection.3 47 The
Court relied on a long-standing rule that the government assumes liability
for loss only if the government gave the contractor instructions on how to
perform the contract and those directions cause the alleged harm? 48 Here,
the manufacturers performed their government contracts without loss and
there was no defect in the required manufacturing process. This rule, relied
upon by Hercules, contrasts sharply with the Winstar plurality's broad
reading of the guarantee against loss authority (discussed below).
Moreover, the Hercules Court held that the Anti-Deficiency Act
prohibits open-ended indemnification forthirdparty liability in government
contracts unless there are appropriated funds to cover the liability. 49
'4 6 Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417 (1996).347 See id. at 421.
348 See id. at 424 (citing United States v. Spearin, 248 U.S. 132 (1918)).
'9 The Court in Hercules held:
The Anti-Deficiency Act bars a federal employee or agency from entering
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Congress appropriatedno funds for this sort of contract liability and indeed
is faced with daunting estimates of future appropriations in the tens of
billions to cover Winstar-type claims 50 The Act's requirement of
appropriation of funds polices the inherent externality that would exist if
agencies were allowed, by presumption or inherent powers, to create
unlimited liabilities of the federal treasury. The Anti-Deficiency Act thus
recognizes the distinct roles of the federal agencies-which make nearly
all government contracts-and of the government as a whole.
Justice Rehnquist raises Hercules in his dissent, focusing on its
distinction between implied-in-factpromises and implied-in-law promises.
Implied-in-law promises are those where the contextual facts support the
conclusion that the parties actually agreedto the disputed provision; but did
not fully articulate it; implied-in-fact promises are actionable under the
Tucker Act. Implied-in-law promises are essentially legally-imposed
presumptions, and are not actionable under the Tucker Act.351 All of this
goes essentially unanswered by the majority opinions, which would be
hard-pressed to explain why Hercules does not apply here.352 In both
Hercules and Winstar, the plaintiffs read the agreements as providing for
government indemnification for actions beyond the control of the agency
that made the promise: damage from latent defects in Hercules, and loss
from anew statute in Winstar. IfHercules is distinguishable, it would seem
that the strongest distinction is that the agreement in Hercules was a typical
government procurement contract, not a regulatory agreement setting forth
into a contract for future payment of money in advance of, or in excess of,
an existing appropriation. 31 U.S.C. § 1341. Ordinarily no federal
appropriation covers contractors' payments to third-party tort claimants in
these circumstances, and the Comptroller General has repeatedly ruled that
Government procurement agencies may not enter into the type of open-
ended indemnity for third-party liability that petitioner Thompson claims
to have implicitly received under the Agent Orange contracts. We view the
Anti-Deficiency Act, and the contracting officer's presumed knowledge of
its prohibition, as strong evidence that the officer would not have provided,
in fact, the contractual indemnification Thompson claims.
Id. at 427-28 (footnotes omitted).
350 See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 15, atA12 (estimating Winstar liability at $30
billion).351 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 930.
352 Cf Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 496
(suggesting that Souter "bifurcated the Government into two juridical personalities:
the Congress... and 'the Government"' but then criticizing this bifurcation for
being inconsistent with Souter's sovereign acts analysis).
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how regulatory power would be exercised. Such a distinction, however,
would clearly undermine most of the majority's analysis, for surely
damages should be harder to win against the government when it acts in its
sovereign role than its contractual role.
The plurality does attempt to locate statutory authority for a promise
to pay damages, but the attempt clearly does not satisfy Hercules. The only
arguably applicable authority it can find for authority to pay damages is a
provision that authorizes the FSLIC to "facilitate a merger or
consolidation" of its thrifts by giving the acquiring thrift a "guarantee
against loss by reason of its merging or consolidating with or assuming the
liabilities and purchasing the assets of such insured institution in or in
danger of default."3 3 Souter implies that this guarantee against loss
authorized the agencies' to make "risk-shifting" promises to reimburse the
acquiring entities for losses from FIRREA's elimination of goodwill
capital. Such an interpretation of the promises makes the agreements even
more difficult to distinguish from the implied indemnification claim
rejected by the Court in Hercules, because this reasoning says nothing
about the intention of the parties. Such evidence is necessary for the
provision to be implied-in-fact rather than implied-in-law. s Reliance on
the agency's authority to provide a guarantee against loss also mistakes
what the agency might have agreed to with what it intended to agree to.
Souter's reasoning really says more about the breadth of the Holmesian
presumption than it says about what the parties intended to require of each
other.
Moreover, the breadth ofthis reading amounts to a presumption ofthe
authority to contract. The statutory language does not specify how directly
the merger must cause the loss: "loss by reason ofits merging."35 A typical
guarantee against loss covers losses arising from certain, clearly defined
business risks of taking over a failing thrift, for example that weaknesses
in part of the target's loan portfolio were underestimated. None of the
regulatory agreements in dispute here cited this authority for anything
relating to the goodwill capital provisions. In order to conclude that the
guarantee against loss includes loss from a change in the capital rules, the
guarantee must be read so broadly that any losses would be covered if the
353 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 890 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1729(f)(2) (repealed 1989))
(emphasis added).
354 Cf Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 564
(suggesting that Hercules does not support application of the Holmesian
presumption to an "indemnity agreement').
355 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 890 (emphasis added).
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losses would not have occurred but for the acquiring thrift acquisition of
the target. Such "but for" causation is very broad. Indeed, the chartering of
the target thrift would also meet the but for causation. To say the merger
caused the loss in this context is better understood as simply another
rendition of the Holmesian presumption that any agreement includes
promises to pay damages (and that these agreements put the risk of
congressional changes onto the government).
Further evidence that Souter is simply presuming the authority to bind
the government contractually to pay damages appears in his citation of
FSLIC's authority "to make contracts." The statute Souter cites refers to
the agency's general corporate powers,15 and Souter's accompanying
footnote quotes a government contracting treatise for its argument that:
"The authority of the executive to use contracts in carrying out authorized
programs is... generally assumed in the absence of express statutory
prohibitions or limitations."3 7 Another of Souter's footnotes shows even
greater signs of the analytic strain required to impose this presumption
upon regulatory agreements.3 58 After the sentence concluding that Home
Telephone & Telegraph does not apply to damages provisions, Souter's
footnote quotes an article in which the author points out that governmental
and private parties sometimes contract to compensate the private party for
intervening acts of other governmental entities that render performance
impossible. 59 Souter stretches the premise that the parties may agree to
such compensation to the conclusion that the government always makes
such promises.360 This analysis of the guarantee against loss authority
356 See id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c) (1988)).
3.1 Id. at 890 n.36 (quoting 1 RALPH C. NASH & JOHN CIBINIC, FEDERAL
PROCUREMENT LAW 5 (3d ed. 1977)) (emphasis added).3
-1 See id. at 890 n.35.
359 See id. (quoting Speidel, supra note 298, at 516).
31 Cf Speidel, supra note 298, at 535-47 (discussing agencies' ability to
assume the risk of breaches or delays caused by sovereign acts). Souter also cites
Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir.
1993) for support of the Holmesian presumption. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 870
n. 17. Butthis cite is somewhatdisingenuous. The court inHughes Communications
rejected the government's defense of the sovereign acts doctrine where delays in
the space shuttle program caused NASA to miss its deadlines for launching private
payloads. A launch scheduling policy specifically referenced in the contract
provided: "Should events arise which require rescheduling, the U.S. will consult
with all affected users in an attempt to meet the needs of the users in an equitable
manner." Hughes Communications, 998 F.2d at 956 (emphasis added). No
Holmesian presumption was necessary or employed to reach the result in Hughes
1999-20001
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makes it clear that the plurality wishes to completely reverse the
presumption from Home Telephone & Telegraph and create a new rule that
the authority of an agency to bind the Treasury to pay damages for breach
of any promises made by the agency, no matter which part of the
government causes the breach is presumed.
Ignoring the issues implicit in delegation of authority to the agencies
is probably the fundamental flaw that runs throughout all of the opinions
in Winstar. The Court's analysis skirts the key ambiguity of which arm of
the government would drive the change in the regulations. Specifically, the
Court does not address whether the agencies can issue new regulations, as
they often have, or whether Congress can enact new underlying statutory
authority and thereby require the agencies to issue new regulations. Note
that this ambiguity, unlike the threshold issue in the unmistakability
analysis above, exists even within a contractual perspective that looks only
to the intent of the parties.
Souter distinguishes between the agencies and Congress only when it
helps to clarify his reasoning that the agencies' purported promise to pay
damages does not "ossify the law in conformity to the contracts"36' or
"constrain" Congress from passing contrary laws.362 Souter, however, often
refers to "the Government" as the contracting party, for example: "Nothing
in the [regulatory approvals] purported to bar the Government from
changing the way in which it regulated the thrift industry."363 This seems
implausible in light of the language of the Winstar approval.
Over and over again, Souter alludes to a delegation of authority only
to the extent necessary to explain his rule of the case without hinting at the
sorts of delegation issues raised by Home Telephone & Telegraph
specifically orby administrative law generally.364 Exploring the distinction
Communications. See also id. at 959 n.9 (describing another example of the
government expressly agreeing to compensate for damages from sovereign acts).
361 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 871.
362 See id.
363 Id. at 868 (emphasis added).
364 See id. at 864 (noting that the lower court correctly found that "'the
government had an express contractual obligation"'). Id. For example, Souter
dismisses the government's attempt to distinguish Lynch on the basis that the
original contract took the form of a federal statute with "[p]utting aside the
question why this distinction would make any difference." Id. at 885. Souter
effectively glosses over the obvious implication that Lynch did not involve similar
delegation issues because Congress made the original promise itself by enacting a
statute. In another example, Souter discusses the American rule of legislative
sovereignty and explains that it "has always lived in some tension with the
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between the "Government," Congress, and the agencies would have
exposed the gap in the plurality's reasoning which it bridges by presuming
that an agency can make promises that bind the entire government, even if
those promises are "merely" promises to pay damages.
Continuing its analysis of the express delegation doctrine, the Winstar
plurality lays out what might appear at first glance to be an alternative
holding that the agencies had authority under Home Telephone &
Telegraph to make the regulatory contracts:
There is no question... that the Bank Board and FSLIC had ample
statutory authority to do what the Court of Federal Claims and the Federal
Circuit found they did do, that is, promise to permit respondents to count
supervisory goodwill and capital credits toward regulatory capital and to
pay respondents' damages if that performance became impossible.365
By framing the issue as the authority to make "promise[s]," this language
could be read as addressing Home Telephone & Telegraph's concern for
authority to contract regarding regulatory treatment, but upon closer
examination it is clear that, notwithstanding these hints, the plurality's
express delegation analysis instead refutes only a more general ultra vires
defense. First, the opinion refers to the express delegation doctrine and the
reserved powers doctrine as the government's "two related contentions of
the score of ultra vires."3I Second, Souter's analysis of the agency's
constitutionally created potential for a legislature, under certain circumstances, to
place effective limits on its successors, or to authorize executive action resulting
in such a limitation." Id. at 873 (emphasis added). The delegation issue implicit in
the last clause is then dropped and ignored. Also, Souter agrees with lower court's
interpretation that "the Bank Board and the FSLIC were contractually bound....
We read this promise as the law of contracts has always treatedpromises toprovide
something beyond the promisor's control, that is, as a promise to insure the
promisee against loss arising from the promised condition's nonoccurrence." Id.
at 868 (emphasis added). Souter does not pursue the obvious implication that the
regulatory change is only beyond the agency's control if driven by legislation.
Regulatory change via new regulations should be within the agency's control, so
why would the agency agree to promises broader than that? Unfortunately, none
of the other decisions, including the dissent, criticize this aspect of Souter's
opinion.365 Id. at 890.
31 Id. at 888. The government's brief in Winstar did little to discourage this
treatment of the express delegation doctrine. It combined the reserved powers
doctrine and the express delegation doctrine into its second section (out of three),
entitled: "The Relevant Federal Agencies Had No Authority to Bind Their
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statutory authority to "make contracts" 361 does not satisfy the exacting
standard from Home Telephone & Telegraph, nor does Souter analyze the
appropriate statute--12 U.S.C. § 1464-which authorized the FBLBB to
"establish" minimum capital levels.368 This section only makes sense as an
ultra vires analysis, because Souter simply presumes the agency had the
power to make the damages promise, citing a government contracting
treatise for its argument that, "[t]he authority of the executive to use
contracts in carrying out authorized programs is... generally assumed in
the absence of express statutory prohibitions or limitations. 3 69 This
presumption, however, is precisely the difference between the express
delegation doctrine and the traditional ultra vires rule.
By ignoring both the issue of administrative delegation and the Anti-
Deficiency Act, the Winstar majority creates an unwisely open-ended (and
apparently retroactive) regime of governmental liability for damages for
any statutory change in regulatory treatment of any activity permitted by
any prior approval, license, or grant. Winstar also makes it extremely
difficult for agencies to enter into agreements governing agencies' use of
discretion to write and enforce regulations. Although the most plausible
interpretation of the agreements is that the parties intended to limit the
agencies' freedom of action within their statutory framework, agencies may
now do so only at the risk of creating broad liability for damages for the
Treasury, should Congress change that statutory framework.
E. The Sovereign Acts Doctrine
Justice Souter goes to even greater lengths to avoid recognizing any
difference between the regulatory agreements and typical procurement
Successors to Particular Regulatory Policies Despite Subsequent Legislative
Changes." Petitioner's Brief at *3, United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839
(1996) (No. 95-865) (1996 WL 99716). As this heading suggests, this section
argued that attempting to bind either a successor agency or Congress would have
been ultra vires for the FHLBB. The reserved powers and express delegation
doctrines differ importantly in that reserved powers analyzes a sovereign's power
to bind itself while the express delegation doctrine focuses on a subordinate
governmental unit's authority to bind its superior sovereign body. Combiningthese
two arguments into the same section obscured the distinction. Instead of arguing
that the agencies' promises bound only the agencies, the government's brief also
essentially admits that the government viewed the banking agencies' promises as
illusory, good only as long as the government cared to honor them.
367 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 890 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1725(c) (1988) (repealed
1989)).
368 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)(2) (repealed 1994).
369 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 890 n.36 (quoting NASH & CIBINIC, supra note 357).
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contracts in his analysis of the sovereign acts doctrine. The sovereign acts
doctrine provides a defense for the government to contract liability when
the government's performance is blocked by the action of a broad new
provision of law. Just how broad the new law must be has always been
open to some debate, but under the better reading of the doctrine, the
elimination of goodwill under FIRREA is probably not broad enough to
provide a defense. This begs the question of why Souter works so hard to
avoid a straight-forward application of the doctrine.
1. Origins and Critique of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine
The sovereign acts doctrine traces back to two early decisions of the
Court of Claims, in cases arising from Civil War-era procurement
contracts. In Deming v. United States,370 the plaintiffs had contracted to
provide food for the Marines. Congress then imposed a duty on some of the
covered items, and the plaintiffs consequently suffered losses in fulfilling
the contracts. The plaintiffs again contracted to provide food, only to have
Congress pass the Legal Tender Act, which again raised prices of some of
the inputs andthe plaintiffs suffered losses in fulfilling the second contract.
The court held there was no government liability for the losses:
A contract between the government and a private party cannot be
specially affected by the enactment of a general law. The statute bears
upon it as it bears upon all similar contracts between citizens, and affects
it in no other way. In form, the claimant brings this action against the
United States for imposing new conditions upon his contract; in fact he
brings it for exercising their sovereign right of enacting laws. But the
government entering into a contract, stands not in the attitude of the
government exercising its sovereign power of providing laws for the
welfare of the State. The United States as a contractor are not responsible
for the United States as a lawgiver. 371
Deming thus announces the two analytical halves of the sovereign acts
doctrine. First, the government acts in one of two roles: that of a sovereign
with power to regulate its citizens and their corporations, or that of a
contracting party that sheds its sovereignty and chooses instead to enter
into a contractual relationship with private parties. Second, in order to
ensure that the subsequent act of the government (i.e., the act that comes
370 Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 190 (1865).
3711 Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
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after the contract and causes its breach) is not simply an attempt by the
contracting part of the government to renege on its contract, the courts will
require that the subsequent act not be targeted at the specific contract, but
instead have a "general" intention and effect.
Similarly in Jones v. United States," plaintiffs had contracted to
perform surveying of Indian lands covered by certain treaties. Plaintiffs'
performance was delayed, however, when the army withdrew its protection
from the sector. 3 Plaintiffs sued for losses from "obstructions and
hindrances" caused by the government's actions, but the court rejected the
claim:
The "obstructions and hindrances" complained of on the part of the
United States were the withdrawal of their troops from the military posts
in the Indian country, contrary to the terms of the Indian treaties; and it is
insisted, "as a matter of law," that "the United States could not change
their attitude or their policy in a material degree, without incurring the
responsibility ofmaking the claimants just compensation forall additional
expenses thereby incurred."
This position cannot be sustained. The two characters which the
government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign cannot be thus
fused; nor can the United States while sued in the one character be made
liable in damages for their acts done in the other. Whatever acts the
government may do, be they legislative or executive, so long as they be
public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct
or violate the particular contracts into which it enters -with private
persons. 3
74
Jones slightly rewrites the test from Deming to read "public and general,"
but the concept is clearly the same.
Two aspects of Jones are notable. First, Jones extends the sovereign
acts doctrine to "executive" action of the government, not just subsequent
legislation that causes breach of the original contract.375 Second, Jones goes
further than Deming to explain that the government gets treated as any
other contractor, but only when it has chosen to shed its sovereign role and
assume the role of private contractor.
31 Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383 (1865).371 See id. at 384.374 Id. (emphasis added).
375 See id.
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In this court the United States appear simply as contractors; and they are
to be-held liable only within the same limits that any other defendant
would be in any other court. Though their sovereign acts performed for
the general good may work injury to some private contractors, such
parties gain nothing by having the United States as their defendants.
Wherever the public and private acts of the government seem to
commingle, acitizen orcorporatebody mustby suppositionbe substituted
in its place, and then the question be determined whether the action will
lie against the supposed defendant ... This distinction between the public
acts and private contracts of the government-not always strictly insisted
on in the earlier days of this court-frequently misapprehended in public
bodies, and constantly lost sight of by suitors who come before us, we
now desire to make so broad and distinct that hereafter the two cannot be
confounded; and we repeat, as a principle applicable to all cases, that the
United States as a contractor cannot be held liable directly or indirectly
for the public acts of the United States as a sovereign.16
Jones does not stand for the proposition that whenever the government
makes an agreement of any kind the government is to be treated as a
private contracting party, because the analysis includes a strong distinction
between the sovereign and private roles of the government.Having made this distinction, however, Deming and Jones are
essentially silent on how to treat an agreement made by the government in
its sovereign capacity. It is clear from the opinions thaf the court means to
deny the private plaintiffs the advantage of holding up the actions of one
part of the government as violative of an agreement made by another part
of the government. One could reasonably guess that if the government
made promises in a sovereign capacity, and subsequent sovereign acts of
the government breached that agreement, Deming and Jones would not
allow the government to use the special defense of the sovereign acts
doctrine because in such a case it is the same part, or role, of the
government both making and breaking the promise. In that case, the
unmistakability and express delegation doctrines by themselves might
provide the best balance between the competing goals of protecting
individuals' contract rights and preserving freedom of action by the
government. On the other hand, if the subsequent, breaching act was much
broader and more general than the original promise, or the subsequent act
was unequivocally caused by another arm of the government, the doctrine




The Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on the sovereign acts
doctrine in Horowitz v. United States, decided in 1925 ?.7 The plaintiff
agreed to purchase war surplus silk, at an agreed-upon price, from the
Ordinance Department's New York Ordinance Salvage Board. Under the
terms of the contract, the Board promised to ship the silk within two days
to a third party, to whom plaintiff planned to sell the silk at the market
price. The Board shipped the silk almost a month late due to an embargo
* on domestic shipment of silk imposed by the Railroad Administration just
after execution of the contract. During the embargo, the price of silk
plummeted andplaintiff suffered consequential damages3 7 The Court held
that there was no liability on the contract with the Board. The Court quoted
much ofthe language above from Jones, adding simply: "We thinkthis was
correct[.] '37 9
Though the Supreme Court has not often revisited the doctrine, the
lower courts have relied upon it on numerous occasions.38 0 Professor
Speidel thoroughly analyzedthe courts' application ofthe doctrine in cases
where an agency made the original contract and another agency performed
the subsequent sovereign act that caused the breach. The cases he
discusses, like Deming and Jones, are limited to situations where the
original contract was made by the government agency acting in its
proprietary capacity. 8' Speidel does not discuss cases involving regulatory
agreements, but he does argue that the sovereign acts doctrine necessarily
includes a requirement that the government assumes an implied duty of
cooperation with the private contractor. This duty is limited, however, to
the particular agency that makes the contract, not the government as a
whole. In an example where agency X makes a contract which becomes
impossible to perform due to the sovereign acts of agency Y, Speidel would
disallow the defense if agency X knew of the conditions about to be
imposed by agency Y and did not inform the private party in advance.
Speidel discusses several, more complicated examples as well, but for our
purposes the point remains the same: government agencies are viewed as
3 7 Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925).
378 See id. at 459-60.
3719 Id. at 461.
38 See, e.g., Krent, supra note 165, at 1558-61 (arguing that courts have applied
the doctrine consistently); Peter S. Latham, The Sovereign ActDoctrine in theLaw
of Government Contracts: A Critique and Analysis, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 29 (1975)
(analyzing numerous cases); Speidel, supra note 298, at 516.
"' See Speidel, supra note 298, at 532-35 and 540-47.
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separate contracting entities.382 Speidel adds the interesting note that, at
least in cases where two separate agencies are involved, the subsequent
sovereign act must cause the breach only indirectly if the government is to
succeed with the sovereign acts defense.3 83
Speidel also aptly summarizes three rationales behind the sovereign
acts doctrine. First is the need to separate the actions of different
agencies. 314 Second, "[a]ny court-established rule imposing a blanket
liability upon the United States for non-contractual acts of effective
government would place an intolerable burden on the public treasury."385
Third, the doctrine prevents private contractors from having an advantage
they would not have if the contracting agency were in fact a private party
that had to contend with sovereign acts just like any other private party.386
This third rationale, which seems to attract universal agreement, is the
genius of the sovereign acts doctrine because it comprehends the
government acting in its two distinct roles, rather than simply trying to
view government agreements as always different or always the same as
private contracts. Thus, it has the potential to reconcile the logic of
exceptionalism and congruence by showing when each is appropriate.
Attempts to clarify or refine the sovereign acts doctrine's standard for
liability, however, reveal the doctrine's potential weaknesses. First, its
relation to the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines has never
been thoroughly analyzed, either by courts or commentators. For example,
Professor Latham, in his analysis of the sovereign acts doctrine, proposes
a three-part test that attempts to tie in takings analysis and look closely at
the nature of the original promise.3 17 But the unmistakability doctrine
focuses on the nature of the original promise, and Jones, Deming, and
Horowitz all seem to presume the enforceability of the original contracts,
so what does it addto look there? Since the sovereign acts doctrine focuses
on the subsequent sovereign act, attempts to analyze the original promise
at the same time are confusing, especially if they do not discuss the role
3 2 See id. at 542-43. See also id. at 545 (discussing Derecktor v. United States,
128 F. Supp. 136 (1954), cert. granted, 348 U.S. 926, dismissed per stipulation,
350 U.S. 802 (1955)).383 See id. at 540.
384 See id. at 538-39. Speidel favorably cites Mitchell,A General Theory, supra
note 286, at 60, for this rationale.
385 Speidel, supra note 298, at 539.
386 See id. at 539. See also Latham, supra note 380, at 37-39 (summarizing
similar rationales, but offering a different critique).387See Latham, supra note 380, at 57.
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remaining for the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines. The
confusion arises from the fact that such a mixed analysis tends to blur the
government's two roles, while still trying to affirm the logic of Jones. Part
II discusses the relationship between these three doctrines in more depth.
The second ambiguity inthe sovereign acts doctrine is simply defining
the threshold for how public and general the subsequent act needs to be for
the government to avoid liability. In Deming, the public at large felt the
effects of the Legal Tender Act, even though the plaintiffs felt a more
particularized harm from the resulting rise in prices for inputs necessary to
fulfill the contract. 8 In Jones, all non-Indians in the area from which the
army withdrew presumably suffered the absence of its protection, but the
plaintiffs had a particular contract that was hindered.8 9 In Horowitz, all
persons needing to ship silk suffered from the embargo, but the plaintiffs
had a particular, unfortunately-timed contract to fulfill. 9
In each case, there are two dimensions to the scope of the new
sovereign act. Initially, it is helpful to compare how many people the new
act affects generally with how many people have contracts particularly
affected. Then, for those with contracts affected by the new sovereign act,
how direct and serious is the effect. Horowitz seems to present the closest
call of the three cases, but it is difficult to tell precisely because the
reported opinion provides so few facts. For example, in the post-war
market for silk, it is certainly conceivable that government surplus was a
major supplier; if that were the case, most shippers in the Northeast might
have bought silk from the government's New York Ordinance Salvage
Board. Moreover, it is left unsaid whether the embargo affected only
silk-the embargo was imposed by the Railroad Administration, not the
Salvage Board. It is difficult, therefore, to test whether the Surplus Board
and the Railroad Administration acted independently. Thus, even with the
aid of Speidel's analysis, it is difficult to define the extent ofthe divergence
between the scope of the new sovereign act and the number of contracting
parties. In light of this, Horowitz seems to set a low standard for "public
and general."
Professor Schwartz succinctly discusses the various possibilities for the
level of generality within a working theory for the sovereign acts
doctrine.39" ' For example, Schwartz defines "complete" generality as
resulting from a subsequent sovereign act that affects all citizens in the
388 See Deming v. United States, 1 Ct. C1. 190, 190-91 (1865).
389 See Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. C1. 383, 384 (1865).
3 oSee Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 460 (1925).
391 See Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 633.
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same manner as the plaintiffs.3 2 Several generally conservative
commentators have suggested importing takings analysis as a way to
address the generality issue. 3 From a certain analytic distance, this
approach has intuitive appeal, because one of the more widely accepted
goals of takings is to prevent the singling out of a few individuals "to bear
public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."' Takings law thus struggles with the similar question
ofwhen the group that bears the burden becomes large enough that it is no
longer being singled out. But given the abundant doctrinal difficulties and
philosophical differences in takings law, it seems an imprudent place to
look for theoretical guidance. It is important, nevertheless, to keep takings
law in mind so as not to create a scheme under the sovereign acts doctrine
that has wildly different rules or standards than takings law. It is not
terribly difficult to present cases like Winstar as takings cases, orto present
certain takings cases as regulatory contract cases. Therefore, different
standards in the respective areas of law would inevitably tend to create
pressure to define a case as one or the other. It is almost always more
productive to argue directly about the liability rules than to argue about the
more abstract-and more arbitrary-definitions of terms or claims.
A few liberal commentators have suggested political process theory as
a measure for the level of generality appropriate under the sovereign acts
doctrine.391 Political process theory, appropriately attributed to the work of
392 Schwartz's summary of the various issues provides a thorough and
intelligent grounding of the issues presented when regulatory agreements are
analyzed as contracts. Schwartz's proposed test for liability adds little to his
analysis, however, as it simply combines the issues into a list of elements to
consider. This proposal, similar to Latham's, does not explain how the sovereign
acts doctrine differs from the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines or
how they ought to interact doctrinally.
393 See Latham, supra note 380; Michael L. Zigler, Takings Law and the
Contract Clause: A Takings Law Approach to Legislative Modifications ofPublic
Contracts, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1447 (1984); cf J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F.
Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach ofthe Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U1.
L. REV. 851 (1996) (arguing that deregulation can work a taking by erasing a
promised monopoly); Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings andBreach of
the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007 (1996).
3 United States v. Armstrong, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960).
3 See, e.g., Griffith, supra note 43, at 277 (suggesting a requirement that
enforceable government contracts not undermine the political process); Krent,
supra note 165, at 1564, 1576-77 (suggesting the political process analysis helps
justify sovereign immunity); Sterk, supra note 43, at 702-18; Levy, supra note 130,
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John Hart Ely,396 advocates leaving most constitutional decisions to the
political branches on the reasonable assumption that few constitutional
issues are purely legal. Therefore, courts should generally defer to the
legislature's view on most constitutional issues. The only exceptions would
be for those issues that affect the political branches' decision-making
processes. Courts already closely scrutinize legislation that affects
individuals' rights to participate in the political process, with voting and
speech rights as examples. Probably the first explication of such a theory
to appear in a Supreme Court decision is the famous footnote in Carolene
Products,397 which provided for increased judicial scrutiny of legislation
targeted at "discrete and insular" 398 minorities. If a group is too small or
otherwise too powerless to have any reasonable input in the political
process, it deserves special protection from the courts. Larger, more
powerful groups are left to fend for themselves in the political branches.
A similar analytic approach would make sense in interpreting the
sovereign acts doctrine. Groups that are large and/or politically powerful
enough to have reasonable influence over the legislative process should be
able to protect their contractual interests whenthose interests are threatened
by subsequent legislation. After all, new legislation and regulation will
often affect the contract rights of those who have agreements with the
government. For example, Social Security benefits could conceivably be
thought of as a contract, but when benefits are rolled back, the class of
persons affected is so large that it is not thought to have a cognizable
contracts claim against the government. As is probably apparent by now,
political process theory, for all its theoretical appeal, does little to suggest
a workable standard for how large the affected group must be for the
legislation to be public and general. Perhaps the best lesson does come
from takings law: try to use comparisons of the facts from certain cases. In
this vein, the affected group would not need to be anywhere near as large
as Professor Schwartz's "complete generality" to satisfy the fact-based
standard apparent in Horowitz, for the simple reason that very few people
at 329; Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 656 n.122 (citing
Saul Levmore, Just Compensation andJustPolitics, 22 CONN. L. REv. 285 (1990)
(suggesting the political process analysis in takings cases)); Note, A Process-
Oriented Approach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1647-50 (1979)
(suggesting avariation on the political process theory as applicable to the Contracts
Clause analysis).
396 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REvIEw (1980).
' United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).398Id. at 153 n.4.
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were affected by the silk embargo. Fortunately, the takings cases seem to
deny compensation in situations where the number of persons affected by
the legislation is roughly analogous to Horowitz. 99 In any event, the
affected group needs to be large enough to avoid the conclusion that it is
being singled out or that the government is using its sovereign power to
relieve itself of an obligation it made earlier in its proprietary capacity.
2. The Sovereign Acts Doctrine Should Have Been an
Easy Loser for the Government in Winstar
Since there is no clear choice for a standard, the outcome could not be
certain, and the pre-Winstar commentary was split on whether the
government would prevail on a sovereign acts defense. The sovereign
acts doctrine analyzes the subsequent sovereign act, which in this case was
the provisions in FIRREA affecting goodwill capital. Among the many
changes it made to the banking regulatory structure, FLRREA set strict,
explicit capital requirements applicable to all thrifts. The OTS, successor
to the abolished F-LBB, would now have little leeway in setting minimum
standards. More importantly, "unidentifiable intangible assets" were
expressly not to be counted towards capital. 1 The OTS quickly decided
that FIRREA left it no option but to eliminate the goodwill capital that it
had allowed hundreds of recently combined thrifts to carry on their
books.102 It promulgated regulations in conformity with its interpretation of
3 I See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. NewYork, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (finding
no taking in building restrictions placed on sites designated by the city as historic
landmarks). It might be an interesting study to look for class-action takings cases
to see whether any such cases have succeeded, and if so, how they have overcome
the singling out language in cases like Armstrong.
41 Compare Krent, supra note 165, at 1570 (arguing the government should
succeed with a sovereign acts defense for FIRREA); and David Toscano, Note,
Forbearance Agreements: Invalid Contracts for the Surrender of Sovereignty, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 426 (1992) (contendingthe government should notbe liable); with
Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 518 (suggesting
FIRREA is not public and general); Linda B. Coe, Abrogation of Forbearance
Agreements: Unauthorized by FIRREA and Unconstitutional, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 157 (1990) (arguing the government should be liable).
401 See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(9)(A) (1994).
4 But see Coe, supra note 400, at 159-73 (arguing that FIRREA required the
OTS to recognize goodwill capital, not abrogate it). It is interesting to speculate on
how things might have played out had OTS continued to recognize the goodwill
capital. Certainly, the legal challenges to this action would have taken on an
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FIRREA and informed thrifts not to count goodwiUI, °3 and soon began
closing thrifts that were not in compliance with the new capital rules.
The capital provisions in FIRREA applied to all federally regulated
thrifts, not just those with regulatory goodwill on their books. The
difference in scope of these two groups is probably large enough to satisfy
a factual comparison to Horowitz and Jones, and even to the takings cases.
But, for those with no regulatory goodwill on their books, the new capital
definition made no significant difference, unlike the other silk shippers that
had contracted with non-governmental parties but who were nevertheless
affected by the silk embargo. So it is largely semantics to argue that the
new sovereign act applied to a larger group than those directly affected. It
applied to a larger group but had a significant impact only on those thrifts
with regulatory goodwill. Similarly, if one applies Speidel's requirement
that, for the government to prevail, the effect must be indirect, it is clear
that the affected thrifts suffered very directly as a result. Even a simple
application of the sovereign acts doctrine, then, should lead to the
conclusion that the government would not prevail on this basis.'
entirely different tenor since it would presumably have been up to competing thrifts
that did not have goodwill capital to sue the OTS on an APA claim. If the OTS had
lost such a suit, it might have been in much better position to defend the Winstar
action later for then it would appear as an agency that had tried to keep its
predecessor's promises. Of course, such a policy undoubtedly would have drawn
harsh criticism from members of Congress who expected OTS to abrogate the
goodwill capital as a result of FIRREA.403 See OTS Thrift Bulletin 38-2 (Jan. 9, 1990) (notifying thrifts that goodwill
should no longer be counted). There was a phase-in for the new capital rules, but
the period was much shorter than the typical amortization schedule for goodwill
that many of these thrifts had been given as part of the regulatory approval of their
mergers. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(t)(3)(A) (1994).
0 The government's argument in its Winstar brief has no credible response to
this logic. "FIRREA as a whole is plainly a'public and general' statute. It instituted
a comprehensive overhaul of the regulation of the entire thrift industry, for the
protection of depositors nationwide and in order to promote the general welfare."
Petitioner's Brief at *44, United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (No.
95-865) (1996 WL 99716) (emphasis added). This argument would plainly apply
to very nearly every piece of legislation Congress enacted. The brief then gives a
similar, if slightly more sophisticated, version of the first argument by suggesting
that the proper standard "is not whether a particular party is affected by the
governmental action at issue; it is whether the impact on a particular party or
parties is caused by a law enacted to govern regulatorypolicy and to advance the
general welfare." Id. (emphasis added).
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Further analysis seems to confirm the point. Both the original
agreements and the subsequent sovereign act were done in the
government's sovereign role. The sovereign acts doctrine recognizes that
the government often takes sovereign or regulatory actions without any
intention of affecting the contracts other arms of the government have
made in a proprietary capacity. The defense is designed to ensure that
actions undertaken in the sovereign role are not used as an indirect way of
rescinding bad bargains made in the proprietary role. But here both the
original agreement and the subsequent breaching act were done by the
same, sovereign role side of the government.
Indeed, the legislative history could not be clearer that Congress
specifically targeted the goodwill capital provisions and purposefully set
out to revoke the regulator's recognition of goodwill. Proponents of
FIRREA's capital provisions argued that it would produce a necessary
culling of the weak thrifts and ultimately reduce the total cleanup bill by
keeping small problems from becoming large and large problems from
becoming catastrophic."5 In this way, FIRREAvetoedthe thrift regulators'
strategy of hoping stronger thrifts could help weaker ones grow out of their
problems. Opponents specifically pointed to the regulatory approvals as
contracts and argued that FIRREA's new capital provisions would result
in governmental breach of these contracts. ° Proponents were less heated
in responding to the concern about breach. Representative Saxton, for
example, argued that "two wrongs don't make a right."' 7 Representative
Rostenkowski commented vaguely that the goodwill agreements were "not
contracts written in stone." 8 As to the question of whether FIRREA's
capital provisions would in fact cause the breach of the goodwill
agreements, there seems to have been little real debate in Congress. The
conclusion seems inescapable that Congress intended to target those thrifts
that had entered into regulatory goodwill agreements with regulators.
°9
5 See, e.g., United States v. Winstar Corp.., 518 U.S. 839-901 (1996) (quoting
135 CONG. REc. 2703-01 (June 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski)).
' See, e.g., Winstar, 518 U.S. at 900-02 nnA8-49.
4 135 CoNG. REC. H2553-02 (June 14, 1989) (statement of Rep. Saxton).
408 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 902 (quoting 135 CONG. REC. H2703-1, H2717 (June
15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Rostenkowski)).41 Despite this intentional targeting FIRREA's capital provision probably does
not qualify as "singling out" as that term is used in takings analysis because the
group of affected thrifts seems fairly large, especially, for example, in comparison
to the group of building owners affected by the New York City historic
preservation ordinance in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York. See Penn
Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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Ifthe sovereign acts doctrine deserved any special attention in Winstar,
it could have been as a chance for the Court to clarify the standard for how
broad the new sovereign act's effect must be. As we have seen in the
discussion here on political process theory and elsewhere on takings, this
would have been a sizeable undertaking, of course. A less ambitious, but
still useful, endeavor might have been to elucidate one or two factors in
addition to the scope ofthe new rule, such as Speidel's requirement that the
effect of the new rule be indirect, or even a congressional intent element
that, in order for the government to succeed, it must show that Congress did
not directly intend or plan that the primary goal of the legislation was to
breach existing regulatory agreements. Adding these elements to the
sovereign acts doctrine would not have required an extended analysis or
run counter to anything in Horowitz.
3. The Likely Purpose Behind Souter's Lengthy
Treatment of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine
The plurality in Winstar took a much different-and greatly
extended-path to its conclusion that the government could not prevail on
the basis of the sovereign acts doctrine. Souter's analysis comes in three
main parts. First, he makes two preliminary arguments that, upon closer
scrutiny, might explain the reasons behind his approach. The second part
lays out his view on the standard for public and general, which perfectly
consistent with the traditional standard described above. Third, Souter
argues at length that the sovereign acts doctrine also requires that the
government prevail on the common law contracts doctrine of impossibility.
When analyzed in the context of Souter's earlier arguments regarding the
unmistakability and express delegation doctrines, it becomes clear that this
extended exegesis is necessary in order for Winstarto both achieve internal
logical consistency and provide damages remedies equivalent to a
regulatory takings theory.
Souter gives his interpretation ofthe appropriate standard in the second
part of his analysis. In isolation from the other parts of his opinion, it seems
mostly consistent with Horowitz. Souter describes the sovereign acts
doctrine as aimed at ferreting out legislation "tainted by a governmental
object self-interest,"41 and he citesArmstrongv. United States, the takings
case, for its language on not singling out individuals to bear public
burdens."1 Defining the standard for public and general, Souter finds that
410 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 896.
41 See id. at 896-97.
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a subsequent sovereign act will not create contract liability if its "impact
upon public contracts is, as in Horowitz, merely incidental to the
accomplishment of a broader governmental objective.... [W]here a
substantial part of the impact of the Government's action rendering
performance impossible falls on its own contractual obligations, the
defense will be unavailable."412 Souter defends this standard, correctly, as
"striking a middle course between the[ ] two extremes"413 of requiring
complete generality and tolerating substantial governmental efforts of self-
relief.414
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, Souter notes that it is of
no import that FIRREA did not specifically target any thrifts: "Legislation
can almost always be written in a formally general way, and the want of an
identified target is not much security when a measure's impact nonetheless
falls substantially upon the Government's contracting partners. '4 5 Souter
412 Id. at 898. It is a little unclear what Souter means by "unavailable." It is
possible he means to suggest that a certain level of governmental self-interest will
result in the doctrine not being applied at all. "The facts of this case do not warrant
application of the [sovereign acts] doctrine." Id. at 891 (emphasis added). This
interpretation also gains some support from his similar treatment of the
unmistakability doctrine. His analysis of the application of the unmistakability
doctrine discusses the same arguments and issues that prior cases have analyzed in
discussing the rule itself. On the other hand, Souter does proceed to apply the
sovereign acts doctrine, and begins his subsequent analysis with: "[e]ven if
FIREA were to qualify as 'public and general'." Id. at 904. Finally, Souter
explains at the end of his introductory section that the government must prevail on
both the public and general requirement and the impossibility doctrine, so the better
interpretation is that Souter's test is for the sovereign acts doctrine itself, not its
applicability. See id. at 896.
413 Id. at 899 (footnote omitted).
414 Schwartz appears to argue that Souter intended to apply a rule of complete
generality. Schwartz relies on language from a footnote: "The generality
requirement will almost always be met where, as in Deming, the governmental
action 'bears upon [the government's contract] as it bears upon all similar contracts
between citizens."' Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at
522-23 (quoting Winstar, 518 U.S. at 897 n.42 (quoting Deming v. United States,
1 Ct. Cl. 190, 190-91 (1865)) (emphasis added)). The better reading is that Souter
does not intend this language to be the rule of decision; indeed, he even hedges it
with "almost" A requirement of complete generality does not square with the
language, quoted above, that Souter sets forth in the text. See also infra Part H.A.
(discussing Schwartz's use of Souter's footnote 42 to build a synthesis of the
Winstar majority opinions).
415 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 902-03.
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logically rejects the dissent's argument, made also by the government, that
the capital provisions are public and general because FIRREA consisted of
twelve separate titles and took up 372 pages.4"6 Souter also quickly
dismisses the government's argument that FIRREA was public and general
because it was enacted to "advance the general welfare," by expressing the
hope for "nothing less of all congressional action."417 The plurality's
analysis relies heavily on the legislative history of the capital provisions,
discussed above, that showed that opponents of FIRREA emphasized the
direct effect on the goodwill promises made by the thrift agencies. Though
S outer does not discuss directly the idea of adding a separate congressional
intent element to the sovereign acts doctrine, his extended analysis of the
legislative history largely accomplishes the suggestion that congressional
intent should be relevant.4 8
The analysis could have stopped there, but to do so would necessarily
have meant approval of the distinction between the sovereign and private
roles of the government, since that is the logical lynchpin of the reasoning
in Horowitz and Jones. Instead, the plurality opinion went further and
required that the government also prevail on the common law contract
defense of impossibility, even though none of the sovereign acts doctrine
cases mention or apply this rule in any way.41 9 Souter sets up the
impossibility requirement with two related preliminary arguments. First,
he "doubt[s] that a workable line can be drawn between the Government's
'regulatory' and 'nonregulatory' capacities." '20 At least in the case of the
416 See id. at 903 n.52. For the dissent's argument, see id. at 933-34.
417 Id. at 903.
418 Cf Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 549
(criticizing Rehnquist's attack on Souter's reliance on legislative history). Schwartz
interprets Souter's use of legislative history as "evidence that FIRREA has a
substantial impact on government contractual obligations" and concludes that
Souter's test for public and general is "an objective test of generality." Id. Whether
the test of generality is objective or subjective is not particularly important.
Evidence of either kind should be relevant in determining whether the government
is taking advantage of its sovereign powers to unfairly reduce its contractual
obligations.
419 Cf id. at 525 (arguing that Souter "assumes" the impossibility doctrine
defines the limits of a sovereign acts defense); and id. at 527 (Horowitz does not
seem to require that government prevail on impossibility doctrine). The
impossibility defense allows a defendant to escape contract liability where
performance was made impossible by conditions beyond the control of the
defendant. See infra note 438 and accompanying text.
420 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 894.
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thrift merger approvals, the overriding goal ofthrift regulation is protection
ofthe federal deposit insurance fund and insurance looks like both apnvate
and a regulatory function:
The regulation thus protected the Government in its capacity analogous
to a private insurer, the same capacity in which it entered into supervisory
merger agreements to convert some of its financial insurance obligations
into responsibilities of private entrepreneurs. In tlns respect, the
supervisory mergers bear some analogy to private contracts for
reinsurance. On the other hand, there is no question that thrift regulation
is, m fact, regulation The inescapable conclusion from all of this is
that the Government's "regulatory" and "nonregulatory" capacities were
fused[.]42'
But under the logic of Horowitz, it is not terribly difficult to keep the two
roles of government separate m the case of deposit insurance. The
government acts m a private capacity with respect to the deposit insurance
when it fulfills its obligation to pay off depositors after a bank failure or
when it follows agreements it makes with insured financial institutions
regarding insurance premiums. It acts in a sovereign role when it requires
deposit insurance as a condition for granting authority to engage m certain
activities. Tins sort of distinction is exactly the distinction made by
Horowitz and Jones.4 2 Moreover, the regulatory agreements in Winstar did
not relate to deposit insurance to regulatory approval of mergers and
regulatory treatment of the thrifts relative to capital rules. The approvals
related to deposit insurance only in the sense that almost all banking
regulation aims, in some way, to minimize risk to the insurance fund.
Moreover, in the above-quoted language where Souter refers to the
regulators' efforts "to convert some of its financial insurance obligations
into responsibilities of private entrepreneurs,"3 he is making a fairly
disingenuous reference to the net worth maintenance agreements used by
the regulators as a part of nearly every goodwill capital agreement. 4 As
discussed in the Introduction of this Article, the net worth maintenance
42
, Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
4 In Ins dissent, Rehnquist argues: "By mnimmuzing the role of lawgiver and
expanding the role as private contractor, the principal opinion has thus casually, but
improperly, reworked the sovereign acts doctrine." Id. at 931 (Rehnquist, C.1.,




agreements were provisions that required the owners of the combined (and
newly chartered) thrifts to commit to infuse additional capital into the thrift
to the extent necessary to bring the thrift into compliance with minimum
capital rules.4  In this way, the net worth maintenance agreements
attempted to dissolve the limited personal liability of corporate
shareholders. 26 Souter's allusion to these tells far less than half the story,
however, because most courts that have interpreted these net worth
maintenance agreements have found them to be unenforceable as contracts
preciselybecause they are, instead, regulatory actions of the government.427
According to the majority of courts which have analyzed the net worth
maintenance agreements, they are not examples of the government acting
in a private capacity. Souter, however, simply fails to mention this.
Souter's analysis on the sovereign/private distinction is inconsistent in
other ways as well.428
Souter's secondpreliminary argument is that Horowitz and Lynch stand
for the proposition that all government agreements should be treated
exactly as private contracts.429 To use the terminology of Professor
Schwartz, Souter advances a pure congruence theory: "the point [of
Horowitz] was to put the Government in the same position it would have
enjoyed as a private contractor."4 3 To do so, however, Souter relies on
4 1 See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
426 The NWMAs were not unlike, but more ambitious than, the double liability
provisions that applied to national bank shareholders from the Civil War through
the Great Depression. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Double
Liability of Bank Shareholders: History and Implications, 27 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 31 (1992) (arguing that double liability worked very well both to reduce
creditor losses and promote early resolutions, and resulted in clear, reasonable
judicial rules).427 See supra note 24.
4 Compare Winstar, 518 U.S. at 894 (holding that deposit insurance is
comparable to private insurance), with id. at 897 n.42 ("[-]ere, the public contracts
at issue have no obvious private analogs"). Souter also argues that the sovereign
acts doctrine is better applied by distinguishing between "legislation that is
relatively free of government self-interest and .. . statutes tainted by a
governmental object of self-relief." Id. at 896. This distinction boils down to a
distinction between sovereign and private capacities because the goal of self-relief
in a sovereign capacity has little meaning, except to the same extent that raising
taxes is an example of self-relief. Accord Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of
Congruence, supra note 13, at 522-23 n. 196 (suggesting that Souter's analysis may
be contradictory on this point).429 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 892.
430 Id.
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ambiguous language from Jones and Horowitz and draws a strained
conclusion from them. The language can be read as espousing pure
congruence or as applying congruence rules only when necessary to avoid
giving private plaintiffs an advantage they would not have against a private
defendant:
In this court the United States appear simply as contractors; and they are
to be held liable only within the same limits that any other defendant
would be in any other court. Though their sovereign acts performed for
the general good may work injury to some private contractors, such
parties gain nothing by having the United States as their defendants.431
The first sentence supports the congruence theory, but the second suggests
that it is limited to only certain factual situations where it would actually
serve the government's interests. In deciding which reading makes more
sense, one should remember that in Deming, Jones, and Horowitz, the
plaintiffs sought to take advantage of the fact that both the party they
contracted with and the party that caused the breach were part of the
government. If the two governmental parties were treated as one and "the
government" were subject to private contract rules, the plaintiffs would
have a strong case. But the courts separated the government's sovereign
and private roles so as to deny private plaintiffs the advantage they would
otherwise enjoy. It was only to the private, separate part ofthe government
that the courts applied the congruence rule, and it worked to the
government's advantage to do so. Thus, the separation of roles that
precedes the application of a congruence rule is itself fundamentally
"exceptionalist," again using Schwartz's terminology. Souter glosses over
this and seizes on the first sentence, expanding it to the conclusion that the
government must suffer the application of all common law contract rules
as if it had no sovereign role.432
431 Id. at 892-93 (quoting Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925)
(quoting Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 383, 384 (1865))).
432 See id. at 893-94. It is interesting to note that Souter might have chosen to
distinguish Deming, Jones, and Horowitz on the grounds that they all involved
contracts made in the government's private capacity (unlike Winstar, which
involved regulatory agreements made in the government's sovereign capacity). Cf
Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 510 n.127 (noting
that Winstar did not involve "Government functioning in its normal contractual
role as purchaser of goods or services"). This, of course, would have meant
recognizing the distinction between the sovereign and private roles, and would
have effectively killed Winstar's usefulness in a regulatory takings agenda.
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Further evidence that Souter is incorrectly reading congruence into the
case law appears in his reliance on language from Lynch, the case finding
contract liability for congressional repeal of life insurance for World War
I veterans. "When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights
and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts
between private individuals."433 The "when" clause can be read as either
purely rhetorical or as signaling a distinction between situations where the
government is subject to congruence from those where it is not. This clause
from Lynch contains essentially the same ambiguity that appeared in Cooke
v. UnitedStates,434whichheldthe government liable for forged commercial
paper it had accepted and paid for where it only discovered the forgery
much later due to its negligent delay:
Laches is not imputable to the Government, in its character as sovereign,
by those subject to its dominion.... Still a government may suffer loss
through the negligence of its officers. If it comes down from its position
ofsovereignty, and enters the domain ofcommerce, it submits itself to the
same laws that govern individuals there. Thus, if it becomes the holder of
a bill of exchange, it must use the same diligence to charge [fraud by] the
drawers and indorsers that is required of individuals .... 435
In holding that laches is not "imputable to the Government," Cooke clearly
means to distinguish between the government roles and apply the rules of
private contracts to the government only when it actually "comes down
from its position of sovereignty" and not when it acts as sovereign. This is
the better reading of the "when' clause from Lynch as well. The Court in
Lynch went on to describe the various ways in which the government made
clear that it offered the life insurance in its private role, for example, by
charging premiums.436 Souter's congruence reading ignores the more likely
meaning of the conditional clause in Lynch. Both Cooke and Lynch, after
all, distinguished between the sovereign and private roles,437 so how can
they support always treating the government as a private party?
433 instar, 518 U.S. at 895 (quoting Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,579
(1934)).434 Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875).
435 Id. at 398 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).436 See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571,576 (1934).
437 See Cooke, 91 U.S. at 398; Lynch, 292 U.S. at 576-77 (distinguishing the
insurance at issue from governmental "gratuities" which can be revoked at any time
without contract liability).
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In light of the ease with which the sovereign acts defense could have
been rejected, in a manner fully consistent with both case law and
commentary, it seems odd that the plurality would bother to stretch it in the
two ways just outlined: blurring the distinction between sovereign and
private roles and applying a pure congruence reasoning to all government
agreements. The reason might be that this approach is necessary to avoid
making arguments that would undermine the plurality's reasoning on the
other defenses. First, these preliminary arguments lead into Souter's
application of the common law contract doctrine of impossibility, an
additional requirement not supported by case law. Souter explains the
impossibility rule:
Where, after a contract is made, a party's performance is made
impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an event the non-
occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the
language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.438
That is, if the parties were relying on the continuation of some condition
but that condition changes, a party's duty to perform is released as long as
that party was not responsible for changing the condition. Souter reasons
that the government cannot pass the impossibility doctrine muster because
the traditionally rapid pace of change in banking law and regulations made
it inconceivable that the parties simply assumed the rules would stay the
same.439 Indeed, the rapid change is why they wanted a contract: "[ilt
would be absurd to say that the nonoccurrence of a change in the regulatory
capital rules was a basic assumption upon which these contracts were
made." O Since continuation of the "rules" was not simply a tacit
assumption of the parties, then, changing of the rules does not discharge the
government from liability. This reasoning has a strongly tautological
quality to it. For example, parties contracting about the price of goods to
be purchased do not presume the continuation of prices, so of course a
change in the price demanded would not excuse one party from liability.
The impossibility doctrine is instead designed to deal with changing
conditions that were not the subject of the bargaining, but were only
background conditions or tacit assumptions, such as the continued legality
of trade in the specific goods.
431 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 904 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS




The plurality's impossibility exercise is probably better explained by
the need to deflect the traditional due process-based reasoning and what
one commentator calls the "heavily regulated industry doctrine"'
("HRID"). This is simply the idea that when a person enters into a heavily
regulated industry, reasonable expectations of secure property rights in the
corporation are necessarily limited. The idea also shows up in criminal law.
For example, it appears in the presumption that one who owns or uses
explosives has prior notice of applicable prohibitions simply because
explosives have traditionally been heavily regulated. This reasoning is
based on the due process concerns for notice, and it puts the risk of
governmental changes to the rules squarelyupon the private party. Banking
has long been considered a heavily regulated industry and numerous cases
have used this HRMD reasoning to shield the government from liability."2
In each instance where this notion is employed, the government was acting
in a sovereign capacity. If this sort of due process analysis were applied to
the facts of Winstar, the inescapable result would be that the thrift owners
were engaged in a heavily regulated industry and therefore bore the risk of
congressional change. This tension in Souter's reasoning has no impact on
his analysis of the sovereign acts doctrine, but it would completely
underminethe plurality's reasoning regarding the unmistakability doctrine,
under which the agencies are presumed to have made the promise to pay
damages resulting from congressional changes to the capital rules. This
directly contradicts the HRMD.
Souter does admit, in a footnote, to the due process basis of the
sovereign acts doctrine, but does not discuss any of the logical tension
between application of due process analysis and the presumption of
congruence.44 Due process concerns are fundamentally based on the
fairness of a sovereign's treatment of an individual, whereas congruence
treats the government as the legal equal of a private citizen. Souter would
perhaps respond with the language he cites from United States v. Bekins,44
that the government's capacity to make contracts is "'of the essence of
sovereignty' itself.' 5 This reasoning is simply oxymoronic. A sovereign
"'Graham, supra note 267.
442 See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); California Housing
Securities, Inc. v. United States, 959 F.2d 955 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (finding no taking
under the Fifth Amendment for RTC conservatorship and receivership and noting
that the highly regulated nature of banking put thrift owners on notice of the
changing regulatory burdens that could impact their investment value).
443 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 898 n.43.
4 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
445 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 884 (quoting Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51-52).
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does not exert sovereignty by bargaining its way to binding agreements or
by seeking approval or permission. A sovereign, by definition, imposes its
will unilaterally. Due process reasoning is necessarily aimed at judging the
fairness of these acts of dominion. Due process analysis, therefore, stands
as the unacknowledged alternative to the contractual, congruence reasoning
employed by the plurality (and the other majority opinions). A key
difference in these perspectives is that contractual analysis is limited to
discerning the intent of the parties, while due process analysis looks much
morebroadlyto the full context surrounding the government's actions. This
difference lies at the core of the problems of Winstar."6
In addition to deflecting the more appropriate due process analysis,
there is a second majorreason to blurthe distinction between the sovereign
and private roles ofthe government and to adopt a pure congruence theory.
Without taking these positions, it would be nearly impossible for the
plurality to avoid inconsistency with its earlier reasoning on the express
delegation doctrine. Just as the plurality's analysis in the express delegation
doctrine obscuredthe distinction between the agencies and the government,
so too does the plurality's analysis of the impossibility doctrine. In
describing the impossibility doctrine, Souter hints that he means to treat the
governmental party as only the agency: "[T]he Government, like any other
defending party in a contract action, must show that the passage of the
statute rendering its performance impossible was an event contrary to the
basic assumptions on which the parties agreed." 7 By use of the word
"statute," Souter apparently means to treat the agency as separate from
Congress and not necessarily contractually responsible for the passage of
the statute."8 This would be consistent with the Southern Utilities logic and
6 The dissent, unfortunately, does not seem to appreciate this fully. In
criticizing Souter's citation of a due process landmark, Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516, 535-536 (1884), Rehnquist writes:
Surely this marks a bold, if not brash, innovation in the heretofore
somewhat mundane law of government contracts; that law is now to be
seasoned by an opinion holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not make applicable to the States the
requirement that a criminal proceeding be initiated by indictment of a grand
jury.
Winstar, 518 U.S. at 932 (Rehnquist C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist does not address
the deeper implications of holding a sovereign to contract rules that were designed
to govern legally equal parties, neither one of which has sovereign power over the
other.
447 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 904 (emphasis added).
448 See id. at 904-05.
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express delegation doctrine precept that agreements by agencies should be
presumed to bind only the agency. It would also explain the language
describing the impossibility rule, which refers to an event occurring
"without his fault." Recalling Speidel's thorough analysis of situations
where agency X's contracts are impossible to fulfill because of the actions
of agency Y, one would think that the parties in Winstar similarly
presumed that other agencies would not somehow affect the agreements.
It is important to keep an eye on which party is responsible for which acts
in order to understand both the impossibility and the express delegation
doctrines.
Yet Souter immediately obscures his working definition of exactlywho
is the governmental party when he applies the impossibility doctrine.
"[T]here is no doubt that some changes in the regulatory structure
governing thrift capital reserves were both foreseeable and likely when
these parties contracted with the Government."' 9 Certainly, "changes"
were foreseeable, both due to agency changes and congressional changes.
This same ambiguity as to who makes the change appears throughout
Souter's application ofthe impossibility doctrine, which fittingly concludes
with: "[I]t would be absurd to say that the nonoccurrence of a change in the
regulatory capitalrules was a basic assumption upon which these contracts
were made.""5 0 It is unclear which rules the parties were bargaining about.
If it was the regulations only, then Souter has contradicted his analysis of
the express delegation doctrine because then it would be obvious that the
agreements meant to say nothing about what Congress would do, consistent
with the interpretive presumption from Home Telephone & Telegraph and
Southern Utilities. If, on the other hand, "rules" refers to both regulations
and statutes, then Souter is not in fact treating the agencies as separate from
Congress and the "Government" as a whole. His use of the impossibility
doctrine fails because it becomes the tautology described above: if the
entire "Government" is the contracting party, then the continued absence
of a new statute must have been a central part of what the parties were
bargaining about. Souter tries to have it both ways: FIRREA is an event far
enough removed from the parties' control that the impossibility analysis
makes sense, but at the same time, "the Government" agreed not to change
the "capital rules." For this to have any coherency (or perhaps merely to go
unnoticed), Souter simply must argue that there is no distinction between
the sovereign and private roles of the government and that the
government's agreements are all to be analyzed and enforced under a
"4 Id. at 906 (emphasis added).45o Id. at 907 (emphasis added).
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congruence theory. These assumptions run counter to the better reading of
the relevant case law and to modem interpretations of administrative law.
Souter almost escapes this logical contradiction by making his most
explicit distinction between the agencies and Congress in the next sec-
tion of his analysis.4 " Unfortunately, this reasoning repeats his error of
ignoring the Anti-Deficiency Act and the externalities his opinion creates
by finding that agencies presumptively create damages liability for the
Treasury:
The mere fact that the Government's contracting agencies (like the Bank
Board and FSLIC) could not themselves preclude Congress from
changing the regulatory rules does not, of course, stand in the way of
concluding that those agencies assumed the risk of such change, for
determining the consequences of legal change was the point of the
agreements. It is, after all, not uncommon for a contracting party to
assume the risk of an event he cannot control, even when that party is an
agent of the Government. As the Federal Circuit has recognized,
"[Government] contracts routinely include provisions shifting financial
responsibility to the Government for events which might occur in the
future. That some of these events may be triggered by sovereign
government action does notrendertherelevant contractualprovisions any
less binding than those which contemplate third party acts, inclement
weather and other force majeure.452
This passage also shows Souter, once again, leaping the logical gap
between what parties sometimes agree to and what they should be
presumed to have agreed upon. As to the question of the authority with
which the agencies may bind Congress to a promise to pay damages, the
only answer is the pure congruence theory combined with the Holmesian
presumption of damages.
Without this otherwise unnecessary detour into the impossibility
doctrine, Souter would have been left with Horowitz's distinction between
the government's dual roles as the logical and precedential center of his
sovereign acts doctrine reasoning. And that would certainly have called
greater attention to the interpretive and analytical flaws buried within the
rest of the opinion.
451 See id. at 907-10.
412d. at 908-09 (quoting Hughes Communication Galaxy, Inc. v. United States,
998 F.2d 953, 958-59 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
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4. Scalia's Analysis of the Sovereign Acts Doctrine
The other majority opinions contribute little. Justice Breyer's opinion
does not discuss the sovereign acts doctrine.453 Justice Scalia takes a
different tack and argues that the sovereign acts doctrine adds nothing to
the unmistakability doctrine.4 Both doctrines, he argues, aim to decipher
whether "the Government was committing itself not to rely upon its
sovereign acts in asserting (or defending against) the doctrine of
impossibility, which is another way of saying that the Government had
assumed the risk of a change in its laws."'455 In short, the major flaw in this
analysis is that it, too, ignores any distinction between the agencies and the
government. If all agency actions are presumed to bind the government,
including presumptive promises to pay damages, then this reasoning makes
sense. Scalia fails, however, to square this view with Home Telephone &
Telegraph, the Anti-Deficiency Act, or the more reasoned interpretation of
the agreements.
Scalia then cites Lynch and Perry (the Gold Clause Cases) for the
proposition that the quoted language is the proper interpretation of
Horowitz.4 6 Scalia is correct that neither Lynch nor Perry mention
Horowitz even though both were decided after it.457 But both are fully
consistent with Horowitz when it is read as a doctrine separate from
unmistakability. Lynch is consistent because the subsequent legislation
specifically targeted the contracts which the government had made earlier
in its private capacity and so could not be classified as public and
general.4 8 Liability makes sense then. It should be noted that the agencies
issuing the life insurance in Lynch were specifically authorized to issue
insurance contracts and later convert them "into ordinary life.., and other
usual forms of insurance."4 9 Lynch also struck down the breaching
provision on due process grounds, rather than ordering payment of
damages on a congruence theory. Perry is also consistent with the broader
reading of Horowitz because the subsequent breaching legislation in
4s3 See id. at 910-18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
See id. at 919-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
45s Id. at 923-24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
456 See id. at 924 (Scalia, J., concurring).
" See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
458 Cf. Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 679 (arguing
that the insurance repeal legislation in Lynch is not an example of "complete
generality").419 Lynchv. United States, 292 U.S. 571,572 n.1 (1934). Thus, the government
should have lost on an express delegation defense in Lynch also.
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Peny-abolishing gold-convertibility of dollars-had an effect of such
generality that the Court found it impossible to compute damages.0 ° The
finding of no damages makes sense.
Justice Rehnquist's arguments in his dissent are summarized above.46'
Suffice it to say he criticizes Souter's blurring of the distinction between
the government's dual roles, but then unwisely proceeds to accept the
government's argument that the length and breadth of FIRREA render any
of its provisions sufficiently public and general to deny liability.462
In sum, the four defenses offered by the government in a shotgun
approach had very different strengths. The reserved powers doctrine seems
more a relic of legal history than a viable defense today. Indeed, its notion
that an entire category of government powers cannot be bargained away is
difficult to square with the unmistakability doctrine's recognition that
sovereign powers can be bargained away if done so explicitly. The
unmistakability doctrine was developed for situations where the sovereign
directly enters into an agreement and then, usually several generations
later, revisits that bargain when it has become a burden to society. It is
difficult to see why that description shouldnot apply to the goodwill capital
provisions, as Winstar could add $30 to $40 billion to the cost of the
cleanup. 3 Winstar's agreement seems to have unmistakably clear language
that the agency will not change its regulations, but the others lack such
language. Because the doctrine is an interpretive device, it is difficult to see
why it should not apply here, especially when not applying it leads to the
collateral theoretical difficulties discussed above. The express delegation
doctrine rises above the other three as the one defense that should have
prevailed on the government's behalf. As an interpretive doctrine, it should
have clarified that the "parties" were the thrifts and the thrift agencies, not
the entire government, and that the parties were bargaining only about the
regulations promulgatedbythe agency under its existing authority. Finally,
the sovereign acts doctrine, put forward by the government without much
hope that it would succeed, gave the plurality the narrow window of
opportunity it needed to reread several cases with a pure congruence
agenda andimport the common law doctrine of impossibility. This doctrine
offered the only means the plurality had to explain away the due process
notion that owners of thrifts cannot reasonably expect that the
41 Accord Schwartz, Liabilityfor Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 681.
461 See supra note 446.
462 See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 926-29, 933-34 (1996)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).463See Schmitt, supra note 15.
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government's heavy regulation of the industry will not undermine their
property rights from time to time. The analytical (and literal) lengths that
Souter's analysis goes to reach its results strongly suggests an
overpowering motivation to achieve the regulatory takings agenda that has
so far eluded a majority of the Court.
F. The Implications of Winstar
The first step to understanding the implications of Winstar is to
reconcile the three opinions comprising the majority to the extent possible,
in order to formulate a coherent rule of the case. Souter's analysis clearly
dominates the majority's reasoning on most issues. One would not go far
astray in simply considering it the majority opinion. Justice Breyer, who
joined Souter's opinion in flil, wrote separately to emphasize his
understanding of the unmistakability doctrine as simply an example of
normal rules of contract construction. 4 Governments do not normally give
up their sovereign power, and the presumption simply reflects that
observation. Breyer's reading of federal unmistakability cases finds their
presumptions fairly weak.465 This interpretation of the unmistakability
doctrine leaves it so weakened, relative to the state cases, that the issue of
whether the doctrine applies or not is virtually moot. Breyer's hints that the
unmistakability doctrine might still apply do not change the functioning of
Souter's rule. Neither does Scalia's more direct insistence that the
unmistakability doctrine should apply.'4 One could count five votes for the
proposition that it applies: Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas (in concurrence), and
Rehnquist and Ginsburg (in dissent)."67 But such an exercise is virtually
pointless, because Scalia's treatment ofthe unmistakability doctrine leaves
it an empty shell compared to what the state cases set forth. The three
" See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 910-18 (Breyer, 3., concurring).
46' As noted above, Breyer ignores the state cases and leaves unmentioned
Souter's assertion that the unmistakability doctrine arises from inherent attributes
of sovereignty, which would imply that the doctrine should apply equally to state
and federal governments.
46 See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 920. Cf Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Con-
gruence, supra note 13, at 542 ("The practical effect of [Scalia's reading of
unmistakability], however, is close to that of Justice Breyer, who avoids the second
promise requirement by questioning whether any generic unmistakability
requirement even exists."). .
46 See Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 546
(arguing that there are five votes rejecting Souter's use of the Holmesian
presumption to "recharacterize" the agreements as promises to pay damages).
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majority opinions offer little divergence of opinion on the three other
defenses claimed by the government. The plurality opinion, therefore, can
be treated as the majority opinion.
Professor Schwartz argues that combining the opinions into a coherent
rule is more complicated. 8 Schwartz proposes two versions of synthesis:
one reconciling the Winstar opinions and their overlapping rationales, and
the other adopting a broader approach that I will discuss below in Part HT.1
Schwartz's reconciliation of the majority opinions in Winstar is the most
ambitious and thorough yet published. He concludes that the strength of the
unmistakability presumption should not be separated from the level of
generality, within the meaning of the sovereign acts doctrine, achieved by
the subsequent legislation:
In short[,] there appears to be a consensus emerging that the level of proof
required to rebut the ordinary presumption that the Government does not
agree to curtail its own sovereign powers is a variable that depends on the
level of generality of the Government's [subsequent] interfering action
and the extent to which it directly undoes the Government's contractual
undertaking.4 7
Schwartz's analysis is much more balanced than the Court's, but the
synthesis does little to improve the clarity of the standards set forth by the
Winstar majority. On the other hand, courts will need to revisit Winstar a
great many times before its rules become clearer than Schwartz's
prediction.4 7'
There are several levels of implications of Winstar. First, agencies now
face a dilemma when making agreements with regulated entities that relate
to the use of the regulatory power. The agencies could begin to include
language in all their agreements reserving for themselves, and for
Congress, the power to change the underlying regulations and statutes,
respectively. This would probably insulate them, and the Treasury, from
contract claims for damages whenever circumstances require a correction
in regulatory strategy. The problem, of course, is what that implies about
the thousands of preexisting regulatory agreements the agencies reached
41 See id. at 481.
49 See infra Part II.
470 Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 556.
471A few others have analyzed Winstar as well. See, e.g., Martinez, supra note
298, at 1193 (arguing that Winstardidnot affectthe government's sovereignpower
to tax, which is so broad as to border on unfair).
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without such language. The most prudent strategy-broad inclusion of
reservations of authority---couldbe used as evidence that the agencies view
the pre-Winstar agreements as giving the authority away. The regulators
now face a grim dilemma.
Winstar thereby gives a big boost to the regulatory takings agenda.
Regulatory takings proposes that any time a new law or regulation
diminishes a property value, the government should be required to
compensate the owner for the diminution in value, even if partial or
temporary. Winstar does not bring the entire agenda along with it; only
those plaintiffs who can show something resembling a contract will
succeed on a Winstar theory. But it is terribly simple to imagine contracts
analogous to the regulatory merger approvals here. Certainly a building
permit, such as the one South Carolina issued to David Lucas, would seem
to suffice, even if the new regulation did not destroy all economic value of
the land.47 2 Indeed, a huge variety of the activities likely to be subject to
new regulations already involve some sort of approval or licensing by the
government. A reasonable prediction is that other Winstar cases will begin
to arise where the initial approval involved a great deal of bargaining,
supporting a fairness rationale behindthe plaintiffs' claims of reliance. But
there is no reason to think that extensive bargaining is necessary to support
claims of reliance or even fairness, just as it is unnecessary to support the
existence of a contract. One would hope that new restrictions on drivers'
licenses would not someday create Winstar damages, but such a claim is
certainly consistent with the regulatory takings agenda and Winstar.
The broadest implication of Winstar is a new tension in the theory
behind regulatory agreements. On the one hand, Winstar argues for the
strongest possible form of congruence, treating the government as any
other private contracting party, even when its agreements relate to
regulatory treatment of a regulated entity. Under this contractual analysis,
the agencies need only have enough statutory authority to pass a low
standard of traditional ultra vires analysis. Winstar did not, after all,
compare the promises allegedly made by the FHLBB to its authority to set
minimum capital levels specific to an individual institution, as one would
expect under Home Telephone & Telegraph. Instead, it compared the
goodwill agreements to the FHLBB's authority to "make contracts" and to
provide guaranties against loss. These latter statutes would support
Winstar's theory of an agency commitment to pay damages for breach of
4
"See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (finding
ataking where environmental regulation eliminated all economic value of shoreline
wetlands).
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virtually any substantive promise. This sort of ultra vires standard strongly
suggests that the agency will always have authority to promise damages,
regardless ofthe treatment or action promised, because it is the meeting of
the minds and the reliance thereon that support -the agreement's enforce-
ability.
Conversely, courts have traditionally analyzed regulatory agreements
not as contracts but as orders, enforceable if consistent with the agencies'
authority. Courts evaluate the limits of this authority with a somewhat
stricter analysis than the ultra vires analysis, and ignore the reliance claims
of the regulated entity. For example, banking agencies have the authority
to impose conditions upon regulatory approvals, such as new charters or
approvals of mergers or acquisitions. The court in Kaneb Services, Inc. v.
FSLIC47 upheld FSLIC's imposition of restrictions on dividends as a
condition to approval of a holding company's acquisition of a thrift. The
court noted that a statute474 gave FSLIC the authority to consider the
financial strength of the acquirers in granting approvals and that the
agency's "broad discretionary power" included the power:
[T]o impose conditions upon approval of an acquisition by a savings and
loan holding company. Otherwise, it would not have been necessary to
give authority to the FSLIC to initiate cease and desist proceedings for
violations of"any condition in writing imposed by [FSLIC] in connection
with the granting of any application." 475
Under this view, the agency has the power to impose conditions under its
regulatory authority and to enforce those conditions under its enforcement
authority. The approval, and its conditions, are not seen as a contract,
enforceable by virtue of the meeting of the minds of the parties or the
holding company's reliance upon their so-called bargain.
Another typical example is Groos National Bankv. Comptroller ofthe
Currency,476 which rejected the argument that consideration was necessary
to support formation of a regulatory agreement. In Groos, the agency had
issued a cease-and-desist order relating to credit concentration and insider
lending. When the bank violated the consent order, the agency brought a
contested enforcement action against the bank and issued another order
41 Kaneb Servs., Inc. v. FSLIC, 650 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1981).
474 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(e)(1).475 Id. at 82.




after administrative litigation.4' In rejecting the bank's argument that the
consent order lacked consideration, the court distinguished the contractual
analysis as inapplicable to the consent order:
This argument is without merit The statute provides that a cease and
desist order may issue upon any violation of an agreement between the
agency and a bank and says nothing of consideration. Nor is there any
reason to import the common law of consideration, proper to private
contractual relations, into the relationships between a regulatory agency
and the entity it regulates.478
An even stricter view of agency authority appears in the short but
significant line of cases that began with Wachtel v. United States
Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision.4 In Wachtel, the
new owners of a thrift promised to infuse capital as necessary to keep the
thrift's capital levels above the regulatory minimums. The promises took
the form of a consent order issued under the statutory authorization.480
When the thrift's financial conditioned weakened, the owners refused to
infuse capital and the agency sued for compliance with the net worth
maintenance obligation by bringing a cease-and-desist action under §
1818(b). 481 The court struck down the cease-and-desist order on the ground
that the agency could require payment of funds only via its restitution
authority, but the restitution order would not lie because the agency could
not make the required statutory showing of unjust enrichment under §
1818(b)(6). 482 The D.C. Circuit Court later reached the same conclusion on
essentially the same reasoning in Rapaport v. United States Department of
Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision.483 Despite flaws in these courts'
analyses, their conception of the consent orders is more consistent with that
of Groos and Kaneb than with the contractual view of Winstar. The major
477 See id. at 892-93.
478 Id. at 896 (emphasis added).
419 Wachtel v. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
480 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b).
481 See Wachtel, 982 F.2d at 582.482 See id. at 586.
483 Rapaport v. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 59 F.3d212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 774(1996). The
court in Rapaport expanded upon the definition of unjust enrichment, holding that
it required a showing that the funds at issue must have come out ofthe bank for the
claim to constitute unjust enrichment. See id. at 216 (emphasis added).
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difference is the level of scrutiny, but the type of analysis is the same: a
comparison with the specific regulatory authorityto impose the substantive
provisions at issue. The meeting of the minds is not sufficient for the
original consent orders to be enforceable. Moreover, neither Wachtel nor
Rapaport mentioned any reliance interest the agencies might have had
arising from the thrift owners' promises.484
Under Winstar's analysis, the meeting of the minds is the source of the
enforceability, and scrutiny of the thrift agencies' power to enter into
contracts is a rubber stamp. The power of the agency to accept a promise
to maintain the capital of the thrift should certainly pass muster under
Winstar because the agencies had the statutory power to "make contracts"
and to create individualized capital requirements. Net worth maintenance
provisions were agreed to in very much the same process as the goodwill
capital agreements-indeed, the net worth maintenance provisions were
required as a part of nearly all the approvals allowing goodwill485-- and the
agencies relied upon the net worth maintenance provisions as much as the
thrift owners relied upon the goodwill provisions. Either party would have
been "mad" to make the bargain without these respective provisions.
Winstarmuddies the theory behind consent agreements. If the agencies
can make implied promises to pay billions of dollars, then why can they not
enforce owners' agreements to infuse capital into ailing thrifts? The only
apparent reconciliation of this tension is that the government must pass
through both strictures in its regulatory agreements. This, of course, totally
flips cases like Jones and Cooke on their heads. Jones attempted to keep
private plaintiffs from taking advantage of a government agency when it
contracted and later a different arm of the government enacted a rule
rendering performance impossible.4 86 Cooke also spoke of a limited form
of congruence, applicable only where the government acted in a private
capacity.487 Now Winstar expands this congruence beyond what the word
144 It is also interesting to note that both Wachtel and Rapaport began their
analysis by finding that the banking agencies merited no deference under Chevron
to interpret § 1818 because there are several agencies that use the same statute,
making possible divergent interpretations of the same statute. See Wachtel, 982
F.2d at 585; Rapaport, 59 F.3d at 216. In addition to the several analytical
problems with its reasoning, this conclusion is interesting because it implies
different roles for the different agencies. This recognition of the separation of the
agencies from each other and, therefore, from "the Government," is difficult to
square with Winstar's view of a unitary government.485 See Jackson, supra note 23, at 521 n.37.
486 See Jones v. United States, 1 Ct Cl. 383 (1865).
417 See Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389 (1875).
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itself can support. The new "exceptionalism" means that the government
gets the worst of both worlds when it enters into regulatory agreements.
The agreements are not contracts when the government seeks to enforce
them, but they are contracts when they are enforced against the
government. This theoretical incoherence is likely to cause ancillary
inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of regulatory agreements before it is
ultimately worked out. If it survives, the likely result of the Winstar world-
view is the erosion of the heavily regulated industry doctrine as a basic
principle of due process. Government agencies' new one-sided ability to
promise that the Treasury will pay for the inconvenience of any changes in
regulation can only result in a contractual reliance version ofthe regulatory
takings agenda. This elevates consent of the governed to essentially a
requirement of consensus. Those with large economic interests can holdthe
majority hostage and demand compensation for any change in their
privileged status.
11. PROPOSED FRAmEWORK TO DECIDE WHEN A GOVERNMENT
AGENCY MAY RAISE SPECIAL CONTRACT DEFENSES
This Part suggests a revision of the distinction between the sovereign
and private roles of the government as the starting point to a more rational
relationship between the government's special contract defenses. Even if
one focuses only on the regulatory approvals of the thrift mergers involving
goodwill capital, Winstar creates a contradiction by claiming that these
approvals are contracts even though the courts have treated different
provisions of the same approvals-the net worth maintenance
provisions-as sovereign actions and therefore something other than
contracts.88 The proposed distinction between the government's sovereign
and private roles would provide a rational limit on the government's ability
411 See, e.g., In re Overland Park Fin. Corp., 232 B.R. 215, 228 n.23 (D. Kan.
1999) (reversing the bankruptcy court's finding that the net worth maintenance
provision was not subject to the super-priority provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 365(o)
(requiring the cure of deficiencies as aprerequisite to bankruptcy proceedings), but
questioning OTS's right to file proof of claim on behalf of RTC). As many
goodwill cases as there are, there are probably an equal number of net worth
maintenance agreement cases working their way through the courts. Many follow
a similar path as Overland Park, where the holding company, which entered into
a net worth maintenance provision, files for bankruptcy protection in order to
dispose of the net worth maintenance obligations. Of course, the tension in the
analysis of regulatory agreements extends to other types of provisions and other
agencies.
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to claim the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines, for these
defenses should not have any application when the agreement at issue is a
typical government contract, such as procurement or employment. Most of
the criticism of the distinction between sovereign and private roles arises
from the practical difficulty in establishing standards, not from the
doctrinal need for the distinction.
This Part proposes an alternative framework for the special contract
defenses that arose in Winstar. Unlike the plurality in Winstar and the
earlier Supreme Court decisions interpreting these special defenses, this
proposal takes a broader view of the goals of each defense and how these
goals can and should interact. Viewing the defenses as logically separate
and independent, as these cases do, leads the courts to apply the defenses
seriatim, oblivious to the redundancies or contradictions this creates. For
example, the reserved powers doctrine holds that certain sovereign powers
(the "police powers") cannot be bargained away by the state, but the
unmistakability doctrine allows the government to do so, provided the
provision is unmistakably clear. Yet, no court has ironed out just how these
two defenses should interact.
Another example is a promise, like the one in Winstar, made by the
government in its sovereign capacity. Should the government be allowed
to plead the sovereign acts doctrine where the government made the
original agreement in its sovereign role? The sovereign acts doctrine has
traditionally focused on agreements that the government originally made
in its private capacity, and later breached in its sovereign capacity. It makes
sense, therefore, to focus on the government's role in making the original
agreement in determining which defenses the government can raise.
This Part begins with a critique of what may be the only proposed
integration of the defenses. Because this proposal integrates Winstar, it
suffers the same logical and doctrinal flaws of the majority opinions. Next,
I describe my proposed framework, including factors for determining
which role the government is using. I hope to show that these factors for
determining whether the government is acting as sovereign or in its private
role explain nearly all the relevant holdings. Finally, I attempt to
demonstrate that each of the major precedents discussed herein are
consistent with my framework, with the exception of Winstar. The goal of
the proposed framework is to integrate both the sovereign power and
contractual perspectives into a framework where each is used where, and
only where, it makes sense. The result should improve the
balance-achieved by either Winstar or the case law prior to
Winstar-between the need for the majority to update regulatory policies
freely and the legitimate reliance interests of individuals.
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A. A Critique ofProfessor Schwartz's Integration of the Defenses
Few commentators have proposed a comprehensive framework for the
special defenses argued in Winstar. Professor Schwartz has made the most
ambitious proposal, though it is conceived of as a synthesis of the Winstar
opinions rather than as a proposal for an alternative framework.489 Schwartz
proposes a two-tiered approach in which the government would enjoy the
protection of a strong version of the unmistakability doctrine only in cases
where the subsequent, breaching legislation achieved complete
generality.4 A secondtier would provide aweakerunmistakability defense
where the subsequent legislation achieved an intermediate level of
generality.4 9' The core of Schwartz's argument is that a majority of the
Winstarjustices agree that the unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines
overlap, and that it makes sense to build a synthesized framework upon this
agreement.4" Schwartz demonstrates considerable interpretive skill in
piecing together this coalition, but because the coalition includes the
dissenters,493 it must remain highly speculative that a majority would agree
on the application of his synthesis to any given factual scenario.
By seeking to build a synthesis on the foundation of Winstar, however,
Schwartz's analysis does not focus enough on the different goals of the
unmistakability and sovereign acts doctrines. Althoughboth doctrines seek,
on a general level, to balance the need to protect the government's ability
489 See Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13.
490 See id. at 560.
491 See id. at 561-62.
4 2 Although Scalia's concurrence and Rehnquist's dissent touch briefly on the
issue of how the unmistakability and sovereign acts defenses relate to one another,
their debate is limited to brief comments that these two doctrines may serve the
same purposes. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 923 (" 'sovereign acts' doctrine adds little,
if anything, to the 'unmistakability' doctrine"). Id. at 937 (Scalia, ., concurring)
("To the extent that the unmistakability doctrine is faithfully applied, the cases will
be rare in which close and debatable situations under the sovereign acts doctrine
are presented."). Id. (Rehnquist, C.L, dissenting). See also Schwartz, Winstar:
Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 501 n.97 (arguing that Souter implies in
his footnote 22 that the federal government cannot claim both the sovereign acts
and unmistakability defenses). On a general level, it is certainly true that both
doctrines aim to protect the government's sovereign powers.
" Schwartz argues that Scalia would apply a combination of the two in effect
as one defense, while Rehnquist would apply each separately. See Schwartz,
Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 552 (suggesting that Scalia's
"integration of the two doctrines" is the "more complete").
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to enact new laws and the need of private parties to rely on government
promises, the two doctrines have very different focuses and mechanisms.
The unmistakability doctrine turns on an analysis of the initial promise. It
seeks to prevent the sovereign from restricting future generations by giving
away too much sovereign power.4 At bottom, the unmistakability doctrine
seeks to improve the accountability of those legislators who would make
long-term commitments by forcing the consequences of their actions to
become more immediately apparent.
The sovereign acts doctrine, by contrast, scrutinizes the generality of
the subsequent breaching legislation.49 It is not an interpretive doctrine
aiding the courts to construe the original promise. In sovereign acts cases
decided so far, the original promise is usually made in the government's
private capacity. The sovereign acts doctrine is not concerned with
accountability for giving away a certain power, but rather with preventing
the government's run-of-the-mill, past promises from discouraging new
legislation about matters that have only a tangential effect on the original
promise. The sovereign acts doctrine does little to encourage more
accountability in government. The two doctrines scrutinize different things
and the government's initial promise is, at least usually, made in different
capacities. Schwartz does not address these differences in the doctrines nor
does his synthesis answer why, if the two doctrines were applied
separately, some of the four possible outcomes might not make sense. 96
Schwartz argues that the sovereign acts doctrine, which came into
existence immediately afterthe Civil War, providedthe federal government
with a defense powerful enough to make unmistakability doctrine
unnecessary as a practical matter.497 The relative paucity ofunmistakability
cases involving the federal government (compared to cases involving
" See id. at 485 (citing Bowen v. Public Agencies Opposed to Social Security
Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986)).49
. See id. at 485-86 (citing Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458 (1925)).
411 In his 1975 analysis of the sovereign acts doctrine, Professor Latham
similarly avoids discussing how his analysis would interact with the other defenses.
See Latham, supra note 380. The same goes for Professor Spiedel's insightful
discussion of the sovereign acts doctrine. See Speidel, supra note 298.
417 See Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 500
(contending that the soveriegn acts doctrine occupied the field and therefore there
are few federal unmistakability cases); id. at 525 (writing that the sovereign acts
doctrine "served in the earliest decisions of the Court of Claims as a kind ofproto-
unmistakability rule rather than as an application of the impossibility doctrine");
see id. at 504 (arguing the sovereign acts doctrine has filled the gap by giving the
federal government the sort of protection unmistakability would have given it).
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states) therefore demonstrates the overlap of the unmistakability and
sovereign acts doctrines, according to Schwartz's reasoning.
The better explanation is that the federal government rarely entered
directly into the sort of regulatory agreements, to-wit corporate charters,
that resulted in litigation of the unmistakability doctrine. The federal
government simply didnot charter very many corporations through special
charters in the form of federal statutes. The exception that proves the rule
is the Sinking Fund Cases, which demonstrate an early version of an
unmistakability analysis (albeit applying only a weak interpretive
presumption) post-dating Deming and Jones.
Schwartz does not discuss the SinkingFund Cases. Nor does he discuss
the fact that essentially all of the early state unmistakability cases involved
corporate charters which included regulatory provisions. Over time,
charteringbodies moved away from includingregulatoryprovisions (which
the government might later want to change) in corporate charters. This
evolution, aided no doubt by the growth of the administrative state during
the New Deal, better explains why there have been so few unmistakability
cases on either the state or federal level following the New Deal. The
relative paucity of federal unmistakability cases should not be considered
evidence that the sovereign acts doctrine has been providing the federal
government with the same or similar protection that the unmistakability
doctrine has provided the states.
One more example should show that Schwartz's analysis probably
holds back too much in its criticism of Souter's opinion in order to build
synthesis. Schwartz argues that Souter is inconsistent in applying the
Holmesian "recharacterization" ofthe regulatory agreements into promises
to pay damages, because Souter applies the recharacterization in his
analysis of the unmistakability, the reserved powers, and the express
delegation doctrines, but does not do so in his analysis of the sovereign acts
doctrine.4 98 Schwartz correctly points out that if Souter hadrecharacterized
the government's obligations at the outset of his sovereign acts analysis,
this would have effectively rendered the doctrine "a nullity"'4 because the
recharacterization would have led to the opposite result in Horowitz, which
like Winstar, involved an arm of the federal government.500 After all, if the
Court in Horowitz had read the silk contract as a promise to pay damages,
then the silk embargo could have been carried out and the contract could
have been enforced.
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This inconsistency makes sense, however, in light of the fact that the
sovereign acts doctrine, unlike the other special defenses, does not purport
to help construe the original agreement. Schwartz's ultimate criticism of
this inconsistency is that it was "unnecessary" for Souter to both
recharacterize the agreements in analyzing the first three defenses and then
analyze the unmistakability doctrine anywayY5' The better explanation for
Souter's reluctance to explore the relationship between the defenses is that
applying the sovereign acts doctrine directly would have lent too much
strength to the distinction between the government's sovereign and private
roles. This would have been inconsistent with Souter's lament that it is too
difficult to contain the unmistakability doctrine to agreements made in the
sovereign capacity, and would have suggested the need to retreat a step
analytically and question whether a purely contractual analysis makes the
most sense. Moreover, as argued above, Souter needed to set up his use of
the impossibility doctrine to avoid the obvious consequences of the heavily
regulated industry doctrine.
Schwartz's synthesis does little to increase the predictability of results
in this area of the law because it is unclear what constitutes complete
generality. Is the generality of Perry, where all holders of gold dollars and
contracts with gold clauses were affected, the minimum required
generality? A much lower level of generality appears in Horowitz, where
the only persons affected by the ban on shipping silk were those either in
the business of shipping silk or those who, like the plaintiffs, contracted for
a delivery of silk at a certain date. If this is sufficient, then what is the
lower threshold of generality that would still entitle the government to a
weaker version of the unmistakability defense? The level of generality, of
course, should be seen as a relative notion, comparing the scope of those
affected by the subsequent breaching legislation or action with the scope
of those who were parties to the original agreements. In this light, there is
not a significant difference inthe level of generality between Horowitz and
Winstar.
Most problematically, neither Schwartz's analysis of the reasoning in
Winstar nor his proposed synthesis adequately addresses the express
delegation doctrine. Again, because Schwartz is aiming to construct the
best reconciliation possible that incorporates Winstar, he cannot reject any
of Winstar's major premises, even where the opinions go fundamentally
wrong. Justices Souter, Breyer, and Scalia all gloss over the express
delegation doctrine and, more generally, the delegation issues inherent in
an agency acting on behalf the government. Unfortunately, this leaves
5 1 See id. at 532.
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Schwartz's analysis similarly devoid of any mention of delegation issues.
For example, in analyzing Souter's argument that it would have been
"madness" for the plaintiffs to have agreed to allow 'the Government" to
changethe capital rules "atthe Government's election," 2 Schwartz echoes
Souter's reasoning by concluding that it is more reasonable to find risk-
shifting promises than "to construe the agreements as offering the plaintiffs
no protection against regulatory change."50 3 As argued above, it is quite
possible that the agreements were intended to protect the plaintiffs against
change initiated by the agencies but were silent with respect to
congressionally required change.
Schwartz's analysis also misses the need forthe distinction between the
government's sovereign and private roles in order to make sense of the
delegation issues implicit in fulfilling the requirements of the Anti-
Deficiency Act5"' and the Appropriations ClauseS°5 of the Constitution.
Schwartz critiques Rehnquist's concluding argument that the need to treat
the government differently than private contracting parties arises from "the
necessity of protecting the federal fisc-and the taxpayers who foot the
bills-from possible improvidence on the part ofthe countless Government
officials who must be authorized to enter into contracts for the
Government." 5°6 Schwartz writes:
The analogy drawn by Chief Justice Rehnquist is, on its face,
puzzling.... Presumably his concern is that an official may have
authority to enter contracts but may lack the further authority to commit
so2 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 910.
503 Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph ofCongruence, supra note 13, at 530 (emphasis
added); id. at 485 (referring to "regulatory standards" without differentiating
between regulations or statutes); id. at 526-27 (discussing the impossibility doctrine
and assumption of risk by "party that did not perform" under the contract); see id.
at 526-30 (discussing Souter's treatment of the sovereign acts doctrine); id. at 540
(discussing Scalia's treatment of the sovereign acts doctrine and the impossibility
doctrine's "requirement that the party seeking exculpation not be responsible for
the impossibility of performance"); id. at 543 (discussing Scalia's description of
"illusory contracf); see also id. at 514-15 (analyzing Souter's treatment of the
express delegation doctrine); butsee id. at564 (discussing the Anti-Deficiency Act,
31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
14 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
SOS U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
5oSchwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 551 (quoting
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 937 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting)).
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the United States to compensate its contracting partners in the event of a
change in generally applicable regulatory requirements. 0 7
This concern should only appear puzzling as it relates to government
contracts, i.e., to promises made in the government's private capacity. It is
not at all clear that agencies have the power to commit the Treasury to pay
damages for changes in regulatory policies as a part of the agencies' power
to enter into regulatory agreements. Schwartz correctly points to Hercules,
Inc. v. United States5 8 as indicative of a major flaw in Souter's reasoning,
for it strongly suggests that the courts should not "recharacterize" all
government agreements as providing for indemnity for regulatory
changes."° Unfortunately, Schwartz's analysis does not seem to recognize
the breadth of this apparent exception to his proposed synthesis. The
framework proposed below avoids this confusion by distinguishing
between government contracts and regulatory agreements, and providing
for an alternative grounds for enforcing regulatory agreements so as to
avoid forcing the courts to decide between treating them as contracts or
illusory promises.
In sum, Schwartz's analysis and proposed synthesis probably make as
much sense out of Winstar as can be made. Given the deep flaws in the
Winstar plurality's analysis and the hostility it heaps upon the
administrative state, the better approach is to encourage the Court to correct
the error that is Winstar and move on to a more coherent, balanced
framework that is far more consistent with the rest of the Court's
jurisprudence.
B. A Proposed Frameworkfor the Special Contract Defenses
Such a framework should begin with determining the government's
role-sovereign or private-when it made the original promise. When
acting in a private capacity, the government should not benefit from the
unmistakability or express delegation defenses at all. Instead, the
agreements should be treated as private contracts, along a congruence
theory. There should be no need for a "second promise" for typical
507 Id. at 551-52.
508 Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417 (1996).
See Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 563-64.
Schwartz clarifies that the Anti-Deficiency Act does not necessarily prohibit the
outcome in Winstarbecause of the standing appropriation to pay judgments against
the government. See id. at n.369 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 1304 (1994)).
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procurement contracts. The government should be allowed to raise the
sovereign acts doctrine for such contracts, since the doctrine specifically
addressed instances where the government contractedin its private capacity
and later faced a subsequent sovereign act that undermined performance of
the earlier contract. For agreements made by the government in its
sovereign capacity, the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines
should apply. These doctrines were designed to address the special
problems arising out of these kinds of agreements; the problem with these
doctrines has always been finding a way to limit them to situations where
they are appropriate. The express delegation doctrine deserves more
attention than it has received given the government's increased reliance on
administrative agencies.
A harder question is whether the sovereign acts doctrine should apply
to promises made in the government's sovereign capacity. I conclude it
could apply, though its application is not critical to the success of the
framework. In any event, its application would not lead to the frequent
release of the government from its regulatory agreements for the simple
reason that when the government enters into regulatory agreements,
subsequent, breaching legislation that is significantly broader in scope is
very unlikely. Much more likely is the sort of targeted roll-backs in
Fletcher v. Peck, in Lynch, and in Winstar. In addition, scrutiny of the
government's intent in enacting the subsequent sovereign act should help
here also.
Nearly all of the Supreme Court's decisions prior to Winstar are
consistent with this framework, in part because they sometimes rely on the
sovereign/private distinction. Unfortunately, the case law has been
inconsistent in its use of the distinction for several reasons. First, it has
never distilled the distinction down to a few factors that produce consistent
results. Second, the jurisprudence has never clarified the relationship
between the defenses and explained when each special defense should or
should not apply. Finally, the case law has never provided an alternative
theory for why a regulatory agreement should be enforced even if it is not
(or not treated like) a private contract.51 Similarly, commentary on the
sovereign/private distinction focuses more on the inconsistency of its
application than on the utility of the distinction. The commentary has
510 See, e.g., United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17-18 and n. 14
(1977) (raising the issue of how to determine if a statute gives rise to a contractual
obligation binding the government, and resolving the issue by noting that the state
conceded the point).
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offered few alternative frameworks and little explanation for how the
defenses ought to interact.
The next several sections describe the framework in more detail. First,
the distinction between sovereign and private roles is explored. The
distinction has arisen in several lines of cases but has been criticized by
commentators and courts alike as hard to maintain. I suggest three factors
that should resolve most questions, and then apply them to several of the
harder cases. Second, the unmistakability doctrine is analyzed as it would
apply within the framework. The fear that the unmistakability doctrine will
encourage the government to spoil its reputation as a dependable
contracting partner is exaggerated. Third, the express delegation doctrine
offers a vital, yet overlooked role. The major concern behind the criticism
of the distinction between sovereign and private roles is the fear that if the
government's sovereign role is too broad, its agreements will not be treated
as contracts and there will be no theory for their enforcement. The express
delegation doctrine suggests grounds for enforcement of regulatory
agreements based on the Administrative Procedures Act's prohibition on
arbitrary and capricious agency actions. Finally, the sovereign acts doc-
trine is discussed in connection with the question of whether to apply it to
agreements made in a sovereign capacity. When seen as part ofthis broader
framework, Schwartz's proposal will make more sense, though I hope to
persuade the reader that any sort of sliding scale approach is
unworkable.
C. Distinguishing Between Sovereign and Private Capacities of
Government
The courts have relied on the distinction between the government's
sovereign and private capacities in several other areas of law, suggesting
that the distinction is not at all incoherent or untenable. Most notably, in
deciding banking agency claims for enforcement ofnet worth maintenance
agreements,5 ' courts have relied on the distinction. This is true of the
"' For criticism of net worth maintenance agreements, see, for example,
Jackson, supra note 23, at 518-28 (summarizing the history of agencies' use and
enforcement of NWMAs); John C. Deal et al., Capital Punishment: The Death of
Limited Liability for Shareholders ofFederally Regulated Financial Institutions,
24 CAP. U. L. REV. 67 (1995) (arguing for an end to personal liability for capital
maintenance); Carolyn J. Buck & Dwight C. Smith I, Enforcement ofNet Worth
Maintenance Agreements andthe Imposition of Civil Money Penalties, 24 CAP. U.
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several cases rejecting enforcement when the regulatory agencies sued on
a contract theory," 2 and of the other line of cases where the agencies sued
on a regulatory enforcement theory and achieved mixed results.513
In the first line of cases, the courts' analysis usually left much to be
desired in terms of depth and clarity. For example, the court in In re
Conner Corp.514 upheld a bankruptcy court decision that a net worth
maintenance agreement was not a contractual obligation but instead
acquiescence to a regulatory requirement.1 The court professed to
distinguish between a contract and a regulatory obligation without relying
on the presence or absence of bargaining: "If the terms of the agreement
between Conner and the Bank Board were defined wholly by federal
regulations instead ofthe give-and-take of negotiation, it is less likely that
a contract was formed. The court is not saying that negotiation is an
essential element of a contract. 516 The court later notes that the thrift
owners agreed to maintain a five percent capital level even though that
specific level does not appear in the regulations, but it seems that the
absence of bargaining over the five percent level is the only indicia
supporting the noncontractual classification:
Although th[e five percent] provision does not derive directly from the
regulations and presumably was negotiable, the court does not believe that
its inclusion is sufficient to transform this regulatory obligation into one
that is also a contractual obligation. The essence of the relationship
between the Bank Board and Conner is wholly regulatory. Conner
applied, on behalf of Cardinal, for federal deposit insurance; the Bank
Board responded by noting deficiencies in Conner's application and
informing it of its options under the Insurance Regulations; Conner then
agreed to comply with certain of these regulations. Nothing in this
sequence of events evidences a mutual manifestation of intent to enter a
contract. The inclusion of the five percent provision by the Bank Board
is insufficient, by itself, to change what is essentially a regulatory
relationship into a contractual relationship.517
L. REV. 135 (1995) (responding to Deal's article).512 See, e.g., In re Conner Corp., 127 B.R. 775 (E.D.N.C. 1991).
513 See, e.g., Wachtel v. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
5,4 In re Conner, 127 B.R. at 775.515 See id. at 780.
-
161 d. at 779.
517Id. at 780 (emphasis added).
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Perhaps the best way to rescue the court from its confusion about the
importance of bargaining is to emphasize the "regulatory relationship"
between the parties. This is consistent with viewing contracts as
agreements between legal equals, enforceable by virtue of their mutual
assent, not by virtue of one party's independent legal power over the other.
Similarly in RTC v. Tetco, Inc.,"'8 court set forth a rather fuzzy
distinction that ultimately depended on the presence or absence of specific
bargaining over the net worth maintenance agreement:
[T]he net worth condition in the Resolution granting deposit insurance
was a statement setting forth a regulatory condition. The net worth
stipulation in the Simms letter was merely an acknowledgment and
statement of assent to be bound by an order of the pertinent regulatory
authorities. The terms of the net worth agreement and the regulatory
approvals were never the subject of negotiations between the parties; their
scope and effect were preordained to the letter by the regulations. 19
The court went on to explain that the agencies had a regulatory
enforcement scheme, under statute,52° that would presumably allow for
enforcement of the provisions.521 The first line of net worth maintenance
cases seem to have reached the right result ultimately, but lacked a
persuasive theory for how to distinguish between a regulatory obligation
and a contractual obligation. Bargaining is certainly not necessary for
contract formation, and moreover, the regulatory approvals for these thrift
mergers often involved extensive bargaining, of which the net worth
maintenance provisions were a part. The distinction must lie in one party's
regulatory power over the other and the application of that power as a basis
for the obligation's enforcement.
This view of the net worth maintenance agreements is reflected in the
other line of cases in which the government tried regulatory enforcement
51' RTC v. Tetco, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 1159 (W.D. Tex. 1990), vacated upon
settlement, 1992 WL437650 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Munsingwear,
340 U.S. 36 (1950)).519 Id. at 1162-63 (emphasis in original). The courtwent on distinguish the trial
court decision in Winstar, which the RTC argued demonstrated that the regulatory
approvals were contracts. The court reasoned that the supervisory goodwill
promises amount to a commitment by the regulator not to look to the owners as a
"source of strength." Id. at 1164. This seems to fundamentally misunderstand the
goodwill provisions.
520 See 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
n2 See RTC, 758 F. Supp. at 1165.
1999-20001
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
theories. As mentioned above, the court in Wachtel v. United States
Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervisions denied adminis-
trative enforcement of a net worth maintenance agreement because the
statute required an additional showing of unjust enrichment to support a
restitution order. Earlier, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite result inAkin v. United States Department of Treasury, Office
of Thrift Supervision."2 In both cases, however, the courts viewed the
provisions as regulatory conditions, not contracts. Enforcement turned on
the scope of the agency's regulatory authority, not on the prior agreement
of the parties. Indeed, neither case questioned the fact that the thrift owners
had properly consented to the net worth maintenance conditions. Other net
worth maintenance agreement decisions, arising in various bankruptcy
disputes, are not inconsistent.524
A far more coherent body of law distinguishes between the
government's sovereign role and its private role in interpreting the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 52 Under the FTCA, the general rule for tort
liability is a congruence rule: "The United States shall be liable, respecting
the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but
shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or punitive damages." 6
But there is a very notable exception where the government acts in a
sovereign capacity:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
5 Wachtel v. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift
Supervision, 982 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
11 Akin v. United States Department of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision,
950 F.2d 1180 (5th Cir. 1992).
52 For example, inIn reDeltacorp, Inc., 111 B.R. 419 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990),
the court enforced a net worth maintenance relying on super-priority provisions of
11 U.S.C. § 365(o). See also Carlton v. Firstcorp, 967 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1992)
(holding that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to block a temporary cease-
and-desist order under 12 U.S.C. § 1818 which sought compliance with NWMA).
The court in In re Securities Groups, 116 B.R. 839 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), did
treat the net worth maintenance provision as a contract, but then found the contract
illegal for violation of restrictions on affiliate transactions.
s5 28 U.S.C. § 2671 etseq. (1988).526 1d. § 2674.
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regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based
upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.5
27
The line between the general rule and the "discretionary function"
exception tracks the distinction between sovereign and private capacity.
Courts have not had great difficulty defining a coherent line between the
two roles.52 For example, the court in Waymire v. United States29 applied
the discretionary function exception, despite arguments that it should not
apply to government contract employees. The court reasoned: 'Tirst, 'it is
the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs
.... Second, the discretionary function exception 'plainly was intended to
encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a
regulator of the conduct of private individuals. ' 530 The multitude of
possible factual scenarios has not lead to disarray or a problematic lack of
coherence to the FTCA's discretionary function exception.
The sovereign versus private distinction has appeared in numerous
other areas of the law as well, with roughly equal success as a coherent,
-'
7 Id. § 2680 (1974) (emphasis added).
I See, e.g., United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 334 (1991) (holding there
was immunity for FSLIC and FHLBB against a claim that their negligence
destroyed the economic value of the plaintiffs thrift); United States v. Varig
Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984) (finding no liability on a state tort claim for the
FAA when it delegated its aircraft inspections to manufacturer); Golden Pacific
Bancorp. v. Clarke, 837 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding there was immunity for
the Comptroller's decision to put the bank in receivership); Starrett v. United
States, 847 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting no immunity for the navy's
contamination of a missile site where the contamination violated the applicable
environmental regulations); cf Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988)
(rejecting the FDA's claim of the exception where plaintiff alleged that the FDA
acted in violation of its policy of testing all lots of vaccine prior to distribution).
See also Krent, supra note 165, at 1533-34 (arguing that sovereign immunity is
betterunderstoodas promoting majoritarian powerand separation of functions, and
that the FTCA discretionary function exception is consistent with these goals
because discretionary functions are much more effectively checked by political
processes than non-discretionary functions); see id. at 1545 n.57 (listing cases
interpreting the standard for the discretionary function exception).529 Waymire v. United States, 629 F. Supp. 1396 (D. Kan. 1986).




workable distinction. When the banking agencies serve as receiver for
insolvent banks, the agencies act in a private capacity because the agencies'
rights are based on the corporation's rights. 3' The Court recognized the
private half of this dual role in two recent decisions involving the
government receiver's rights. In O 'Melveny v. FDIC,532 the Court denied
the government's claims that its role in regulating the banking system
entitled the FDIC, as receiver, to special federal common law defenses not
available under state law. Similarly, in Atherton v. FDIC,5 3 the Court
recognized that the FDIC, when acting as a receiver, stands upon what are
essentially private causes of action and, in bringingthese suits, does not act
as a regulator when it sues bank insiders for negligence.
The Court in South Carolina v. UnitedStates"4 upheld a federal tax on
the sale of liquor as applied to a state-owned and operated liquor stores.
The Court reasoned that the state was acting in its private capacity in
selling the liquor and so was therefore not entitled to the exemption from
taxation recognized by early precedent:535
'Moreover, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there probably
was not one person in the country who seriously contemplated the
possibility of government, whether State or National, ever descending
from its primitive plant of a body politic to take up the work of the
individual or body corporate...
The Government was no competitor, nor did it assume to carry on
any business which ordinarily is carried on by individuals.536
In distinguishing numerous cases granting states immunity from federal
taxation, the Court wrote:
31 See, e.g., Texas American Bancshares, Inc. v. Clarke, 954 F.2d 329 (5th Cir.
1992).532 O'Melveny v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) (applying California common law,
not federal common law, to the issue of defenses available to a law firm defending
itself from the FDIC's tort claims as receiver for failed bank).
3 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1996) (applying the state common law
standard of care for directors of a failed federally chartered thrift, where the
common law standard is not more lenient than the federal statute's minimum
standard).
5 South Carolinav. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
5See id. at 459. The Court cited, inter alia, The Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 113 (1871) (holding that Congress lacked the power to tax the salary of a
state judicial official).
536 South Carolina, 199 U.S. at 457-58 (quoting an earlier Court of Claims
opinion) (39 Ct. Cl. 284 (1904)).
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It is also worthy of remark that the cases in which the invalidity of a
Federal tax has been affirmed were those in which the tax was attempted
to be levied upon property belonging to the State, or one of its muni-
cipalities, or was a charge upon the means and instrumentalities em-
ployed by the State, in the discharge of its ordinary functions as a
government.5
7
These decisions, while not controlling the question before us, indicate
that the thought has been that the exemption of state agencies and
instrumentalities from National taxation is limited to those which are of
a strictly governmental character, and does not extend to those which are
used by the state in the carrying on of an ordinary private business.5 8
Similar reasoning appeared in Cooke v. United States, 9 discussed above,
in which the Court found the government could not recover on forged
commercial paper it had accepted and paid for when it did not find the
forgery with reasonable speed but instead was negligently slow.
Laches is not imputable to the government, in its character as sovereign,
by those subject to its dominion.... Still a government may suffer loss
through the negligence of its officers. If it comes down from its position
of sovereignty, and enters the domain ofcommerce, it submits itself to the
same laws that govern individuals there. Thus, if it becomes the holder of
a bill of exchange, it must use the same diligence to charge [fraud by] the
drawers and indorsers that is required of individuals[.]5 °
The same distinction is implicit in the 1935 Gold Clause Cases in that the
Court, both the majority and the dissenters, relied on different reasoning in
two very similar cases. Nortz v. United States54" ' involved gold clauses in
government gold certificates which the Court found were equivalent to
currency and subject to the same level of regulation. Peny v. United
States 2 involved gold clauses in Treasury bonds, which the Court treated
like private contracts. If there were no distinction in the nature of the
original agreements-or in the government's role in entering into the
5
"
7 Id. at 459 (emphasis added).538 Id. at 461.
39 Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875).
o Id. at 398 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935).
M2 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935).
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original agreements-there would have been no need to write separate
opinions for these companion cases.543
1. Suggested Factors for Distinguishing
Between the Sovereign and Private Roles of Government
The cases and commentary that distinguish between the sovereign and
private roles of the government can be reduced to two factors. These
factors enable courts to coherently determine whether agreements reached
by a government agency should be treated as regulatory agreements or as
private contracts. As discussed above, regulatory agreements would be
enforceable only after the government has had the opportunity to raise the
unmistakability and express delegation doctrines, and the government
might get to raise the sovereign acts defense. Correspondingly, if the
factors indicate that the agreement is akin to a private contract, the only
special defense the government could raise is the sovereign acts doctrine.
The first factor simply applies the reasoning from Home Telephone &
Telegraph and AMTRAK by looking for a legislative intent to contract in
the language of the authorizing statute. If the statute uses language such as
"contract" or "agreement" or "mutually agreeable terms," then the
agreements resulting from this authority should be treated as contracts. The
proposed framework would then, somewhat redundantly, label this an
example of the government acting in a private capacity, without resort to
the second factor. If the statute does not show a clear intention to contract,
then this factor will be insufficient by itself. It should be clear by now that
the test from Home Telephone & Telegraph and AMTRAK elides the role
of the agency in reaching the agreement. Where an agency is involved, the
situation is complicated by the possibility that the agency seeks to bind
itself to a regulatory agreement without binding the sovereign. This is the
strength of the second factor.
The second factor begins by asking whether the agency, in reaching the
agreement, acted pursuant to a statutory mandate to regulate the private
party to the agreement. The alternative is that the agency does not regulate
the private party, but reached an agreement with it as a necessary adjunct
to its regulatory mission. Illustratively, hiring employees or leasing office
" See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-48 (1982);
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), ajfd by United States v. Illinois
Cent. R.., 154 U.S. 225 (1894); Hughes Communications Galaxy, Inc. v. United
States, 998 F.2d 953, 958 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that the unmistakability
doctrine was designed for the government in its sovereign capacity).
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space are private contracts, while agreeing to allow certain rates for utility
companies are regulatory agreements. Professor Schwartz, in analyzing the
Court's decision in POSSE finds this distinction helpful:
Somewhat more helpful may be the observation that the contractual
provision [in POSSE] abrogated was an integral part of "a regulatory
program" which "Congress retained authority to amend in the exercise of
its power to provide for the general welfare... ." In distinguishing Lynch
and Perry, the Court's opinion suggests a distinction between
conventional contracts that have private analogues, such as a contract to
repay borrowed money or to provide insurance in return for payment of
a premium, and uniquely governmental contracts that are integrally
intertwined with a regulatory or social service program of the
government, such as the section 418 agreements.... Such a distinction
has great practical importance; federal agencies may enter contracts as
part of the administration of their uniquely governmental regulatory
responsibilities that do not resemble typical private contracts.... The
agreements in Winstar appear to fall into this category.544
The difficulty presented by this factor is selecting the level of scrutiny
with which to determine the limits of the agency's regulatory power.
Fortunately, the decision will not present the sort of question Wachtel
presents of whether an agency has any power to perform the disputed
action. The question, instead, should be more focused on which authority
the agency relied upon: its regulatory powers specific to the counterparty,
or its corporate powers more generally employable with various counter-
parties? The factor thus focuses more on the relationship between the two
parties to the agreement.
Professor Speidel's insights fit neatly here as well: 4s if the breaching
action or regulation is caused by a different agency than the agency that
entered into the original agreement, the government's role in making the
original agreement was almost certainly private. Otherwise, the second
agency would not only share regulatory authority over the counterparty, but
its regulations would trump those of the agency making the original
agreement. While this may be possible, it should be rare. Under this
framework, therefore, the government, whether sued through the first or
'" Schwartz, Liability for Sovereign Acts, supra note 13, at 686 (citations
omitted).
" See Speidel, supra note 298.
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second agency, could raise the sovereign acts doctrine as a special contract
defense. Under the sovereign acts doctrine's intent analysis, it seems
unlikely that the government sought to take advantage of the second
agency's regulatory authority to relieve the government of the contract
made by the first agency.
The inverse of the second factor appears in situations where the
government faces market risks in seeking to reach the agreement. Has the
government "come down from its position of sovereignty,"' and in so
doing accepted the risks that no one will want to do business with it? Other
indicia are whether the government must compete with other buyers or
sellers, and whether the government derives a financial benefit from the
competition ofothers. A good example of government choosingto enter the
marketplace is the space shuttle program. The court in Hughes
Communications547 viewedthe program as a private enterprise: "The United
States government was then promoting commercial use of its shuttle fleet
by private industry to offset the costs of its space program. To further this
goal, NASA actively marketed its shuttles as launch vehicles for
commercial payloads to both domestic and foreign users." '548
One must be careful in applying this factor not to require a profit
motive per se. In this vein, language from Lynch is illuminating:
True, these contracts, unlike others, were not entered into by the United
States for a businesspurpose.... In order to effect a benevolent purpose
heavy burdens were assumed by the Government. But the policies,
although not entered into for gain, are legal obligations of the same
dignity as other contracts of the United States and possess the same legal
incidents.549
When hiring a private contractor, the government may benefit from
competition and save money for the taxpayer. It may even sell liquor or
lottery tickets to make money in a certain "business" sense. But focusing
on the profit is probably misleading. The government may benefit from
competition without a "business purpose" and when it does, it is likely to
assume market risks, including high prices and low supply. These
situations describe government's business, or private contracting role.
s Cooke v. United States, 91 U.S. 389, 398 (1875).
57Hughes Communications, 998 F.2d at 955 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
58 Id.
14' Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 576 (1934) (emphasis added).
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Ultimately, this inverse of the second factor is less determinative than
looking at the scope ofthe agency's regulatory authority. After all, the state
unmistakability cases, especially the local utility cases, could be seen as
examples of both regulation and market risk. The difficulty in these cases
arises from the fine distinction between, for example, a city chartering a
company to provide water for its residents, and the city purchasing water
to resell to them. In both cases, the city runs a market risk that no one will
accept a charter if the city prices the maximum rates too low. It makes
more analytical sense to conclude that there are elements of both
governmental roles in this relationship between the city and the utility
companies. The proposed framework, however, looks for the presence of
a significant sovereign role; it does not insist on characterizing the role as
purely sovereign or purely private.
There are two other factors that appear in the cases and commentary,
but these tend to muddy the issue and so should not be used. The presence
or absence of bargaining should not control the finding of a private contract
as opposed to a regulatory agreement. The net worth maintenance
agreement cases illustrate the difficulty with reliance on bargaining as a
test. Similarly, the adequacy of consideration should not be a factor. The
notion that bargains need to include mutuality of promises is simply not
consistent with regulatory agreements, such as enforcement orders (or even
criminal plea bargains) where the government's actions are essentially one-
sided precisely because it is exercising sovereignty over the counterparty.
Groos correctly rejected a challenge to a net worth maintenance agreement
for lack of consideration.
Conversely, a good example of the confusion that the search for
consideration can cause appears in Rapaport v. United States Department
ofTreasury, Office of Thrift Supervision,5 0 which struck down a cease-and-
desist orderrequiring compliance with a net worth maintenance agreement.
The OTS arguedthat the agency's approval of deposit insurance constituted
consideration for the regulatory approvals. The agency was not arguing for
the existence ofthe agreement, but instead for the value to the thrift owner
of the approval, in order to support its claim ofunjust enrichment. Deposit
insurance should satisfy common law standards for consideration, but the
court rejected the argument because the benefit did not meet a different
common law standard, i.e., that of unjust enrichment. Consideration is
probably present in some sense in most regulatory agreements, but that is
550 Rapaport v. United States Dep't of Treasury, Office of Thrift Supervision,
59 F.3d 212 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1073 (1996).
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not always the sort ofmutuality envisioned by contract law. Moreover, the
issue is less whether the agreements should be enforced than on what
theory and subject to which defenses and remedies.
Criticism of the distinction between the sovereign and private roles of
the government has focused on the difficulty in making the distinction
coherent and predictable, not on the need to make the distinction in order
to establish a broader framework of special defenses. Professor Arthur
Miller criticized the distinction as breaking down but did not explore the
legal implications of the breakdown.551 Miller's critique focused more on
the use of contractual conditions as a means of implementing social policy.
His analysis therefore makes no attempt to define the distinction legally or
to criticize the test itself. J.D.B. Mitchell first endorsed the distinction, but
later reconsidered and found that it broke down.552 In the latter article,
Mitchell argues that the several categories of governmental action (i.e.,
police power, taxation power, rate regulation, eminent domain, reserved
power) are coherent predictors of when the courts will uphold the
breaching action.553 Mitchell's reliance on the categories of police power
(among others) are subject to the same, if not worse, boundary problems,
especially on the federal level. A deeper problem with this reasoning as a
basis for criticizing the distinction between sovereign and private roles is
that it looks to the wrong governmental action. The nature of the
subsequent governmental action says little about the nature of the initial
agreement. Mitchell directly criticizes many of the unmistakability cases,
saying that "the operation by the municipality of a public utility
undertaking whether of water supply or telephones must surely be in
551 See Arthur S. Miller, Administration by Contract: A New Concern for the
Administrative Lawyer, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 957 (1961).
552 Compare Mitchell, A General Theory, supra note 286, at 83 (endorsing the
distinction); with Mitchell, The Treatment of Public Contracts, supra note 65, at
210-11 (criticizing it). Forahistorically interesting, but not particularly persuasive,
version of the critique, see Delmar W. Doddridge, Distinction Between
GovernmentalandProprietaryFunctions ofMunicipal Corporations, 23 MICH. L.
REV. 325 (1925). Doddridge analyzes six areas of law that make the distinction,
finding that it is workable in three. Of the three where he finds the distinction
wanting, his strongest argument is an analysis of several tort cases where immunity
was denied even though the government's role appeared public. His critique can
be fully answered, however, by noting that the line may be drawn more liberally
in torts than in contracts without any logical inconsistency, and he seems to
recognize this. See id. at 336.
s5 See Mitchell, The Treatment ofPublic Contracts, supra note 65, at 210.
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[government's] proprietary capacity."' s 4 More fundamentally, Mitchell
does not address how the failure to make the sovereign/private distinction
will undermine coherence in the broader jurisprudence bf regulatory
agreements.
Perhaps the strongest critique is that ofProfessor Janice Griffith.55 One
of her primary examples of the difficulty in making the distinction is a
comparison of two similar cases that reached opposite results. Both
involved municipalities that agreed to provide sewer services to people
outside their jurisdictions on the same terms and conditiois as they
provided the services to their residents.15 6 In Copper Country Mobile Home
Park v. Globe,557 the municipality subsequently raised the rates of the
nonresidents above the rates it charged residents. The Arizona Supreme
Court found the agreement a private contract and held the municipality
liable for breach. In Barr v. City Council ofAugusta,s" the municipality
enacted an assessment upon the nonresidents and the Georgia Supreme
Court upheld the new rates, rejecting the contract claim as an infringe-
ment on the sovereign power of the municipality. The results can be
reconciled under the proposed analysis: The fact that the Augusta resi-
dents in Barr did not challenge the subsequent assessment indicates that
Augusta probably had some sovereign power over the sewer users all along
and thus their agreement would have implicated the sovereign role of the
city. By contrast, the city in Globe presumably lacked sovereign power
over the non-residents and so could only affect rates with their consent,
i.e., via contract. Therefore, Globe could not raise the unmistakability
defense.
Given the multitude of state court decisions Griffith proposes to
reconcile at face value, without criticizing individual results, it is not
surprising that her proposed test is an extremely flexible five-factor test.
All five elements must be met in order to enforce the contract: (1) there
was no bad faith or fraud involved in formation of the contract; (2) the
contract does not undermine the political process; (3) the contract advances
a governmental interest that outweighs the loss of governmental control;
(4) the contract restrains governmental operations only as far and long as
necessary; and (5) the historical context has not changed so much that
5'4Id. at 228.
"
5 See Griffith, supra note 43, at 277.
..
6 See id. at 285 n.25.
... Copper Country Mobile Home Park v. Globe, 641 P.2d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982).
" Barr v. City Council of Augusta, 58 S.E.2d 820 (Ga. 1950).
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enforcement would work substantial harm to public. 59 The plasticity of
elements (3) and (4) strongly resembles the means-ends nexus analysis put
forth by the Supreme Court in Spannaus for interpreting the Contracts
Clause. The other elements, while not sufficient by themselves to constitute
a useful framework, are sound. The last, catch-all element should not be
immediately dismissed. Changing historical circumstances have appeared
as the rationale behind many major Supreme Court decisions, from Charles
River Bridge to Brown v. Board ofEducation,56 and it does have a certain
built-in limitation on the frequency of its use. I argue below that it should
be employed as a last-ditch escape for the sort of giveaways that survive a
generation and come to shock the conscience of the next generation.
2. Conventional Wisdom Has No Theory for the Enforcement
ofRegulatory Agreements Other than Private Contract Theory
In Charles RiverBridge 61 the Court briefly raised the issue ofwhether
the plaintiff's original charter constituted a contract under state law but
then side-stepped the issue:
[Plaintiffs] must show that the title which they claim was acquired by
contract.... The nature and extent of the ferry right granted to Harvard
College in 1650 must depend upon the laws of Massachusetts .... But in
the view which the court take of the case before them, it is not necessary
to express any opinion on these questions. For, assuming that the grant to
Harvard College, and the charter to the bridge company, were both
contracts, ... , still they cannot enlarge the privileges granted to the
bridge[.] 62
The Court thus treated the charters as contracts, apparently for lack of an
alternative theory. This theme runs through most of the cases discussed
herein to some degree. Declaring that the regulatory agreement is not a
contract raises the difficult question of whether it can be enforced against
the government in any way. After all, if the courts do not treat the
government as a legal equal, then it seems counterintuitive to allow the
regulated entity to require certain actions of the sovereign.
559 See Griffith, supra note 43, at 285-86.
soBrown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
161 Charles River Bridge Co. v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420
(1837).
s6 Id. at 540-41.
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This same fear-that calling regulatory agreements something other
than contracts will leave them completely unenforceable-probably
explains why the Winstar plurality prefaces its lengthy opinion with one
brief paragraph noting that it has ignored the underlying issue of whether
the acquisition approvals constituted contracts at all: "'The anterior question
whether there were contracts at all between the Government and
respondents dealing with regulatory treatment of supervisory goodwill and
capital credits, although briefed and argued by the parties in this Court, is
not strictly before us."563 As discussed in Part I, a lengthy discussion of
whether regulatory agreements constitute contracts would have raised too
directly the issue of whether they should be scrutinized under a due process
analysis as opposed to contractual analysis.5" The contracts analysis flows
coherently once chosen; the deeper issue is, of course, when contractual
analysis should govern.
This same pressure to treat regulatory agreements as contracts runs
through most commentary as well. Typical is this criticism of the
sovereign/private distinction written by Professor Griffith:
The most widely adopted test distinguishes between a municipality's
governmental and proprietary activities. This test is based upon the
nineteenth-century view that a local government is both a private
corporation that engages in proprietary actions and a public entity that
performs governmental functions. A municipality that contracts in
furtherance of its proprietary powers-acting in effect as a private
party-is obligated to perform the contract. On the other hand, a
municipality that contracts with respect to a governmental function is not
bound because public powers may not be contracted away or removed
from public control.565
563United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 860 (1996) (citations omitted).
4 Another example of this concern appears in Columbus Railway, Power &
Lightv. Columbus, 249 U.S. 399 (1919), where the company soughtto abandon its
franchise on the grounds that it had become unprofitable. The city objected and
argued that it had chartered the company while acting in itsprivate capacity. The
company argued the charter was "legislative" and therefore it granted only rights,
not obligations. See id. at 407. The Court found for the city, reasoning that the
charter was indeed a contract Cf. Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co.,
251 U.S. 32 (1919) (finding the company's franchise to have been granted by the
city acting in its proprietary capacity and holding the charter enforceable against
the city, which sought to remove the company's existing lighting systems prior to
expiration of the franchise without compensating the company).
565 Griffith, supra note 43, at 284 (emphasis added).
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Like most commentators, Griffith does not propose an alternative theory
of enforcing a regulatory agreement other than private contract law.
Without an alternative theory, the decision not to treat regulatory
agreements as contracts leaves the agreements as illusory promises,
creating enormous pressure on the courts to treat regulatory agreements as
contracts. Unfortunately, this confuses the applicability of the
unmistakability doctrine because it blurs the helpful distinction between
regulatory agreements and government contracts.
If municipal governments or government agencies were held to their
agreements under another theory, apart from private contract law or a
modified version thereof, there would be no need to fear a finding that the
regulatory agreement is not an ordinary contract, just as there would be no
need to conclude that government's promises are revocable at will. Far
from pushing towardthe result of illusory promises, the distinction between
the government's sovereign andprivate roles would clarify the rationale for
enforcing government's agreements. When acting as a sovereign, the
government should be allowed to raise the unmistakability doctrine. Under
the proposed framework, the government would first have to demonstrate
that the original agreement related not to private contractual matters, but
instead to the government's use of its regulatory powers. Thus, the
government would need to show that the actions at issue were subject to the
direct regulatory control of the government's sovereign power, and that,
therefore, the government's use of the defense would not spillover into
other situations more akin to typical procurement contracts.
Moreover, in the case of a federal agency, its regulatory agreements
could easily be enforced on a modified version of "arbitrary and
capricious" review under the Administrative Procedures Act: if the agency
makes an unmistakably clear promise not to change its regulatory treatment
of the counterparty, but then later changes its regulation of the counterparty
in the absence of a congressional mandate to do so, the new regulation
could be struck down as beyond the agency's remaining authority. The
APA remedy-an injunction-would not run afoul of the Anti-Deficiency
Act or the Appropriations Clause as interpreted by Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) v. Richmond.5" In this way, agreements made by an
agency relating to regulatory decisions within the.agency's control and
discretion would be binding, not illusory promises.
5 Office of Personnel Mgt. (OPM) v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990) (holding
that claims for money against the government are saved by the Appropriations
Clause if there is no statutory basis for paying out the money).
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This theory of enforcement better accounts for the statutory and
constitutional context in which administrative agencies operate. Agencies
frequently act within a wide range of discretionary options given to them
by broad or vague statutory language. Judicial recognition of the breadth
ofthe authority granted by any particular language should eventually make
clear that Congress sometimes passes the buck to the agencies to make
politically difficult decisions. Exercising discretion given to them by
Congress, agencies generally act with the knowledge that Congress could
effectively veto their actions either through direct legislation or, less
effectively but more readily, through its oversight functions. Just as with
the sovereign legislature, an administrative agency should be allowed to
make agreements concerning the exercise of its sovereign authority, but
with the same protection from giving away its sovereign authority by
implication. In light of the fact that government rarely makes agreements
directly, i.e., through statutes, but frequently makes agreements through
administrative agencies, it makes sense to have some predicate for the
enforceability of regulatory agreements. As long as that basis recognizes
the relationship between the parties is not that of legal equals, -and that the
governmental party needs to retain its sovereign authority in order to carry
out its primary mission of representing the will of the majority, there is no
difficulty. Other than recognizing the unmistakability doctrine and limiting
the remedy to an injunction, this theory of enforcement of regulatory
agreements need not look much different than contract law.
3. Reconciling the Recommended Factors
with Supreme Court Precedent
Despite the different rationale behind this framework as compared to
either existing case law or the proposals of various commentators, it is
consistent with nearly all Supreme Court decisions regarding regulatory
agreements, except Winstar. This section discusses a few of the more
salient decisions.
Historically, the distinction between the government's sovereign and
private roles has experienced the most difficulty in the municipal utility
cases. In the typical case, the city is both acting in its sovereign capacity
and taking market risks that it will have to change the terms of the charter.
Where the sovereign acts directly, the textual analysis from Home
Telephone & Telegraph and AMTRAK should suffice, as it has for the
Court's economic due process jurisprudence. The search for legislative
intent to be bound by contract rationalizes the state unmistakability cases,
discussed in Part I, because the statutes in these cases do not require
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agreement or consent, but instead authorize the municipality to fix, set, or
regulate rates. The relationship between the chartering entity and the
corporation is not that of legal equals. This holds true for the cases like
Charles River Bridge and the Sinking Fund Cases where the sovereign
itself grants the charter, and also for cases like Rogers Park and Home
Telephone & Telegraph where a municipality grants the charter relying on
authority delegated to it by the sovereign. Even under the second factor, the
municipalities are exercising their limited authority to charter utility
companies. It is less likely that if the government takes no market risks the
counterparties will reject the charter, but the presence of the regulatory
authority should suffice. After all, the government could be seen as taking
a market risk in using tax policy to encourage certain social outcomes when
it has not set the tax break or penalty high enough to achieve its ends, but
even Justice Souterwould agree that taxation is always a sovereign act. The
more important element is the presence of direct regulatory authority,
rather than the presence of market risk facing the government.
The utility congruence cases are generally consistent with the proposed
framework as well. For example, in Detroit Citizens ,,567 in which the Court
blocked the new rates, the relevant statutes required cities to issue
franchises "upon such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the
company and the township[.] 5 68 Therefore, under the reasoning of Home
Telephone & Telegraph andAMTRAK, the state's intention to be bound by
contract is made plain by the requirement of consent of both parties. The
state has come down from its position of sovereignty and requires treatment
of its municipality as a legal equal in this instance.
In Los Angeles City Water, the authorizing statute gave the city the
power to "regulate" water rates.569 This statute evinces a clear intention by
the legislature not to treat the utility charters granted under it as contracts.
Nevertheless, one could apply the second factor and reach the same result.
The agreement relates to regulation of rates, so it is an example of the city
acting in a sovereign capacity. The city later changed the rates, but the
Court blocked application of the new rates to the plaintiff because the
charter, with unmistakable clarity, "provided that they [i.e., the mayor and
the city council] shall not so reduce such water rates or so fix the price
thereof as to be less than those now charged by parties of the second part
for water."57 The city could have raised the unmistakability defense in Los
567 Detroit v. Detroit Citizens' St. Ry., 184 U.S. 368 (1902).
568 Id. at 373.
569 See Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City Water Co., 177 U.S. 558, 560 (1900).
570Id.
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Angeles City Water because the regulatory agreement was an exercise of
its sovereign power. The unmistakably clear language, however, would
have meant that the defense would not have won the case for the city. It
should be noted as well that the remedy in Los Angeles City Water, as in
the other utility congruence cases, was an injunction blocking application
of the new rates,"' not damages as Winstar would have provided.
Perhaps the only utility congruence case that would be reversed by the
proposed framework is Cleveland City Railway. In that case, the railroad
company had gone through several mergers, approved by various
ordinances. The company's original charter included a reservation of
authority to change rates, but subsequent ordinances approving combined
charters omitted the reservation of authority. The statutes, however, did not
at all speak in terms of contracting with the railroads: "[The City] Council
... shall have the power tofix the terms and conditions upon which such
[street] railways may be constructed, operated, extended, and
consolidated.""s The Court quoted from the ordinance's language on rates:
"no greater charge than 5 cents shall be collected,"'S"3 and then gave as its
most conclusive reason the lack of an applicable reservation of authority:
"In reason, the conclusion that contracts were engendered would seem to
result from the fact that provisions as to rates of fare were fixed in
ordinances for a stated time and no reservation was made of a right to alter
[them]."5 The Court declaredDetroit Citizens 'as controlling, even though
it would seem to indicate a contrary result.75 Cleveland City Railway
appears to be the only Supreme Court decision, other than Winstar, that the
proposed framework would reverse, but it should be noted that the error of
Cleveland City Railway is plain even within the jurisprudence of its own
era.
The more recent unmistakability cases are perfectly consistent with the
proposed framework and the distinction between sovereign and private
roles. The sovereign role of the government is clear in POSSE, where the
agreements at issue governed administration of social securitybenefits. The
government exercised direct regulatory control over the counterparties,
571 See id. at 583.
" Cleveland v. Cleveland City Ry., 194 U.S. 517, 534 n.1 (1904) (emphasis
added). The statutes also barred the city from permitting the railways to raise their
rates upon extensions of the lines, suggesting that the power to reduce rates might
be reserved.573 Id. at 535.




even though they were public agencies, because these agencies were
subject to the federal government's power to enact binding regulations, just
as private employers are.576 Similarly, inMerrion, the government acted as
sovereign because the agreement at issue-the sale ofa riverbed-involved
the government's constitutional power to regulate navigable waterways. -'
It is interesting to compare POSSE and Merrion to Appleby v. Delaney.578
In Appleby, the state contracted to sell tidewater land, later acquired by
plaintiffs. As construed by the New York state courts in a prior lawsuit, the
deed's covenants permitted owners to fill most of the land without the
city's permission, and the Court in Appleby struck down the city's
ordinance preventing the filling of the land. 7 9 The state in Appleby lacked
the underlying constitutional authority to regulate the land. Nevertheless,
it is unclear why the Court did not apply the unmistakability doctrine since
the Court did not seem to question the city's authority to regulate
construction at the site, other than by pointing to the contract. In any event,
the original sale in Appleby was made by the state in its private capacity.
The government acted in its private capacity in making each of the
agreements in the three landmark sovereign acts doctrine decisions. In
Deming, the agreement was a contract to provide food for the Union army.
In Jones, the government hired individuals to survey wilderness land. In
Horowitz, the government contracted to sell surplus silk at a certain date,
place, and price. In each case the government entity making the contract
did not have regulatory authority over the counterparty, and it therefore
assumed the market risk that no one would agree to the government's
terms. It would have been needlessly protective of sovereign authority in
these cases to allow the government to raise either the unmistakability or
express delegation doctrines.
This same private role appears in Fletcher v. Peck,58 where the
Georgia legislature sold huge tracts of land to speculators. Under the
proposed framework, the state would be allowed to raise the sovereign acts
doctrine but would lose because the revocation was specifically targeted at
revoking the original bargain. Fletcher is better seen as a takings case
576 Of course, POSSE raises federalism issues that went unaddressed by the
Court.57
1 See also United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 889 F.2d 1067
(Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that a federal agency's selection of a national bank as a
public depository was use of its sovereign authority, not a contract).
578 Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926).
579 See id. at 414.580Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
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because there was no longer an operative contract after the land had been
sold. The Court treated the "executed contract" just as an "executory
contract," i.e., one that has yet to be fulfilled by the parties, probably
because the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment had not yet been
incorporated against the states, as it now has. As discussed below, Fletcher
also illustrates the need to coordinate the law of special government
contract defenses with takings law, so as to avoid creating pressure on the
definitional differences between the two claims.
The courts have more directly faced the issue of the government's role
in cases involving municipal and other kinds of bonds. Under the proposed
framework, municipal bonds are private contracts because government has
no regulatory authority over the purchasers of the bonds simply because
they have purchasedthe particular bonds. Moreover, the government entity
is entering the market and exposing itself to the market risk of
undersubscription (or conversely, underpricing). In UnitedStates Trust Co.
v. New Jersey,581 the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey floated
bonds backed by the revenues and reserves of the Port Authority. Identical
statutory provisions enacted in 1962 in New York and New Jersey
prevented the Port Authority fromdiverting the pledged funds to subsidize
passenger rail transit. Then, in 1974, the states repealed the bar
retroactively and a bondholder brought suit. The Court struck down the
repeal, based on the Contracts Clause.8 2 The Court nodded to the reserved
powers doctrine, finding it bound up in "formalistic distinctions," but
nevertheless allowing "financial contracts" even though they might also
infringe on a police power: "[T]he States are bound by their debt
contracts.1 53 The Court did not define debt contracts, nor attempt to
distinguish them from agreements regarding taxation. But in a footnote the
Court elaborated on the government's role: "The truth is, States and cities,
when they borrow money and contract to repay it with interest, are not
acting as sovereignties. They come down to the level of ordinary
individuals. Their contracts have the same meaning as that of similar
contracts between private persons."584 This language probably came from
the earlier decision in Cooke, which treated the federal government like a
581 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
512 See id. at 32.
583 Id. at 24.




private contractor when it accepted forged commercial paper."5 In both
United States Trust and Cooke, the government set aside its role as
sovereign and met the bond-purchasers as legal equals. The state did the
same thing in South Carolina v. United States586 by entering into the
business of selling liquor to retail customers.
At least two local bond cases do not fit the pattern as neatly. In Keefe
v. Clark,87 the Court upheld a statute that rolled back a similar backing to
drainage district bonds. The state originally authorized the drainage district
to issue bonds and required districts to levy assessments on the covered
lands if necessary to pay the bonds in full. Later, the state passed another
statute allowing for the sale of lands encumbered by such assessment, but
the buyer would take encumbered title. Bondholders sued, but the Court
denied their claim. The Court applied a strict construction, essentially an
unmistakability presumption, citing the need to avoid restricting the state's
sovereignty.588 The Keefe decision, which predated United States Trust,
seems incorrect. The flaw in the Court's analysis, not surprisingly, appears
in its description of the sovereign power at issue:
Emphasizing the serious consequences of such a hobbling of the State's
powers to meet pressing problems, the [state supreme] Court pointed out
that the power of the State to sell tax-delinquent lands free of the burden
of assessments for completed drain projects was essential not only to
protect the bondholders themselves but to protect the public interest.
Without power in the State to offer an attractive title to prospective
585 See United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 28-32, where the Court applied a
means-end nexus analysis similar to that in Blaisdell and its later decision in
Spannaus. Under this analysis, the Court found that the repeal was not reasonably
necessary to serve an important public purpose. See also Schwartz, Winstar:
Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 490 n.35.
56 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (upholding a federal
tax on the sale of liquor by a state-owned seller). See also W.B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935) (striking down a law which so restricted creditor
remedies against municipal bonds as to make the bonds worth very little); W.B.
Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934) (striking down on Contracts Clause
grounds a state statute that exempted life insurance proceeds from judicial process).
In the Sinking Fund Cases, the Court upheld new restrictions on bonds floated by
the government to subsidize the railroads, but the statutes authorizing the bond
specifically reserved the power to Congress to amend the provisions of the statute.
See Central Pacific Ry. v. Gallatin, 99 U.S. 700 (1879).517 Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393 (1944).
588 See id. at 397.
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purchasers, the Court found, many of such lands would remain tax-
delinquent and thereby be rendered valueless for all public revenue
purposes, including drain assessments.589
In other words, the only two sovereign interests at stake were: (1) the
ability to sell any land so as to pay off bondholders at least in part, and (2)
"public revenue purposes." Neither of these interests amounted to a
regulatory interest. Indeed, it is clear that the bondholders were in no way
regulated by the state or the drainage districts, and that the state's real
interest in passing the subsequent legislation was simply to relieve itself of
the financial strain.
Less problematic is the Court's decision in Faitoute Iron & Steel Co.
v. Asbury Park,9 which upheld a law that extended maturity of the city's
bonds by thirty years and reduced the bond's coupon rate. Two factors
make the case reconcilable withthe proposed fiamework. First, the reduced
.obligations were authorizedpursuantto a state reorganization statute which
the Court concluded did not improperly infringe on federal bankruptcy
powers. Second, the bonds were not backed by a specific project or
property but were general obligation bonds effectively backed by the city's
taxation authority.5 91 This makes the bonds look a little less like a method
by which the city entered the marketplace for funds for a specific project.
It is also true that making good on such bonds during fiscal hard times
would affect the city's sovereign powers. But making an exception for
general obligation bonds places too much emphasis on the specific backing
for the bond. Under the proposed framework, the city is entering the market
for funds and taking the market risks that the bonds will be undersub-
scribed or underpriced; the city does not regulate the bondholders as such.
Faitoute Iron is better understood as an example of the permissible reach
of state bankruptcy laws under an old bankruptcy regime.
Most commentators see the Court's decision in Lynch as standing for
a congruence ideal in government contracting. 92 InLynch, the government
provided as a benefit to veterans of World War I life insurance
underwritten by the government pursuant to the War Risk Insurance Act. 93
The Act required payment ofpremiums to offset the cost of the insurance,
589 Id. at 396.
5 oFaitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
591 See id. at 508-10.
592See, e.g., Schwartz, Winstar: Triumph ofCongruence, supra note 13, at 491;
see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 884-85, 895 (1996).
93See Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 574-75 (1934).
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which exceeded the total receipts from premiums. 594 Congress later
repealed the benefits entirely, and the Court struck down the repeal. Under
the proposed framework, this insurance is an example of the govern-
ment contracting in its private capacity. Benefits incident to employ-
ment or military service are generally contracts because they are offered
as part of the government's efforts to find the market price for labor.
The factors clearly distinguish this form of quid pro quo benefit from
broader government benefits distributed as part of a social program
or policy, such as Social Security. The sort of payments one normally
refers to as government benefits do not involve a market risk that
the government is either bidding too high or too low to fulfill the other
need driving the government's entry into the market. Instead, Social
Security involves a direct form of regulation of wage earners through
their employers. The Social Security Administration has the authority to
require payroll deductions from workers' paychecks. Wage earners cannot
opt out. The program serves a broad social goal of providing living
incomes for the elderly and disabled. As such, benefits are modified
frequently by Congress, without creating any contract liability for the
government.
The Lynch Court distinguishes between contracts, like the life
insurance, and "gratuities" such as "[p]ensions, compensation allowances
and privileges"5 95 by noting that "[t]he benefits conferred by gratuities may
be redistributed or withdrawn at anytime in the discretion of Congress. 596
The Court goes on to apply a sort of reverse unmistakability presumption:
"[N]o power to curtain the amount of the benefits which Congress
contracted to pay was reserved to Congress. 597 This presumption is logical
because one would not read into a private contract the power of one party
to alter the terms later. The Court goes on, however, with reasoning that
should have given Souter pause:
Contracts between individuals or corporations are impaired within the
meaning of the Constitution whenever the right to enforce them by legal
process is taken away or materially lessened. A different rule prevails in
respect to contracts of sovereigns .... "The contracts between a Nation
and an individual are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign and
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have no pretensions to compulsive force. They confer no right of action
independent of the sovereign will."598
The Court explained that this means the government is allowed to waive its
sovereign immunity and later reinstate it at will. "For immunity from suit
is an attribute of sovereignty which may not be bartered away."599 The
Court finally makes clear that had Congress merely withdrawn the
veterans' access to ajudicial remedy for denial of their insurance proceeds,
the legislation would have passed scrutiny.' Somehow the incidents of
private contract present in the insurance policies indicated that Congress
intended to create private "rights" protected by the Constitution.
This tortured reasoningputs tremendous emphasis onthe government's
sovereign immunity. 6°1 When one analyzes Lynch's full reasoning, the
decision hardly seems a strong example of congruence, as Schwartz and the
majority opinions in Winstar suggest.' Instead its language, much like that
from Cooke, should be read as only describing one of the two government's
roles: "When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and
duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts
between private individuals." 3 Since the government offered the insurance
in its private capacity, private contract rules should apply. The government
would lose under the sovereign acts doctrine as well because the
subsequent breaching legislation was narrow and targeted at repealing the
contract obligations. In sum, Lynch provides far more support for the
proposed framework than for the any of the majority opinions in Winstar.
Similar support for the proposed framework appears in the three Gold
Clause Cases, which all denied the liability claims against the government
when Congress removed the country from the gold standard and banned
private ownership of gold. The agreements in Norman were contracts
between two private parties. InNortz, the agreements were gold certificates




"o It also puts pressure on the distinction between rights and remedies and
encourages Congress to pursue an indirectmethod of reneging on the government's
promises.
' See Schwartz, Winstar: i'umph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 490 n.35
and 491; see also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 884-85, 895
(1996).
603Lynch, 292 U.S. at 579 (citing Cooke, inter alia).
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issued by the Treasury attesting to the availability of gold for the
beneficiary. The Court had a relatively easy time denying liability in these
two cases by relying on Congress's authority to regulate currency. The
government hadnot entered into bargains with the plaintiffs inNorman; the
certificates in Nortz functioned like money. In the third case, Perry,
however, the agreements were government bonds which included clauses
requiring payment in gold-backed currency. Under the proposed
framework, government bonds are treated as private contracts. Therefore,
the government would be allowed to raise only the sovereign acts doctrine
as a defense. Since the legislation has a public and general effect, the de-
fense would succeed and the government would escape liability. The
Court's reasoning is easily reconciled to this framework. First, it found
that the government had breached its contracts with the bondholders. But
then the Court found it impossible to calculate damages.' A modem
summary of the Court's reasoning might conclude that the Court viewed
wealth, as measured by money, as a relative concept. Since everyone
suffered the same reduction in wealth, no one suffered any (justiciable)
harm. As mentioned above, this reasoning is perfectly consistent with the
sovereign acts doctrine. Perry fits perfectly within the proposed
framework. 65
One could also test the proposed distinction between the government's
two roles by looking at federal deposit insurance, or even federal crop
insurance orthe federal insurance of employee pension funds. In each case,
the specific insurance contract should be seen as a government contract
entered into by the government in its proprietary capacity. It is true that the
government requires these forms of insurance as preconditions for other
regulatory advantages, such as the authority to accept deposits or to get
certain government-backed agriculture loans. But persons who do not have
the insurance are free to choose whether to accept it, along with the
privileges and conditions set by the government.6 Moreover, there is no
need to conclude, as Souter apparently does in Winstar,6°7 that the mere
presence of a contractual relationship converts all the related regulatory
agreements into contracts. Souter omits, for example, that the insurance
6 See Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 300, 354-58 (1935).
65 It is also true that the separate opinions in Norman and Perry strongly
suggest that the Court distinguished between private contracts and government
contracts.
6
' This choice supports the due process theory of heavily regulated industries.
6 SeeUnited States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 894 (1996) (reasoning that
deposit insurance has both sovereign and proprietary aspects).
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does not cover the thrifts, but instead covers its depositors. Souter is
probably correct when he predicts that the government's two roles are
likely to appear intertwined more often in the future,608 but from this he
concludes that it is appropriate to require damages for changes in
regulatory policies. The sounder conclusion is that the need to reliably
differentiate between the roles the government assumes in reaching
agreements will only grow.
D. The Four Defenses within the Proposed Framework
The unmistakability doctrine is unquestionably such a powerful
defense that it should be limited to a clearly defined and narrow set of
circumstances.1 Although many cases have recognized its merit, none
have explained how to determine whether it should apply. After reading
cases such as Charles River Bridge, one could easily conclude that the
unmistakability doctrine amounts to a public policy exception to the
enforceability of government contracts when those contracts strike terribly
imbalanced bargains. In accordance with the expression that one does not
get rich working for the government, it is advisable to cap the riches one
can extract from the public fisc by contracting with the government.
Charles River Bridge might reasonably stand for such a public policy
exception, with the threshold being that only one or two generations of
taxpayers need to suffer for the sake of upholding the government's
contracting reputation.610 Such a threshold might be high enough by itself
8 See id. at 894 ("such fusion [of government's two roles] will be so common
in the modem regulatory state").
6 If private parties to regulatory agreements could somehow have better
information aboutthe unmistakability doctrine, there would be far less need to limit
it, however. Private parties would need only to bargain for what Souter refers to as
a "second promise" by the government not to change its regulatory policy. See id.
at 887. Earlier in his reasoning, Souter as much as admits that the parties could
bargain around whatever rule the Court imposed: "To be sure, each side could have
eliminated any serious contest about the correctness of their interpretive positions
by using clearer language." Id. at 869.
610 Cf. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 515 (1942)
(noting that legislation struck down in a prior decision "was found 'to have taken
from the mortgage the quality of an acceptable investmentfor a rational investor")
(emphasis added); County of Stanislaus v. San Joaquin & King's River Canal &
Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201,214 (1904) (upholding new lowerrates despite water
company's charter, and reasoning that "[o]ther circumstances might exist which
would show the original rates much too large for fair or reasonable compensation
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to limit the reach of the umnistakability doctrine enough to protect the
government's contracting reputation.61' Chief Justice Rehnquist seems to
view the unmistakability doctrine along these lines, at least in part:
The wisdom of this principle arises, not from any ancient privileges of the
sovereign, but from the necessity of protecting the federal fisc-and the
taxpayers who foot the bills-from possible improvidence on the part of
the countless Government officials who must be authorized to enter into
contracts for the Government.61
2
This simple understanding of the unmistakability doctrine focuses on the
fallibility of the officials who make the original agreement. This focus is
probably more accurate than the concerns in Fletcher that "sudden and
strong passions" 3 might tempt subsequent legislatures to repudiate
government contracts. Because the government has developed, since the
time of Fletcher, such a strong reputation as a contracting partner, the
benefit of protecting that reputation seems to provide sufficient restraints
on subsequent legislatures. Indeed, the government is probably the ultimate
long-term player and so probably has a much stronger incentive to protect
its reputation than other corporate players in the market. This is true even
though the government's reputation as a contracting partner is better
understood as a series of reputations attached to both the government as a
whole, represented by the Treasury's ability to pay, and to each of the
government's agencies. Viewing the unmistakability doctrine as balancing
the need to let the government out of bad agreements with the need protect
at thepresent time") (emphasis added).
611 Indeed, if the regulatory agreements in Charles River Bridge and the
unmistakability cases are contracts, then these decisions have somehow managed
not to ruin the government's contracting reputation yet.
612 Winstar, 518 U.S. at 937 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Cf Schwartz,
Winstar: Triumph of Congruence, supra note 13, at 551-52. Schwartz interprets
this passage as ultimately reflecting Rehnquist's concern that contracting officials
might violate the Anti-Deficiency Act by agreeing to indemnify the private parties
for changes in the applicable regulations. It is better to read Rehnquist's Anti-
Deficiency concern as a criticism of Souter's scheme of liability under the Tucker
Act than as a concern that contracting officials would violate the Anti-Deficiency
Act by misunderstanding their authority. Rehnquist treats the risk-shifting promise
in Winstar not as part of the intent of the parties, but as a promise implied in law
and imposed essentially by the plurality. See Winstar, 518 U.S. at 930 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
613 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137-38 (1810).
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the government's reputation would justify conceptualizing the doctrine as
a public policy exception to contract enforceability.
But such a reading of the unmistakability doctrine does little to clarify
when the doctrine should apply, which is the key issue. The proposed
framework cabins the unmistakability doctrine to the appropriate situations.
The first factor, from Home Telephone & Telegraph and AMTRAK, will
suffice where the sovereign itself has entered into the agreement at issue
through passage of legislation. The proposed distinction between the
sovereign and proprietary roles of the government takes advantage of the
fact that governmental power is generally exercised, and regulatory
agreements generallyreached, through agencies with limited subject matter
authority. The proposal synthesizes the various strands ofthought from the
relevant case law, yet condenses these ideas into sufficiently few factors to
produce predictable results. It shouldproduce more predictable results than
either the five-element test proposed by Professor Griffith or the sliding
scale proposedby Professor Schwartz. Moreover, the sovereign/proprietary
distinction already serves as a major barrier to tort claims against the
government. It is wise to use similar analysis for these areasof law so as
not to create definitional pressure between claims that could be
characterized as either contract or tort.
Moreover, the advent of the modem administrative state should
minimize this difficulty. Owing to the development of general corporation
laws, the government exerts very little sovereign regulatory authority
through terms in corporate charters. As a general rule, chartering
authorities have come to impose only the obligation to follow the laws,
which the sovereign can change independently from the charter. Plaintiffs
will seldomclaim the charters themselves are contracts. Therefore, this
difficulty is not likely to appear in the typical case, but only in the unusual
cases, like Winstar, where the sovereign chooses to impose more specific
regulatory provisions in the charter. Second, sovereigns generally act
through administrative agencies, both to issue corporate charters and to
regulate them. This element of administrative delegation provides the basis
for enforcing, against the agency, the promises it has made to the
corporation in the charter. This alternate basis for enforcement relieves the
pressure to treat the charter as a contract in order to hold the agency to its
promises. A determination that the government acted in both capacities in
issuing the charter need not create much analytical confusion. Focusing the
analysis of the factors on the disputed provision should resolve any
lingering confusion.
In the municipal utility cases, the disputed provisions involved the
government's power to regulate rates, a sovereign function. Similarly in
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Winstar, the provision at issue was regulation of capital levels. Conversely,
the provisions at issue in Lynch were payment of insurance benefits, not the
government's ability to regulate insurance contracts. Of course, Congress
could have exercised its Commerce Clause authority to regulate the
insurance contracts at issue in Lynch, but it did not. Moreover, the agency
that made the contract did not have regulatory authority over life insurance.
Once again, the government's widespread reliance on agencies clarifies the
analysis considerably because agencies do not have plenary sovereign
power, only limited authority. These limitations are of tremendous
assistance in determining whether the agency is acting in a sovereign
capacity.
The proposed framework provides a logical theory for enforcing
regulatory agreements against the agencies that make them, and thereby
avoids treating these agreements as illusory agreements, even when the
agency does not have the authority to bind Congress. This would increase
the effectiveness of agencies to pursue experimental policies, while still
leaving Congress the ability to overrule these experiments without having
to purchase the right to do so from the regulated entities. At the same time,
it gives the regulated entities assurance that they can enforce the regulatory
agreements against the agency should the agency decide on its own that it
would prefer to rescind the agreements. This aspect of the proposed
framework is unique; the proposals of Griffith and Schwartz do not touch
on this facet of delegation at all, nor do they propose an alternative basis
for the enforcement of regulatory agreements. Rather, their proposals work
entirely within a contractual perspective and look for rational exceptions
to contractual rules. The more complete, logical approach is to retreat a
step and recognize the applicability of the due process perspective andthen
address the threshold question of which perspective is more applicable in
a given situation. The proposed framework accomplishes this without
overturning any major precedent, except Winstar, and without requiring
any amendments to the Administrative Procedures Act. More generally,
recognition of the delegation issue is essential to squaring a general theory
of government contracts with the post-New Deal reality of the
administrative state. In this light, Winstar's hostility to the administrative
state becomes all too clear.
The proposed framework would apply equally well to both state and
federal regulatory agreements and contracts. From the perspective of the
private party, it should not make significant difference whether the
governmental party is state or federal in judging the agreement's validity
and enforceability. Even Winstar acknowledges that the sovereignty-
protecting function of the unmistakability doctrine traces back to inherent
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attributes of sovereignty applicable to both state and federal govern-
ments.614 Certainly, the trend in the Court's Contracts Clause jurisprudence
has been to relax its scrutiny of state legislation infringing on contract
rights to the point where the scrutiny is close to the deferential due process
review accorded federal legislation that similarly infringes contract rights.
Whatever one thinks of the trend, Winstar fits poorly into the surrounding
jurisprudential landscape.
The proposed frameworkwould apply the sovereign acts doctrine to all
government agreements, i.e., both government contracts and regulatory
agreements.Horowitz, Jones, andDeming clearly contemplate government
contracts that fall on the proprietary side of the framework's initial
distinction. Analytically, it is more difficult to decide what to do on the
sovereign side. But the difficulties ought not pose much of a practical
problem in light of historical examples. Every instance of a regulatory
agreement scrutinized in these cases was breached by subsequent
legislation that would have failed the public and general test of the
sovereign acts doctrine. For example, the new lower rates in the
unmistakability cases, the new competing charter in Charles River Bridge,
the repeal of the opt out provisions in POSSE, and the termination of
supervisory goodwill in Winstar.
It is certainly conceivable that a comparatively narrow'regulatory
agreement could be rolled back by a subsequent, broader piece of
legislation; in such a case, the same need to protect the government's
ability to enact new laws exists. A relevant hypothetical example would
have the banking agency promising to recognize goodwill (and not to
change its regulation), relying on delegated authority to bind the
government as a whole, but being forced to breach the agreement by much
broader legislation from Congress (for example, by legislation banning
recog-nition of goodwill in mergers of all types of corporations). The
original promise was unmistakably clear, but because of its narrow scope
relative to the subsequent breaching legislation, it does not make sense that
it should effectively limit the government's ability to pass other broader
legislation.
In any event, the unlikelihood of this issue arising under the proposed
framework suggests that this particular rule is not essential to the
framework's success. After all, even in this hypothetical, the difference in
scope of the original promise and the subsequent breaching legislation is




not so great that the latter obviously qualifies as public and general. 61  What
is essential to the framework's success is that the government could raise
the sovereign acts doctrine when it reached its original agreement in its
private capacity and that, in such cases, the government could not raise the
other special contract defenses.
Moreover, the congressional intent element implicit within the
sovereign acts doctrine should also help to minimize abuses by Congress.
It also seems that the alternative-blocking the government from raising
the sovereign acts defense for regulatory agreements-invites the creation
of another public policy exception. While this sort of reasoning can often
be justified in particular cases, it is submitted that a reasoned basis is a
preferable theory, as it allows greater predictability in general as well as
clearer bases with which to compare the exceptional cases.
In addition to the rationality and predictability of results stemming
from adoption of the proposed framework, it would greatly reduce tht
definitional pressure that Winstar creates between government contract la,"
and takings law. Under the proposed framework, damage awards ar
available only under the Tucker Act, when the government has contractec
in its private capacity. Regulatory agreements are enforceable vi
injunctions under the APA.
For contracts reached in the government's private capacity, it coulc
raise only the sovereign acts doctrine, in addition to traditional contrac
defenses. Under the sovereign acts doctrine, the government would neec
to show that the subsequent, breaching legislation had a public and genera
effect. As discussed in Part I, this standard closely resembles the singling
out standard from takings law. Proof of being singled out is not, of course
always sufficient to make out a takings claim, and so there would still bc
numerous claimants who might do better by bringing a Tucker Act clain
than a takings claim. The proposed framework shines on this point
however, when compared to the Winstar regime. Under Winstar, the onl,
apparent threshold issue for coming under its generous damages rule i
evidence of some form of agreement, license, or approval from th
government to form the plaintiff's so-called contract with the government
The inevitable result will be unguided arguments and unpredictabli
decisions about the threshold definitional issue of whether the plaintiff'
approval or license constitutes a sufficient contract to take advantage o
Winstar. This can only harm both the government contracts and taking
jurisprudences and clog the appellate courts.
615It might fail Schwartz's complete generality test, for example.
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CONCLUSION
Viewed strictly from within the assumptions and perspectives applied
by the majority opinions, Winstar makes some logical sense. Apparently
driven by the desire to avoid the appearance of overturning any precedents,
however, the plurality opinion demonstrates a disappointing intellectual
disingenuousness. For it is the selection of the contractual perspective that
ultimately controls the outcome, but this selection is never analyzed. Even
within the contractual perspective, however, the majority opinions miss two
key aspects of the parties' intentions. First, the rationality of the
supervisory goodwill cannot be separated from the NWMAs. To say that
the thrift owners would have been crazy to agree to the approvals without
the supervisory goodwill should force a recognition that the thrift agencies
would have been just as crazy to approve the mergers without the NWMAs.
Since the courts have generally struck down the NWMAs-reasoning that
they amount to regulatory agreements and therefore not contracts-the
Court in Winstar creates confusion by failing to explain whether its ruling
overturns this contrary finding relating to the very same category of
agreements.
Second, Winstarfailsto implement the likeliest intention ofthe parties:
that the agreements would bindthe banking agencies but saidnothing about
Congress or the Treasury. As Rehnquistpoints out in dissent, the plurality's
Hoimesian presumption of a damages promise seems to violate the rule in
government contracting against promises implied in law.
But the greater analytical failing is Winstar's failure to address the true
threshold issue of which perspective to apply to regulatory agreements.
Because governmental agreements are equally susceptible to two very
different analyses, the distinction between the government's sovereign and
private roles is essential to clear analysis of the law governing these
agreements. Currently, court decisions must be analyzed by comparing
facts and outcomes because the opinions do not address either the
difference of perspective or the parallel tension between the need to protect
the power of the current majority to govern and the reasonable reliance
interests of individuals.
Prior to Winstar, the law of regulatory agreements consisted of a series
of unstable, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory exceptions to
contract law. Although Winstar did not create these problems, it made
matters worse by using the case law's failure to clarify the implicit
threshold issue-when do these defenses apply?-and insert a wholly new
rule that virtually overrules the special defenses entirely. The resulting




In addition to the damage done to the law of regulatory agreements,
Winstar destabilizes the surrounding takings, economic due process, and
the Contracts Clause jurisprudences by creating an unhealthy definitional
pressure between these claims. Instead of facing the jurisprudence that has
built up over two hundred years regarding takings, and which has
consistently rejected a conservative regulatory takings regime, the plurality
in Winstar outflanks this jurisprudence and installs its functional
equivalent. The message to would-be takings plaintiffs could not be clearer.
All the while the Court can disingenuously claim not to have overruled its
precedents in these other areas. After all, by avoiding any discussion of
whether the supervisory goodwill provisions constituted contracts, the
Court left open the issue of whether any regulatory agreement would
suffice as a contract, including whether virtually any sort of license, grant,
approval, or charter could also qualify.
Perhaps the theoretical weaknesses in the opinion will ultimately
weaken Winstar as a precedent. There is the initial difficulty in discovering
the basis for the holding. If it is simply based on the Tucker Act, then it
seems to contradict the Court's holding in Hercules that the government
cannot be held to contracts implied in law (precisely the sort of
presumption advocated by Winstar). Moreover, if the basis is the Tucker
Act, then the plurality's discussion of the Due Process Clause as the basis
of the special defenses is incorrect. If it is statutory, presumably Congress
could and should overrule it by limiting the Tucker Act to government
contracts based on the distinction between the government's sovereign and
private roles, just as it has under the Federal Tort Claims Act. If Winstar is
somehow constitutionally required, then does it apply equally to state
regulatory agreements? If not, then the states, which must comply with the
Contracts Clause, would seem to enjoy a much stronger defense than the
federal government, which has traditionally been limited only by the more
lenient standards of the Due Process Clause. On any of these groundings,
Winstar makes little sense doctrinally.1 6
In sum, Winstar handcuffs the ability of Congress to update the policies
tried by regulatory agencies. It is simply disingenuous to claim that
payment of damages for changing policies does not restrict the sovereign
616 Cf Levy, supra note 130, at 329. Professor Levy describes a process of
"reinvigoration and retreat" in which conservative constitutional property theories
advance but ultimately face pressure to retreat growing out of theirweak theoretical
underpinnings. Id. See also id. at 357-58 (arguing that regulatory takings is the
latest advance of conservative thought on property, but it too will ultimately be
forced to retreat).
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power of government. When the Founding Fathers gathered to draft the
Constitution, they debated initially about whether to form a democracy or
a republic. The republic famously emerged, but with democratic ideals
intact. Those seeking to protect vested property rights could not select a
better system of government than a republic, designed as it is to protect
individual rights. But this individual liberty has always been balanced by
the democratic need to allow the majority room to govern. The tension
between these two strands of political theory has long defined our
constitutional history. Winstar's greatest sin can be summarized as
throwing balance to the wind and validating only the individual values so
well protected by a republican system. Winstar makes no serious effort to
protect the other strand of American political theory: democracy. The price
of this begins at $30 billion and will go up from there when other
regulatory policies are updated.
The proposed framework, by contrast, suffers none of these glaring
faults. It clarifies the operation of each of the special contract defenses and
their relationships to one another. The unmistakability doctrine must, of
course, be limited to apply only when sovereign power is at issue. It makes
no sense for typical government contracts. The express delegation doctrine
should be updated in two ways. First, it should be made clearer when an
agency is bound to its promises and, second, should allow Congress to
change outdated or unwise regulatory policies. But again, the government
should not be able to raise the defense when it acts as a private contractor.
Both the unmistakability and express delegation doctrines should work to
improve the accountability for binding agreements by more specifically
locating the decisionmakers.
At the same time, the government should be allowed to raise the
sovereign acts defense when the original agreement was made in the
government's private capacity. The missing link in this logic has been
distinguishing between the government's roles as sovereign and private
contractor. The proposed frameworkprovidesjust such aworkable test, one
that seems to have worked well under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Finally, the proposed framework fits much more comfortably than
Winstar with the adjacent areas of law. In the case of a typical government
contract, a plaintiff would see very similar standards under the Takings
Clause and under the sovereign acts doctrine: both would ask whether the
plaintiffhas been unfairly singled out or if the breaching action has a public
and general effect. Plaintiffs suing based on reliance on a regulatory
agreement would face the unmistakability doctrine as a defense or the
Court's traditional reluctance to allow a regulatory takings theory.
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The proposed framework thus minimizes the definitional pressure
between similar types of claims. This rough harmony in legal standards
encourages a more honest debate about the standards that ought to govern
these types of claims, instead of the fractionalized and misleading debates
within each area. Most importantly, the proposed framework reaches a
much more effective balance between the right of current majorities to
govern effectively and the rights of individuals to rely on government
promises.
